370 special forces detachment. Flag "16 OBrSpN

At the beginning of January 1985, having marched by rail, the detachment arrived in Chirchik at the base of the 56th Air Assault Brigade, which was already fulfilling its international duty in the DRA.

On January 13, the 334th special forces unit arrived there, and on January 16, the 186th special forces unit arrived there, and the three detachments jointly began combat training in the mountainous area.

On the night of March 12, 1985, the detachment was alerted and, having completed a combined march along the Chirchik-Kushka route, entered the DRA in full force on March 16. The column with equipment, equipment and property was very impressive - 275 units. They carried everything that was necessary to ensure life in the new place. Having completed a two-day march in a combat situation along the route Kushka - Herat - Girishk - Lashkar Gah, on March 18 the detachment arrived at the temporary deployment point. It was located 2 km southeast of the city of Lashkar Gah at the junction of the Arghandab and Helmand rivers. A tent camp was quickly set up and water purification from the river was organized. Then the detachment personnel began to study the area of ​​​​upcoming military operations in the provinces of Lashkar Gah and Nimruz, which was up to 300 km along the front and in depth.

On January 5, 1987, a group under the command of Major E.G. Sergeev, who later served in the 16th brigade, flew out to reconnaissance the area for the upcoming ambush operations. Having entered the Meltanai Gorge at an extremely low altitude, she encountered a group of Mujahideen who began to flee into the green area. Sergeev opened fire, and the helicopter commander launched missiles and began to land. Strange pipes and a diplomat were discovered on the ground, which, as it turned out later, contained instructions for using the Stinger. American MANPADS, which were hunted by various departments, were first taken by Soviet special forces and personally by Major Sergeev and his subordinates. Only 25 years after the accomplished feat, on May 6, 2012, Sergeev E.G. was awarded the title of Hero of Russia. Lieutenant Colonel Sergeev E.G. died in 2008.

Losses of the 370th Special Forces in Afghanistan - 47 people.

Article about them, "Brother" magazine.

Tests strength, endurance and precision of every movement. Participants in large-scale competitions had to not only shoot accurately or defuse mines, but also hit a needle with a thread.

Special forces teams are detaining criminals, examining house by house. One wrong move and the tripwire is triggered. Everything here is as close as possible to combat conditions. Now the team needs to urgently provide medical assistance to the wounded man.

Competitions of special forces of the Russian Guard are held in the Smolensk region, models of settlements are built here - a small village or a high-rise building. In their work, special forces must quickly make decisions and adapt to any situation. Competitions of this scale are being held for the first time; SOBR and OMON soldiers take part in them together with military special forces units.

“We, SOBR officers, are at such competitions for the first time, we take something for ourselves from these competitions, share with others, for example, in storming buildings, we met with many of our comrades with whom we served before, but our paths diverged to different structures, in different units,” says a SOBR employee.

Every day of competition there are new challenges. The obstacle course is being replaced by another new feature - the Guards Biathlon. The team runs the distance at speed, and at the same time fires from different weapons - from a pistol to a grenade launcher.

“This is exactly the composition of the unit that is going on a combat mission. A full-fledged squad that can be used to work for a week, two weeks, a month, or for detention. There are specialists, a sniper, a machine gunner, a grenade launcher, all the rest are shooters with machine guns,” says a SOBR employee.

They need to hit the target and run as fast as possible, but the finish line is another test, and perhaps the most difficult one. The fighters must try to thread the needle.

At first glance, nothing special, but not after you’ve made a forced march in full gear, fired off a magazine, or ran in a gas mask. The test of the needle seems to remind us that even in the midst of the most intense battle, there are moments when a fighter must calm down, pull himself together and be as focused as possible.

This is how strength and endurance are tested: first you need to carry giant logs, then these wheels, 300 kilograms each - inhuman loads, but then more - the soldiers push a 14-ton armored personnel carrier, and immediately after that they must make a forced march of 5 kilometers.

“Technique plays more of a role than strength. If you approach this question technically correctly, in principle there was nothing complicated. The unit was much smaller in height and weight than the rest, but they managed it quite quickly because they knew how and what,” says an employee of a separate special forces unit.

The Russian National Guard says that this is not just a competition, but also a large-scale exercise that will help all special forces employees in the future.

“A fairly serious headquarters has been created here, which summarizes the results of these competitions, which summarizes the methods used by the unit in solving training problems. And based on these methods, a unified concept for the training of these units will be developed,” explains Sergei Melikov, First Deputy Director of the Federal Service of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation.

The competition lasted a week, and every day the standings changed, someone lost ground, and someone took the lead. As a result, the military special forces of the central district, a detachment based in Smolensk, were declared the winner.

Special Forces Soldiers

The most responsible tasks were active actions to search and destroy caravans that had proven their effectiveness. The corresponding goals were set for many units and divisions, including aviation, but the main role was assigned to the GRU special forces reconnaissance forces (special forces units in the GRU system of the General Staff were created for targeted sabotage missions - detection and destruction of missile launchers, headquarters and other key objects behind enemy lines; by order The Minister of Defense of March 1950 provided for the deployment of 46 special forces companies in military districts). The training, methods and tactics of their actions almost completely corresponded to the assigned tasks, however, until 1984, special forces units in the 40th Army were used to a limited extent, and often not for their intended purpose. After the deployment of troops, the forces of the GRU Special Forces in Afghanistan were limited to one 469th separate reconnaissance company in Kabul, which was involved from time to time for individual tasks - reconnaissance, additional reconnaissance to verify information, capture prisoners and destroy opposition leaders and commanders. Later, two more special forces detachments were introduced (a GRU special forces detachment of about 500 people corresponded to an army battalion). When entering Afghanistan, for reasons of secrecy, they were called “separate motorized rifle battalions” with serial numbers - 1st, 2nd, etc. Thus, the 154th special forces unit became the 1st battalion, the 177th special forces unit - the 2nd battalion. These names were used in intra-squad documentation and everyday life. The 154th special forces unit from Chirchik and the 177th special forces unit from Kapchagay, Alma-Ata region, were transferred to the ARA in October 1981.

Special forces platoon of Lieutenant Sergei Melnichuk of the 1st company of the Jalalabad 154th special forces unit, summer 1987. Uniformity in clothing was observed in the unit - all fighters were dressed in camouflage KZS, which, for convenience, were often divided into separate jackets and trousers, cut at the waist.

The Chirchik detachment received its own name - the 154th - just before its entry, on October 21, 1981, and was stationed in the city of Akcha, Jawzjan province in the north of the DRA. His first commander in 40A was Major I.Yu. Stoderevskikh. Since August 1982, the detachment was transferred to Aibak in the neighboring province of Samangan.

177 Sospn Lieutenant Colonel B.T. Kerimbaev was formed in February 1980 from scouts from the Chuchkovsky 16th Special Forces Brigade (MVO) and the Kapchagai 22nd Brigade (SAVO), but the detachment received the Battle Banner only in September 1981 before leaving for the DRA. The detachment crossed the border together with the 154th special forces unit on October 21, and a week later received its first combat mission.

The special forces had their own armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles), off-road trucks, mortars and anti-aircraft guns (the high rate of fire of the automatic ZU-23 and "Shilok" significantly increased the unit's fire capabilities, and large elevation angles made it possible to fire at steep slopes).

The activities of the Special Forces were initially limited to the protection of industrial facilities, which were few in number and therefore of particular importance - gas fields in Shibargan and the pipeline in Puli-Khumri in the north of the country. They were staffed by officers of motorized rifle units and practically lost their previous capabilities.

The staff and structure of the detachments also resembled ordinary army ones: each special forces unit had six companies (three special forces, one engineering-flamethrower, one grenade launcher-mortar and repair and material support and transport) and two groups - communications and anti-aircraft. They were armed with heavy equipment, including Shilkas, and a variety of armor. Thus, the 1st and 2nd companies were equipped with BMP-1, the 3rd - with BMD-1, BRDM and BTR-60PB. During the offensive during the Panjshir operation, the forces of the 177th special forces unit were involved. At the end of the operation, his scouts were stationed at outposts near Rukha, compensating for the weakness of the implanted “people's power” and covering their units. The enemy, who had just been “defeated,” did not even think of surrendering - on July 18, at the post of the 31st reconnaissance group of Lieutenant I.A. Egiazarov (15 people, 2 AGS-17, 1 DShK and 1 mortar "Tray") near the village of Marishtan had to repel the attack of a large group of dushmans, who, under the cover of heavy machine guns, managed to break into the heights, but were cut down by fire already at the outpost.

Special forces of the Kandahar detachment before departure on a mission. The group includes a squad of grenade launchers with “Flame”. The AGS-17 is disassembled for transport, the weapon itself is packed in a bag. In addition to the drum, they take with them a spare tape with shots.

Return of the reconnaissance group from an ambush. Every second person is armed with a PC or PKM. The machine gun was the most suitable weapon for ambush operations, where a high density and range of fire was required, capable of stopping the caravan, knocking out vehicles and suppressing the resistance of the guards, and success often depended on the force of sudden pre-emptive fire. Kandahar, summer 1987.

By the end of winter 1984, they decided to use the special forces for their intended purpose. The 177th special forces unit was transferred to Ghazni, which lay on the main highway that encircled the whole of Afghanistan, and the 154th was stationed in Jalalabad on the Pakistani direction. On February 10, the third detachment was introduced into the DRA, the 173rd special forces unit from Kirovograd, formed by order of the USSR Minister of Defense on February 29, 1980, on the basis of the 12th special forces brigade (then stationed in Lagadehi ZakVO). However, uncertainty over the role of special forces in Afghanistan led to a delay in deployment. The detachment crossed the border on February 10, and by February 14, on its own, arrived in Kandahar, where it was stationed in a military town near the airfield. These places were the hottest: the city, located near the border, was located at the intersection of ancient caravan routes and served as a key in controlling the southwest of the country.

By the fall, another detachment appeared in the Army - freshly formed by order of August 21, 1984, the 668th special forces unit (“4th battalion”) from the 9th Kirovograd brigade from Ukraine. He was stationed in the village of Kalagulai near the Bagram air base, and in March 1985 he was transferred to the village of Sufla near the “hot spot” - the Dushman stronghold of Baraki, which is why it became known as the “Baraki Battalion”.

To ensure mobility and fire support, each of the Special Forces detachments was assigned 4 Mi-8 transport helicopters and 4 Mi-24 combat helicopters from the Jalalabad 335th Separate Combat Helicopter Regiment (OBVP) and the Kandahar 280th Separate Helicopter Regiment based near the special forces deployment sites. (OVP) and the 262nd separate helicopter squadron (OWE) from Bagram. Helicopters from the Kabul 50th separate mixed air regiment were also involved in working with the special forces.

Kandahar special forces are sent out along with Afghan gunners who have stocked up with everything they need for several days - canisters of water, clothing, sun blankets and soldier blankets. One of the scouts, wearing a KZS suit and kimry sneakers, has an assault rifle equipped with an RPK-74 horn with a capacity of 45 rounds.

Scouts lead Afghan gunners to the helicopter. In order not to give away the assistants, they were brought to the very departure, hiding them from prying eyes and wrapping their faces with turbans. In the same unrecognized form, they left the airfield after the mission.

With the advent of new tasks, the staff, structure and armament of the detachments were changed: the detachments were “unloaded”, getting rid of heavy weapons, and the disparity in equipment was eliminated. Now the Special Operations Forces included five companies (three Special Forces and one each for mining and RMO), as well as communications groups and ZSU. In addition, four groups of ATS-17 and RPO-A “Shmel” were introduced into the Special Forces companies from among the previous flamethrower and grenade launcher platoons of the corresponding detachment companies. The 1st company was armed with BMP-2, the 2nd and 3rd - BTR-60 and BTR-70.

Before the introduction of a mining company into the state, each of the detachments had an attached special mining platoon (group) from the 45th engineer-sapper regiment. If necessary, artillery units were allocated to support Special Forces operations at garrisons and bases.

The most combat-ready in the entire 40A, special forces units received the latest equipment and weapons, including special ones - communications, surveillance and alarms, silent shooting and explosive equipment. They were equipped and supplied better than others, albeit with allowance for the well-known sluggishness of the rear services. Until the very end of the war, the army never received modern mountain equipment and appropriate uniforms; camouflage equipment and heavy body armor left much to be desired. The few experimental samples of workwear, overalls, capes and equipment remained isolated. There were especially many complaints about medical supplies, unsuitable shoes and low-calorie food rations, which forced them to improve their supplies from trophies, buy and make their own the most necessary items of equipment - backpacks, unloading vests, pouches and satchels.

Mi-8MT are going on a mission. After the first losses, all sorties - from communications and transport to strike and search and rescue - were carried out only in pairs and units. This procedure made it possible to provide quick assistance to a crew that was shot down or stranded in inhospitable places. The pilots and troops were picked up by the partner himself or helped them wait for the rescue, providing covering fire from the air.

Mi-8MT of the Kandahar helicopter detachment of the 205th air force, assigned to the 173rd special forces unit. When forming “special forces” squadrons, they were equipped only with the newest helicopters of the latest series. To ensure fire support capabilities, it was prescribed that all Mi-8s working with airborne reconnaissance groups in the “Veil” system, in addition to onboard machine guns, be equipped with two 32-round UB-32-57 missile pods.

Battalion commander Major I.V. Solonik characterized the equipment as follows: “Basically, all soldiers and officers had their equipment and uniforms altered, since it restricted movement and was inconvenient. No one wore army boots to ambushes. In the mountains it was inconvenient and heavy, and from its tracks the enemy could easily determine the location of the ambush.” In the 177th special forces unit, the personnel “shared” money in order to order 200-300 sets of necessary ammunition at home from a sewing cooperative with vacationers. In the destroyed caravans, boots, the same "bras", camouflage, sleeping bags and, especially, high-quality medicines, painkillers, blood substitutes, disposable syringes, tourniquets and splints were in great demand.

Reconnaissance and search operations were carried out in small mobile groups, usually a squad of 7-10 people. The group traveled in several armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and Urals along well-known caravan routes. Acting autonomously for 5–6 days and relying mainly on their own strength, armor and trucks in a collision, they took heavy machine guns and ATS-17. Special forces groups were sent to check intelligence data, to capture weapons and prisoners, to detect parking lots, caravans, warehouses and gangs, installed reconnaissance and signal equipment and mined paths, including with special means - PD-530 radio control explosion kits, Okhota non-contact explosive devices " and others. While searching in the area east of Surubi in November 1986, Major G. Bykov’s group from the 154th special forces unit in one three-day raid destroyed 15 dushmans and identified three warehouses, taking trophies.

Well-armed and trained special forces were also involved in participation in combined arms operations, where they were used not only for special events, but also as regular units that took fortresses and villages and cleared the area. However, even at this they were given a special role.

Mi-8MT is landing a reconnaissance group over the Registan desert. Pressing close to the ground for stealth, the car goes right over the dunes, almost touching its own shadow with its wheels. Flight at low level at a speed of 150–180 km/h, prohibited by all instructions, required exquisite aerobatics, eye and reaction.

After several false landings that distracted possible enemy observers, the Mi-8MT hovers to parachute the group. The landing site was usually chosen not far from the foot of the mountains, where the landing party was hiding from possible pursuit.

The landing of a special forces group near the Pakistani border in preparation for the Khosta operation. Alizai-Parachinar area, summer 1986

The inspection team returns to the helicopter after checking the nomad camp. For inspections, even close ones, they took a walkie-talkie with them - to report on the progress of the control and, if necessary, call for help or demand evacuation. Sand spreads towards the scouts, thrown up by the propeller of the helicopter engines that continue to operate. They were not jammed, so as not to waste extra minutes on starting when leaving or “jumping” to help.

Kandahar special forces after a successful exit. A caravan with raw materials for drugs was slaughtered in the desert, in which 1,700 kg of “goods” and prisoners were taken. There were no losses on our part. June 1987.

Having stopped the caravan with fire, the special forces blocked it in a lowland near the border and called in combat Mi-24s. Vehicles with ammunition were destroyed on the spot by an air strike. Kandahar Province, February 12, 1988.

BTR-80 armored group of the 173rd special forces unit is preparing to leave. Winter 1988.

The special forces took prisoners. Many Afghans did not have documents, and the nomads often did not know about them. Having been delivered to the base, they were handed over to local state security, who decided the fate of suspicious persons. The two feared big men have their hands tied.

Prisoners brought from a helicopter search. It was common for militants handed over to the Afghan authorities to be paid off or released “for lack of evidence” and soon find themselves back in caravans and gangs. In this case, prisoners taken to the airfield or to the garrison of their unit were blindfolded so that they could not clearly see and remember the situation and forces.

A captive "spirit" taken with a weapon in his hands. A bandolier hangs around his neck, and the paratrooper-escort carries a selected rifle.

The famous “Boer” is an English repeating rifle of the Lee-Enfield system, various models of which came to Afghanistan in large numbers back in the 20-30s, becoming known by the name that has been attached to the weapon since the Boer War. With a caliber of 7.62 mm, a powerful cartridge and good ballistics made it a dangerous weapon with sniper characteristics. The sighting range of the “drill” reached 2500 m, and even a bulletproof vest could not save you from a bullet.

Search of the caravan driver. Afghan clothes did not have pockets; everything they needed was carried in bags, and money and documents were usually hidden in a turban. An Afghan man sits on sacks of smuggled hashish found in the cargo.

Landing of a reconnaissance group on “Kalatka” - the road from Shahjai to Kalat. On the crowded road, cars with smuggled goods were often encountered, and many drivers, who exchanged their profession as caravan drivers for the profession of drivers, earned extra money by delivering cargo to local gangs. Zabal Province, late 1987.

Inspection of cars on the road near the Pakistani border. According to local custom, the men rode on the roof, with livestock and women inside. Forbidden property, in addition to contraband, weapons and ammunition, included uniforms, equipment and medicines necessary in military affairs.

The semi-truck Toyota Simurgh was often found in caravans. The reliable, roomy and unpretentious car was a coveted trophy and was a success in Soviet units, where it received the nickname “Simurka”. This car even managed to receive numbers from the military traffic police of the 40th Army.

The Dushman shooter is a strong fellow, two meters tall, who was taken prisoner during an inspection. The militant was given away by a bruise on his right shoulder - a mark from the butt of a powerful drill or machine gun.

A Toyota pickup truck intercepted from the air in the middle of the desert. The Afghans, who were going about their business without any road, noticed the helicopter of the 205th OVE, poured out of the car and ran to the side, showing the absence of weapons and hostile intentions, and at the same time trying to get away from the car in case of shooting.

RESULTS OF COMBAT ACTIVITIES OF THE 186th OSPPN

Thus, during the capture of the fortified area of ​​Wasatichignai in Kandahar province in March 1986, a special forces group of Art. Lt. Kravchenko was mistakenly landed directly on the anti-aircraft positions of the dushmans. Both of her helicopters were shot at point-blank range, but 12 paratroopers managed to gain a foothold and knocked the enemy out from a height, and then captured the neighboring one, ensuring the success of the operation. On March 20, 1986, during the assault on the base in the Hadegar Gorge near Kandahar, large forces were deployed - two battalions of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade, a howitzer division, two helicopter and two assault squadrons. The gorge was blocked from the surrounding mountains by four groups of the 173rd special forces unit of 16 people (each had an ATS-17 and two PCs). They intercepted the retreating enemy, shot him with fire from ambushes and directed aircraft. The whole operation took 4 hours, its result was 20 killed dushmans and trophies without losses on our part.

For the most part, the detachments had to deal with “piecemeal” tasks - hunting for caravans, for which the special forces worked out their own methodology. According to the headquarters of the 40th Army, the special forces soldiers were “true professionals who had excellent physical and military training.” It is curious that it was not tall and massive soldiers who were most often selected for special forces. According to the Chirchik battalion commander, Colonel Yu.M. Starova, “jocks” are better suited for sports. We need to carry a mountain of all sorts of junk, weapons and supplies, and helicopters and armored personnel carriers are not made of rubber. We don't need Gullivers, we need compact guys.

According to the experience of the Kandahar detachment, typical equipment for 3–4 days of independent work was determined as follows: 2–3 sets of ammunition for personal weapons, 4 hand grenades (2 RGD-5 and 2 F-1), one RPG-18 grenade for two, two 200 g TNT bombs, 5 smoke bombs and 5 signal rocket cartridges, 4 mines for an 82 mm mortar (if you took it with you) or a drum with tape for the ATS-17, food supply for 3–5 days, 2–3 flasks water or tea, a raincoat and a blanket. The equipment varied according to the time of year and conditions - warm clothes, pea coats and sleeping bags were added in winter and in the mountains. Massive ATS-17, mortars and machine guns were disassembled into “lifting” parts of 15–20 kg each. Sometimes they sacrificed part of the food in favor of ammunition - as the same Starov taught, “if you have enough cartridges with you, you will always get food.” The fighter’s overall equipment weighed, in the best case and the “summer” version, 35–40 kg, including the bare necessities. The group preparing to leave consisted of 10 to 25 people, and, in addition to the obligatory sniper, grenade launcher and signalman, could include grenade launchers with ATS-17, an artillery spotter and an aircraft gunner, miners and flamethrowers from chemical troops units armed with RPO-A with volumetric explosion ammunition .

Inspection of a Mercedes truck. The driver and owners of the cargo are waiting at gunpoint for the results of the inspection. Sacks and bales were pierced with a probe and monitored with mine detectors, looking for weapons and ammunition - the main purpose of the inspection. Paktika Province, winter 1988.

There were no searches at night - the caravan sneaking in the dark was clearly not carrying raisins and nuts. The fate of those who came to the ambush was decided unambiguously: by fire to kill. In the photo - “Simurgh”, spotted on the road at night and blown up by a controlled landmine. The driver and attendant died in the cabin, and in the morning the car was finished off by helicopters. Registan, January 18, 1988.

The group was divided into capture, fire and cover units, the actions of which were coordinated and practiced in advance, specifying the balance of forces and mutual support on the spot. The basis was troikas, seniority in which was not always assigned by rank, but based on experience and a young officer could easily become subordinate to a knowledgeable sergeant.

Getting to the ambush site where the caravan or band was expected remained the most difficult part of the plan. Not only the success, but also the fate of the group depended on his secrecy. In places where the appearance of any stranger became noticeable, nomads, shepherds and local residents could betray the ambush; Dushman posts monitored the situation, immediately reporting the danger by radio, signal fires and mirror “bunnies”.

Inspection of a caravan in the desert. Drivers herd the camels together at gunpoint and lay them on the ground to check their packs. Cover helicopters continue to circle nearby, ready to stop the caravaners’ attempts to flee or support the scouts with fire if they resist. In this caravan, 15 prisoners were taken, suspected of being sent from a foreign training camp to one of the local gangs. Kandahar Province, February 12, 1988.

At the site of a pack caravan destroyed in the desert. The ambush was organized on April 3, 1988 by the group of “Malysh” - Lieutenant Igor Vesnin from the 173rd special forces unit. His combat work by the spring of this year was appreciated by the Order of the Red Star and the Red Banner.

Soldiers of the 370th near the burned Toyotas of the Dushman caravan. In the bodies are ammunition and Yamaha motorcycles, at the door is the body of a burnt driver. Helmand Province, 1987

After a night ambush near Shahjoy. The surviving pickup truck with its cargo and the caravan drivers who did not have time to run away, mowed down in a short-lived battle.

The machine gunner is trying out shooting, getting used to the SPS - a small arms and machine gun structure. SPS were built from stones assembled nearby and provided protection from small arms fire. Due to the speed of preparation and the abundance of building materials around, the location of the reconnaissance group or the ambush site, several SPS were set up, which made it possible to transfer fire in different directions. Grenades and a supply of ammunition could be stored in the cells ahead of time.

A large caravan whose camels carried weapons and ammunition. About a hundred Chinese rockets were found in the packs of the killed animals.

The cargo taken in battle, which had nothing to transport it with, was doused with diesel fuel and burned on the spot.

In the morning at the battle site there is a dead caravan driver near scattered bags of drugs. They tried to prevent any of the drivers and those accompanying the cargo from leaving - if shooting in the mountains was commonplace and attracted almost no attention, then the one who left could call for help and cause trouble.

Mi-8MT 335 obvp removes an ambush of Jalalaba special forces. Most reconnaissance officers have the characteristic flat RD-54 backpacks, some have ordinary backpacks with additional pockets sewn on them. Soldiers near the helicopter carry PTM-62 anti-vehicle mines. An impressive hole is visible on the overalls of the trailing man - the trace of a raid on the rocky mountains. Nangarhar, summer 1986.

Special forces soldiers at the headquarters of the 22nd Special Forces brigade in Lashkar Gah before being sent home. All the property of soldiers and sergeants who had served their time fit into a “demobilization” diplomat, but on the chest of almost everyone there were not only the obligatory badges “From the Grateful Afghan People,” but also military orders of the Red Star.

Sergeant of the Kandahar detachment of the 173rd special forces unit Andrei Goryachev before going out on an ambush in the fall of 1987. Afghan clothing and a turban allowed the group’s fighters to pass for one of the local gangs and use the advantage they had won. The equipment includes sneakers, a belt with pockets for under-barrel shots for the GP-25, and an unloading vest, in the pockets of which, in addition to machine gun horns, there are grenades and signal cartridges. Sergeant Goryachev died on October 24, 1987 from multiple wounds in a battle in the village of Kobay.

The most valuable trophies are rockets and Stinger MANPADS, for the capture of which they were promised in advance to be presented to the order.

RESULTS OF COMBAT ACTIVITIES OF THE 334th Special Forces Regiment

Trophies taken after the destruction of the Dushman warehouse: cartridges and weapons of various systems, including hunting rifles, several “drills” of different models and years of manufacture, an SKS and RPG self-loading carbine, boxes with fuses, grenades, explosive packages, coils of incendiary and demolition cord, cartridges boxes for machine guns and mines in ribbed plastic cases, undetectable by mine detectors.

To “outplay” the enemy, deceptive maneuvers and landing methods were invented. At first, it was carried out by advancing in armored vehicles and trucks, sometimes accompanying the exit by sending false armored groups in other directions. Having reached the desired area, the group dismounted and, true to the rule “the scout’s legs feed him,” marched away as quickly as possible. The transition to the ambush site, confusing the tracks, took 10–20 km (and sometimes much more). They tried to complete it before sunrise, having time to disguise themselves. The equipment continued to move on, distracting enemy observers with noise, but continuing to remain in the close area in order to support the fighters if necessary. Still, the waiting zone had to be designated no closer than 30–50 km, so as not to frighten off the caravan. In the ambush they knew that if something happened, help would not arrive soon, and they were left with only light weapons, counting on preparation, surprise and luck.

Having taken a position (“sitting on the path”), the special forces tried not to give away the location of the ambush, avoiding movement and not lighting fire - in the best case, the enemy who discovered something was wrong blocked the route, waiting or changing the path of the caravan. In the worst case, having noticed the group, the dushmans pulled up their forces and tried to destroy it, having superiority both in numbers and in weapons. The danger of oncoming dushman ambushes could await the group even upon leaving. In hostile territory, even with good organization and camouflage, the group, as a rule, remained unnoticed for no more than 2-3 days and, in the absence of results, they tried to remove the ambushes without waiting for the enemy to respond.

A group of the Kabul 469th Special Forces company takes positions near a stone ridge above the gorge at the mouth of the Panjshir. Blocking the caravan route in an area flooded with dushmans required the concentration of firepower. The group included flamethrowers with RPO-A Shmel rockets, whose volumetric explosion ammunition provided the detachment with firepower that was not inferior to heavy artillery shells. Anawa area, September 1986

RESULTS OF COMBAT ACTIVITIES 1985–1988 370th OOSPN

Such an organization, which resembled combined arms operations in miniature with the exit of columns and support with equipment and combat operations on the spot, quickly showed its shortcomings. The effectiveness of special forces operations depended, first of all, on secrecy and surprise, and the cumbersome and time-consuming landing of groups did not contribute to this. To a large extent, this was due to the low effectiveness of ambushes in the first year of combat work of the Special Forces: during the winter of 1984/85, OKSV forces carried out 1,460 ambushes, but their success rate remained at the same low level.

More successful were operations involving helicopters that landed groups and remained ready to support them with air fire and, if necessary, quickly evacuate them. Stage changes occurred in March 1985, when special forces forces were reorganized and significantly strengthened. While maintaining the 469th Kabul Special Forces company, the number of detachments was increased to eight, an additional three were transferred from the Union and another one was formed on the spot. In addition to the already existing Special Forces units in Kandahar, Jalalabad and Ghazni, the 334th Special Forces Regiment ("5th Battalion"), the 370th Special Forces Regiment ("6th Battalion"), the 186th Special Forces Regiment ("7th Battalion") arrived battalion") and the 411th special forces unit ("8th battalion").

The 334th special forces unit was formed in the winter of 1985 on the basis of the 5th brigade from Maryina Gorka (BelVO) and was replenished with personnel from the 2nd, 14th, 9th and 22nd special forces units. After being transferred to Chirchik, he went under his own power to the place of deployment, arriving in Asadabad on March 29. The first commander of the detachment was Major V.Ya. Terentyev. The permanent deployment point of the 334th special forces unit, already operating in the most difficult border region, was so close to the Pakistani border that there were militant bases almost next to the Kunar River, from where the garrison was continually fired upon. The Kunar valley, teeming with dushmans, soon confirmed its bad reputation - a group of the unfired first company of the 334th special forces unit, going out to comb the Maravar Gorge, came under fire from ambushes on April 21, was cut off from its own and almost completely died. The company commander, Captain N., died in the battles. N. Tsebruk, group commander Lieutenant N.A. Kuznetsov blew himself up with a grenade, and seven more surrounded soldiers did the same. The dead had to be carried out by battle, and in three days the detachment lost 29 people.

Soon after this, the commander was changed - Major G.V. became him for two years. Bykov, who became famous as "Grigory Kunarsky".

370th special forces unit, formed on January 1, 1985 in Chuchkovo (Moscow Military District), under the command of Major I.M. Krota arrived at his base in Lashkar Gah (Helmand Province) on March 21. On April 14, the 186th special forces unit, which arrived from Izyaslav (Prikvo), was stationed nearby in Shakhjoy. It was formed on the basis of the 8th Regiment on the basis of the General Staff directive of January 6, 1985 on the same staff No. 21/422. The formation of the “southern belt” was completed by the fall by the 411th special forces unit in Farah, organized on the basis of the 70th separate detachment and the 5th guards. msd. The task of these detachments was to block routes through the Khash and Registan deserts, where there were practically no outposts or garrisons.

Organizationally, the Special Forces detachments were consolidated into two brigades - the 15th and 22nd Special Forces Brigades with headquarters in Jalalabad and Lashkar Gah (better known as Lashkarevka). In April, by General Staff Directive No. 314/2/0208, management and support units for brigades were introduced. The 15th brigade included the 154th, 177th, 688th and 334th special forces units, the 22nd brigade included the 173rd, 370th, 186th and 411th special forces units (the latter was fully staffed by the winter of 1985).

Special forces were brought in to work as “fire brigades” - carrying out special events and operations in other areas. An-26 delivered the reconnaissance group of the 173rd Separate Regiment with equipment and weapons after the operation back to Kandahar.

The group commander leads an Afghan gunner to the helicopter. In order to remain unrecognized and keep their collaboration with the Shuravi secret, the Afghans hid their faces under a turban, revealing it only in the helicopter cockpit.

At Army headquarters, the general management of the special forces was carried out by the Ekran operational group, which supplied the brigades with intelligence data and coordinated their actions. Each of the battalions consisted of about 500 people, and the entire special forces force consisted of more than 4,000 soldiers. Their level and correlation with combined arms units is evidenced by the fact that, according to Army command estimates, up to 80 thousand people were required to perform the same tasks of blocking the border with conventional forces. The belt along the Pakistani border and in the south would control an area of ​​almost 1,200 km.

Available data on the 186th detachment allows us to evaluate its combat work: by the end of 1985, in a little more than 200 days, its fighters completed 202 combat missions and 45 inspection missions. The predominant actions of reconnaissance groups (200 exits) in ambushes and only twice were the forces of the entire detachment involved in raids on Dushman bases. There were 36 successful ambushes (18%), in which 370 dushmans, 34 vehicles and a lot of ammunition were destroyed, 15 prisoners and 98 weapons were taken. Losses amounted to 12 killed, including two officers.