Viktor Marakhovsky, for RIA Novosti
In the global community of irreconcilable Russian oppositionists, they comprehend the new reality.
In general, the Russian irreconcilable opposition is perhaps the most international of all oppositions. It includes not only residents of Russia and citizens Russian Federation living abroad, but also former citizens of the Russian Federation who have long since become citizens of other countries. In its ranks there are even citizens of one country that claims that it is at war with Russia (and try to expel them from the ranks of the opposition guard).
…So. The question that this world community now has to solve is severe: why did the protest campaign launched in Runet not work from the word "completely"?
The presence of implacable anti-Putinists in the Internet media and social networks was, if not overwhelming, then at least equal to the “pro-Putin” one. And the total output of the protest efforts of the “anti-system candidates” and the boycotting “politician whom Putin is afraid of” turned out to be somehow miserable.
No, their result is pitiful, not in the sense that the couple of millions of our fellow citizens who voted for K. A. Sobchak and G. A. Yavlinsky are pathetic, insignificant individuals. And not in the sense that tens or maybe even hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens who really consciously heeded the call to "boycott the farce" are miserable. No, they are all full citizens of the country.
Their problem is elsewhere. Despite the fact that these people are a minority, at the same time they are a minority, so to speak, informationally hyperactive. And that is why this minority usually considers itself not just full-fledged, but something more.
This is for a normal user and the Internet is normal. That is, for personal purposes - mainly for correspondence with loved ones, watching movies and storing music.
And an advanced anti-Putin user, even if he is an Israeli housewife in years, is a daily factory of likes, comments and reposts, producing and distributing kilotons of political content. Not to mention the army of Baltic, Ukrainian, Transcaucasian and Central Asian couch fighters against the empire. Not to mention the sofa corps of anti-imperial resistance in Russia itself - Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Urals and Siberia.
But the main thing is that this minority is used to considering themselves not only active, but also informationally effective. By virtue of its near-intellectual diplomas and simply class traditions, it is used to thinking that it has much greater skill in presenting its political position. Much more convincing and brighter finds words. Where better able to "get through".
And so the conclusion was made: each representative of this intellectual minority, of course, is worth hundreds of ordinary passive users of the information space. Simply by the level of informational noise it produces and the impact it has.
And it’s not that they didn’t have any reason to count on success. At least limited.
Firstly, on the side of the global international of the Russian opposition there was a rather impressive package of media. Starting from the British and American, who with desperate persistence repeated the mantra about "Putin's main rival, who called for a boycott of the elections," and ending with the German ones, who thoughtfully explain to the Russian reader how best to express their protest against the Kremlin: "Stay at home, as Navalny calls, or ruin the ballot How does Khodorkovsky advise? decision affect the electoral process?
(At this point, it was necessary to ask rhetorically: do these people accuse Russia of trying to interfere in their elections? But this question has long been answered. The right countries interfere in other people's elections correctly, for the sake of good. The wrong countries, like Russia, in the name of evil. )
Secondly, the informationally hyperactive minority is also mastering new media spaces at a faster pace. For example, among the popular political telegram channels, the clear majority is clearly oppositional in nature.
Thirdly, the audience of this minority is the Russian "media class" - including a fairly large stratum of official media workers who are accustomed to walking around with figs in their pockets and consider themselves victims of circumstances. That is why they like and repost information that scourges modern Russia with redoubled enthusiasm.
…So.
As practice has shown, all this Internet self-esteem of the hyperactive anti-state minority turned out to be exaggerated. That is, it failed to convert into either a boycott or a protest vote. It read itself a lot, liked it and reposted it, but for some reason it remained in its three percent ghetto.
© Photo: press service of the administration of the Krasnodar Territory
© Photo: press service of the administration of the Krasnodar Territory
I have a version why.
The thing is that there is probably no society on the planet that would be more resistant to information pressure than Russian society.
Even before the mass advent of the Internet (and the onset of the established "Putin era"), the Russian voter/reader/viewer lived for a decade and a half under a natural information dictatorship. The Russian citizen was told from morning to night that his country was falling apart and that it was good, that his past was criminal, that his pride was false, and that the best prospects were to dump him in a normal country. And if it doesn’t work out, sit and not twitch.
And the Russian citizen withstood this informational occupation.
And then came the era of the mass Russian Internet. And although the “irreconcilables” certainly had a head start (the Internet first of all spread to megacities, where its founding fathers were people who later went to Bolotnaya almost in full force) - the majority already in the 2010s began to inexorably catch up with them and overtake. Simply because even very hyperactive minorities, who assert themselves at the expense of the majority, will not read and listen to the latter if they have a choice.
And the majority had a choice. And in the form of "state" media, and in the form of self-made patriotic blogosphere.
And in the end it turned out that all the campaigning and propaganda powers of the opposition telegram and YouTube channels, and Facebook groups, and VK publics, and powerful Prague and Riga Russian-language publications with advanced design and cool stray, and everything like that, are closed actually on yourself. To the international Russian-speaking opposition media class.
In particular, this happened also because this closed community was never able to develop a normal, respectful language of communication with the majority. They did not come up with anything more creative than "pitiable" stories about how "I met an old woman in a store who was trying to buy two oranges at a promotion" about citizens. Basically, all their political lyrics were based on a mockery of the "obedient / gullible majority." On tragic self-love, smart and beautiful. And on listing the differences between smart and talented selves and a gray monochrome mass.
That is, these guys have mastered some new media, new formats and new networks.
But in the main they never learned anything. For example, a simple truth: "If you are addressing people who, for the most part, have voted for V.V. Putin for ten years, then why the hell are you mocking their choice? Are you sure that this is how hearts are won?"
... As a result, today the information troops, defeated during the next storming of the Kremlin, are discussing the future.
Some, as after every election in Russia, gloomily prophesy that now the stupid majority will cry, and we won’t feel sorry for him, it’s our own fault.
Others try to steer in a constructive way and offer instead of fighting an irresistible force to join it and change it from the inside: “We all need to learn how to sacrifice. Our pride, our attachments, our love, our fate and our lives. We cannot defeat Putin. and notes. The regime can only be changed from within. If you want to change Russia, love Putin. Love him and be faithful to him. To ever give you power, he must be sure that you will not betray him. Go work in power "and etc.
The call is, of course, frightening (from the point of view of us, the majority). But hardly realizable - after all, in order to fulfill it, the militant irreconcilable minority will have to abandon their own nature. And this is hardly possible.
In the global community of irreconcilable Russian oppositionists, they are comprehending a new reality.
In general, the Russian irreconcilable opposition is perhaps the most international of all oppositions. It includes not only residents of Russia and citizens of the Russian Federation living abroad, but also former citizens of the Russian Federation who have long become citizens of other countries. In its ranks there are even citizens of one country that claims that it is at war with Russia (and try to expel them from the ranks of the opposition guard).
…So. The question that this world community now has to solve is severe: why did the protest campaign launched in Runet not work from the word "completely"?
The presence of implacable anti-Putinists in the Internet media and social networks was, if not overwhelming, then at least equal to the “pro-Putin” one. And the total output of the protest efforts of the “anti-system candidates” and the boycotting “politician whom Putin is afraid of” turned out to be somehow miserable.
No, their result is pitiful, not in the sense that the couple of millions of our fellow citizens who voted for K. A. Sobchak and G. A. Yavlinsky are pathetic, insignificant individuals. And not in the sense that tens or maybe even hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens who really consciously heeded the call to "boycott the farce" are miserable. No, they are all full citizens of the country.
Their problem is elsewhere. Despite the fact that these people are a minority, at the same time they are a minority, so to speak, informationally hyperactive. And that is why this minority usually considers itself not just full-fledged, but something more.
This is for a normal user and the Internet is normal. That is, for personal purposes - mainly for correspondence with loved ones, watching movies and storing music.
And an advanced anti-Putin user, even if he is an Israeli housewife in years, is a daily factory of likes, comments and reposts, producing and distributing kilotons of political content. Not to mention the army of Baltic, Ukrainian, Transcaucasian and Central Asian couch fighters against the empire. Not to mention the couch buildings of the anti-imperial resistance in the Russian Federation itself - Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Urals and Siberia.
But the main thing is that this minority is used to considering themselves not only active, but also informationally effective. By virtue of its near-intellectual diplomas and simply class traditions, it is used to thinking that it has much more skill in presenting its political position. Much more convincing and brighter finds words. Where better able to "get through".
And so the conclusion was made: each representative of this intellectual minority is certainly worth hundreds of ordinary passive users of the information space. Simply by the level of informational noise it produces and the impact it has.
And it’s not that they didn’t have any reason to count on success. At least limited.
Firstly, on the side of the global international of the Russian opposition there was a rather impressive package of media. Starting from the British and American, who with desperate persistence repeated the mantra about "Putin's main rival, who called for a boycott of the elections," and ending with the German ones, who thoughtfully explain to the Russian reader how best to express their protest against the Kremlin: "Stay at home, as Navalny calls, or ruin the ballot "How does Khodorkovsky advise? How is a boycott different from a protest vote, and how will the decision affect the election process?"
(At this point it was necessary to ask rhetorically: And these people accuse Russia of trying to interfere in their elections? But this question has long been answered. The right countries interfere in other people's elections correctly, for the sake of good. The wrong countries, like Russia, - in the name of evil).
Secondly, the informationally hyperactive minority is also mastering new media spaces at a faster pace. For example, among the popular political telegram channels, the clear majority is clearly oppositional in nature.
Thirdly, the audience of this minority is the Russian "media class" - including a fairly large stratum of official media workers who are accustomed to walking around with figs in their pockets and consider themselves victims of circumstances. That is why they like and repost information that scourges modern Russia with redoubled enthusiasm.
…So.
As practice has shown, all this Internet self-esteem of the hyperactive anti-state minority turned out to be exaggerated. That is, it failed to convert into either a boycott or a protest vote. It read itself a lot, liked it and reposted it, but for some reason it remained in its three percent ghetto.
I have a version why.
The thing is that there is probably no society on the planet that would be more resistant to information pressure than Russian society.
Even before the mass advent of the Internet (and the onset of the established "Putin era"), the Russian voter/reader/viewer lived for a decade and a half under a natural information dictatorship. The Russian citizen was told from morning to night that his country was falling apart and that it was good, that his past was criminal, that his pride was false, and that the best prospects were to dump him in a normal country. And if it doesn’t work out, sit and not twitch.
And the Russian citizen withstood this informational occupation.
And then came the era of the mass Russian Internet. And although the “irreconcilables” certainly had a head start (the Internet first of all spread to megacities, where its founding fathers were people who later went to Bolotnaya almost in full force) - the majority already in the 2010s began to inexorably catch up and overtake them . Simply because even very hyperactive minorities, who assert themselves at the expense of the majority, will not read and listen to the latter if they have a choice.
And the majority had a choice. And in the form of "state" media, and in the form of self-made patriotic blogosphere.
And in the end, it turned out that all the campaigning and propaganda powers of the opposition telegram and YouTube channels, and Facebook groups, and VK publics, and powerful Prague and Riga Russian-language publications with advanced design and cool stray, and everything like that, are closed actually on yourself. To the international Russian-speaking opposition media class.
In particular, this happened also because this closed community was never able to develop a normal, respectful language of communication with the majority. They did not come up with anything more creative than "pitiable" stories about how "I met an old woman in a store who was trying to buy two oranges at a promotion" about citizens. Basically, all their political lyrics were based on a mockery of the "obedient / gullible majority." On tragic self-love, smart and beautiful. And on listing the differences between smart and talented selves and a gray monochrome mass.
That is, these guys have mastered some new media, new formats and new networks.
But in the main they never learned anything. For example, a simple truth: "If you are addressing people who, for the most part, have voted for V.V. Putin for ten years, then why the hell are you mocking his choice? Are you sure that this is how hearts are won?"
... As a result, today the information troops, defeated during the next storming of the Kremlin, are discussing the future.
Some, as after every election in Russia, gloomily prophesy that now the stupid majority will cry, and we won’t feel sorry for him, it’s our own fault.
Others try to steer in a constructive way and offer instead of fighting an irresistible force to join it and change it from the inside: “We all need to learn how to sacrifice. Our pride, our attachments, our love, our fate and our lives. We cannot defeat Putin. and notes. The regime can only be changed from within. If you want to change Russia, love Putin. Love him and be faithful to him. To ever give you power, he must be sure that you will not betray him. Go work in power "and etc.
The call is, of course, frightening (from the point of view of us, the majority). But hardly realizable - after all, in order to fulfill it, the militant irreconcilable minority will have to abandon their own nature. And this is hardly possible.
Russia has a truly heroic military history. No army in the world has fought so successfully. The heroism of Russian soldiers was often recognized by opponents. But Russia also had defeats.
Livonian War (1558-1583)
The Livonian War was one of the longest wars in which Russia participated. It lasted for almost thirty years. During this time, there were many events both inside and outside the political system that seriously influenced the course and outcome of the war.
The first stage of it was extremely successful for the Russian troops. From May to October 1558, 20 fortresses were taken, including Narva and Yuryev (Derpt). However, Russia failed to consolidate its military successes due to internal disagreements at the court and the Crimean campaign.
The Livonian Order took advantage of the truce of 1559 in its own way. The master of the order, Gotthard Kettler, instead of coming to Moscow to conclude an agreement, transferred the lands of the order and the possessions of the Archbishop of Riga under the protectorate of the Principality of Lithuania. Reval was in the possession of Sweden, and the island of Ezel - the Danish prince Magnus.
A month before the end of the truce, the Livonian Order treacherously attacked the Russian troops, but by 1560 its troops were completely defeated, and the Livonian Confederation ceased to exist. Russia faced a new problem: Lithuania, Poland, Denmark and Sweden now legally claimed Livonian lands.
Now Russia was already at war with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Three years later, Lithuania offered to divide Livonia, but Grozny went on principle. In 1569 Lithuania united with Poland. At the end of the war, Sweden also decided to fight for a piece of the Livonian pie ...
Russia lost the Livonian War due to many factors. Firstly, internal disagreements at the court of Ivan the Terrible and the betrayal of the governor; secondly, a forced war on two fronts (in 1572, the Russian army crushed the troops of Devlet Giray in the Battle of Molodi); thirdly, "The tsar made an oprichnina ... And from that there was a desolation of the greatness of the Russian land."
The "English factor" also played a role in Russia's defeat. Grozny believed to the last in England's help, but the British in every possible way delayed the conclusion of a defensive-offensive treaty with Russia. England was preparing to move its trading post to Reval, after the end of the seven-year war between Denmark and Sweden. The diplomatic efforts of Ivan the Terrible (and the privileges given to English merchants for transit trade with Persia) delayed the transfer of the trading post for almost 9 years, but the conclusion of an alliance treaty never took place.
Russia's strategic advantage was lost. England, skillfully using military actions between other countries, pressed the Hanseatic League in the Baltic, finally seized the trade initiative, and turned into the strongest maritime power.
Russo-Swedish war (1610-1617)
In 1611, a new king, Gustav II Adolf, ascended the Swedish throne. On the throne he continued the line foreign policy his father, Charles IX, from whom he had three wars left, including Russia, where Novgorod had already been captured by the Swedes. Karl, anticipating a future confrontation with Poland, wanted to "untie the Russian knot" as quickly as possible. He understood that Novgorod's chances of becoming a Swedish outpost were extremely small.
"This proud people," Gustav II Adolf himself wrote about the Russians, "feeds an inveterate hatred for all alien peoples." Therefore, the young king was more and more inclined towards the idea of leaving all his conquests in Russia and concluding peace with Mikhail Romanov on the most favorable terms.
However, in order to take large military booty in Russia and secure a strong position in the negotiations, the Swedish king began military operations in the North-West of Russia. In 1614, he captured Gdov, and the next year he besieged Pskov, approaching the city with 16,000 troops. But Pskov did not give up, even despite the fact that "700 fiery cores were fired at it in three days, and there were no count of cast iron ones."
A lengthy negotiation process in 1617 in the village of Stolbovo near Tikhvin was mediated by the English diplomat John Merrick. He several times persuaded the Swedes to stay when the negotiations reached an impasse and they were about to leave home.
The Swedes wanted to get all the lands captured in the Time of Troubles - together with Novgorod. The Russians demanded that everything be returned. As a result, a compromise was reached, at that time acceptable to both sides: Sweden received the Baltic cities, cutting off Moscow from access to the sea, and in addition almost a ton of silver; Russia regained Novgorod and focused on the war with Poland.
John Merrick was generously rewarded by the tsar: among other things, he was granted a fur coat from the tsar's shoulder: a rare and exceptional honor for a foreigner. But he participated in the negotiations, of course, not for the sake of a fur coat: he needed to achieve preferential rights for the British to travel through Russia to Persia and trade there.
Despite all the merits of the Englishman, his main request was gently denied: after the Time of Troubles, trade with Persia became one of the main sources of profit for Russian merchants, and therefore it was unprofitable to let foreigners into the Caspian Sea. Nevertheless, Merrick managed to get the consent of the Russian tsar for the British to find a way to China, to investigate iron ore deposits in the Vologda region, to sow flax and export alabaster.
Crimean War (1853-1856)
In terms of its grandiose scale, the width of the theater of operations and the number of mobilized troops, the Crimean War was quite comparable to the world war. Russia defended itself on several fronts - in the Crimea, Georgia, the Caucasus, Sveaborg, Kronstadt, Solovki and Kamchatka. In fact, Russia fought alone, on our side were insignificant Bulgarian forces (3000 soldiers) and the Greek legion (800 people). We were opposed by an international coalition consisting of Great Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire and Sardinia, with a total number of more than 750 thousand.
The peace treaty was signed on March 30, 1856 in Paris at an international congress with the participation of all the belligerent powers, as well as Austria and Prussia. Under the terms of the agreement, Russia returned Kars to Turkey in exchange for Sevastopol, Balaklava and other cities in the Crimea, captured by the allies; conceded to the Moldavian Principality the mouth of the Danube and part of Southern Bessarabia. The Black Sea was declared neutral, Russia and Turkey could not keep a navy there.
Russia and Turkey could only maintain 6 steam ships of 800 tons each and 4 ships of 200 tons each for guard duty. The autonomy of Serbia and the Danubian Principalities was confirmed, but the Turkish Sultan's supreme power over them was preserved. The previously adopted provisions of the London Convention of 1841 on the closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles for military vessels of all countries except Turkey were confirmed. Russia pledged not to build military fortifications on the Aland Islands and in the Baltic Sea.
The patronage of the Turkish Christians was transferred into the hands of the "concern" of all the great powers, that is, England, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia. The treaty deprived Russia of the right to protect the interests of the Orthodox population in the territory of the Ottoman Empire.
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)
large-scale fighting The Russo-Japanese War began on January 26, 1904, with a treacherous attack by Japanese destroyers on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur against the Russian squadron.
The Japanese torpedoed and temporarily disabled the best Russian battleships Tsesarevich and Retvizan, as well as the cruiser Pallada. Measures to protect ships in the outer roadstead were clearly insufficient. It must be admitted that none of the Russian ships received fatal damage, and after an artillery battle on the morning of January 27, the Japanese fleet was forced to retreat. The moral factor played a fatal role - the Japanese fleet managed to seize the initiative. Our squadron began to suffer ridiculous and unjustified losses in the following days due to poor interaction and control. So, two days after the start of the war, the Yenisei minelayer and the Boyarin cruiser were killed on their own mines.
The war went on with varying success and was marked by the heroism of Russian sailors and soldiers, who struck even the enemy with their fighting spirit. Like, for example, Private Vasily Ryabov, who was detained by the Japanese during a reconnaissance exit. In the clothes of a Chinese peasant, in a wig with a pigtail, Ryabov ran into a Japanese patrol behind enemy lines. The interrogation did not break Ryabov, he kept a military secret and, being sentenced to death, behaved with dignity. Everything happened strictly according to the ritual. Shot from guns from fifteen paces. The Japanese were delighted with the courageous behavior of the Russian and considered it their duty to bring this to the attention of his superiors.
The Japanese officer's note sounds like a presentation for an award: "Our army cannot but express our sincere wishes to the respected army that the latter educate more such truly beautiful, worthy of full respect warriors."
The peace treaty, signed on August 23, 1905, is still a very controversial document, some historians consider it a big mistake of Russian diplomacy. Not the last negative role in resolving the negotiation issue was played by Lieutenant General Anatoly Stessel. In literature, he is often called the commandant of the fortress, although this is not so. Stessel was the head of the Kwantung fortified region, after the abolition of the latter in June 1904, contrary to orders, he remained in Port Arthur. As a military leader, he did not show himself by sending out reports with exaggerated data on Russian losses and the number of Japanese troops.
Stessel is also known for a number of very dark financial dealings in the besieged fortress. On January 2, 1905, contrary to the opinion of the military council, he began negotiations with the Japanese on the surrender of Port Arthur. After the war, under the pressure of public opinion, he was put on trial and was sentenced to 10 years in a fortress, but six months later he was released by decision of the emperor and hurried to go abroad.
World War I (1914-1918)
Despite the fact that the first World War is considered a lost war by Russia, our troops showed considerable heroism in it. The capture of Przemysl, the Battle of Galicia, the Sarykamysh operation, the Erzemrum and Trebizond operations can be attributed to the number of Russian victories in the First World War.
The Brusilovsky breakthrough received great fame. The troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of A. A. Brusilov, having broken the Austrian defense, again occupied almost all of Galicia and Bukovina. The enemy lost up to 1.5 million people killed, wounded and captured. But like many other Russian victories, the Brusilovsky breakthrough, with all its military success, turned out to be more beneficial for Russia's allies: the German pressure on Verdun was weakened, and in the Alps the Italians managed to put themselves in order after the defeat at Trentino. A direct consequence of the Brusilov breakthrough was Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente, which forced Russia to lengthen the front by another 500 kilometers.
Only towards the end of 1916 did both England and France feel their strength. The defeat of Germany was not far off. War is an economic funnel, after which you can get good dividends at the end, and the war itself brings good profits. The United States also planned to enter the war. Woodrow Wilson, originally neutral, has matured. Participation in the division of territories and indemnities of Russia was highly undesirable.
Undermined from within (not without British influence), Russia was morally ready for the Brest Peace. If it were not for the confluence of circumstances that led to unrest and loosening of power in the country, Russia would definitely have emerged victorious from the war. Thanks to the "allies" - did not come out.
England and France presented the war as a struggle for freedom against the power of an autocracy. Presence tsarist Russia in the democratic Allied camp was a serious handicap in this ideological war. The London Times hailed the February Revolution as "a victory in the military movement" and an editorial commentary explained that "the army and the people united to overthrow the reactionary forces that were suffocating the popular aspirations and binding the national forces."
June 12 is Russia Day in our country. However. There is another country in the world - Paraguay, which celebrates a holiday on this day. And the Russian contribution to this holiday is very significant. 80 years ago, on June 12, 1935, the war between Paraguay and Bolivia, the so-called Chaco war, ended victoriously. An invaluable contribution to this victory was made by Russian officers, for whom, after the civil war in Russia, Paraguay became their new homeland.
The war was named after the Chaco territory - semi-desert, hilly in the northwest and swampy in the southeast, with impenetrable selva, on the border of Bolivia and Paraguay. She considered this land to be her own, but no one seriously drew a border there, since these wastelands and impenetrable thorny bushes intertwined with vines really did not bother anyone. Everything changed dramatically when, in 1928, in the foothills of the Andes, in the western part of the Chaco region, geologists discovered signs of oil. This event radically changed the situation. Armed skirmishes began for possession of the territory, and in June 1932 a real war broke out.
Economics is inseparable from politics. And from this point of view, the Chaco War was caused solely by the rivalry between the American oil corporation "Standard Oil", led by the Rockefeller family, and the British-Dutch "Shell Oil", each of which sought to monopoly dispose of the "future" Chaco oil. Standard Oil put pressure on President Roosevelt to secure US military aid to the friendly Bolivian regime via Peru and Chile. In turn, Shell Oil, using Argentina, which was then allied to London, heavily armed Paraguay.
The Bolivian army used the services of German and Czech military advisers. Since 1923, General Hans Kundt, a veteran of the First World War, has been the Minister of War of Bolivia. From 1928 to 1931, Ernst Röhm, then the well-known head of the assault squads of the Nazi Party, served as an instructor in the Bolivian army. In total, there were 120 German officers in the Bolivian army. German military advisers created from the Bolivian armed forces an exact copy of the German army of the First World War model. Seeing his troops at the parade, marching in a typical Prussian style, where officers flaunted in shiny helmets with "shishaks" from the time of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the President of Bolivia proudly declared: "Yes, now we can quickly resolve our territorial differences with the Paraguayans"!
By that time, a large colony of Russian White Guard emigrant officers had settled in Paraguay. After wandering around the world, they were unpretentious, homeless and poor. The Paraguayan government offered them not only citizenship, but also officer positions. In August 1932, almost all the Russians who were at that time in the Paraguayan capital of Asuncion gathered in the house of Nikolai Korsakov. The time was very disturbing: the war began and they, the immigrants, had to decide what to do in this situation. Korsakov expressed his opinion: “Twelve years ago we lost our beloved Russia, which is now in the hands of the Bolsheviks. You all see how warmly we were received in Paraguay. Now, when this country is going through a difficult moment, we must help it. What can we expect? After all, Paraguay has become a second homeland for us, and we, the officers, are obliged to fulfill our duty to it.”
Russians began to arrive at recruiting stations and sign up as volunteers for the Paraguayan army. They all retained the ranks with which they ended the civil war in Russia. There was only one feature: after mentioning the rank of each Russian volunteer, two Latin letters "NS" were always added. This abbreviation meant "Honoris Causa" and distinguished them from regular Paraguayan officers. Eventually. in the Paraguayan army there were about 80 Russian officers: 8 colonels, 4 lieutenant colonels, 13 majors and 23 captains. And 2 generals - I.T. Belyaev and N.F. Ern = headed General base Army of Paraguay, commanded by General José Felix Estigarribia.
Russian officers at one time participated in the First World War and actively applied their experience in battles against the Bolivian army. Bolivia also used the German experience. On the side of Bolivia there was a significant superiority in numbers and weapons. The Bolivian army at the first stage of the war began an active advance deep into the territory of Paraguay and captured several strategically important forts: Boqueron, Corrales, Toledo. However, in many respects, thanks to Russian officers, out of tens of thousands of mobilized illiterate peasants, it was possible to create a combat-ready, organized army. Also, Generals Ern and Belyaev managed to prepare defensive structures, and in order to confuse the Bolivian aviation, which had superiority in the air, they planned and skillfully made false artillery positions, so that the aircraft bombed the trunks of palm trees disguised as guns.
The merit of Belyaev, who knew quite well the straightforwardness of the tactics of the German general and well studied the methods of the German army on the fields of the First World War, should be recognized as determining the direction and timing of the offensive of the Bolivian troops. Kundt later stated that in Bolivia he wanted to test a new attack method he had used on the Eastern Front. However, this tactic failed against the defenses built by the Russians for the Paraguayans.
Heroically behaved in battles and Russian officers. Yesaul Vasily Orefiev-Serebryakov in the battle of Bokeron, led the chain into a bayonet attack, himself in front, with a naked saber. Struck, he managed to say the words that became winged: "I carried out the order. A wonderful day to die!" ("Lindo dia para morir"). Captain Boris Kasyanov's cavalry squadron attacked the fortified point of Puesto Navidad. The attack was successful, but at the decisive moment two machine guns hit the Paraguayans. The attack began to "choke". Then Boris rushed to one of the machine guns and covered the embrasure of the machine gun nest with his body. Russian officers died heroically, but their courage is not forgotten, their names are immortalized in the names of streets, bridges and forts of Paraguay.
Using the tactics developed by the Russian generals of fortified points and attacks by sabotage detachments, the Paraguayan army neutralized the superiority of the Bolivian troops. And in July 1933, the Paraguayans, together with the Russians, went on the offensive. In 1934, hostilities took place already on the territory of Bolivia. By the spring of 1935, both warring parties were extremely financially exhausted, but the morale of the Paraguayans was at its best. In April, after fierce fighting, the Bolivian defenses were broken through along the entire front. The Bolivian government asked the League of Nations to mediate a truce with Paraguay.
After the defeat of the Bolivian army near the city of Ingavi, on June 12, 1935, a truce was signed between Bolivia and Paraguay. Thus ended the Chak war. The war turned out to be very bloody. 89,000 Bolivians and almost 40,000 Paraguayans died, according to other sources - 60,000 and 31,500 people. 150,000 people were injured. Almost the entire Bolivian army was captured by the Paraguayans - 300,000 people
And here is what caused the whole “cheese forest” to flare up - oil was never found in the Chaco. However, the Russian diaspora after this war received a privileged position. Dead heroes they honor, and any Russian in Paraguay is treated with respect.
