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Registration 26 Mar 2012 Posts 1

Knowing

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An interesting publication. Somewhere, however, part of the Administration disappeared, for example, Analysts were lost, Departments and specializations were added, the Office was "transferred" to Khodyn instead of st. Sorge ... Not mentioned, for some reason Ogarkov, but the founding fathers should, as it were, be honored ...
We still have, it turns out, secrets from the Pindos attaches, whom it would be better to push out

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Knowing

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So you add - then too ... they will add)))
Actually, in the light of the interests of the Forum, it is worth noting that this kind of service did not feel drawn to "forgery" of documents certifying everything and everyone. Technological operations of this nature - of course - took place, but with the aim of more developing technological cycles. It was on the basis of "Gryzov" that the technology for replacing photos on the docks appeared without re-gluing, but by washing off the old one and applying a new layer of emulsion (essentially gelatin with chemicals). re-embossing), the ability to bring the photo in line with the "age" and condition of the document, and so on.
And so everything was based on "doubles" made at the corresponding "yards". Not excluding Goznak. At one time, a group of comrades received the Stars of Heroes SySySyRy, who brought to their alma mater a whole load of fabulous wealth in the form of Uncle Sam's passport books from one Arab country, supplied by this very Uncle even with paper from the US federal treasury ... Then they changed their minds, and bombed everything to their American mother...

Last edit: 27 Mar 2012

Rojer731

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Knowing

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And why, I'm sorry, "Bats"? Well, some of them are colloquially called "Batmen", but this has nothing to do with the office or their attributes.
The silhouette taken by everyone for a bat is actually the silhouette of an owl.

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dacota08

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GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Unlike the former KGB of the USSR, the organizational structure of the GRU was never advertised or published anywhere. And perhaps the only source of information on this issue is the book of the former GRU captain V. Rezun (V. Suvorov), who fled to England in 1978, "Soviet military intelligence", published in London in 1984. Of course, this source is far from perfect in terms of accuracy. However, for lack of a better structure of the GRU in the 70s. mainly based on this book.

The main complex of buildings of the GRU headquarters was located (and is still there) in Moscow in the area of ​​​​the Polezhaevskaya metro station, on the territory of the Central Airfield (the former Khodynskoye field). The main building - a 9-story structure made of glass and concrete, originally intended for a military hospital - was called "glass" in the local slang, and after the appearance of Suvorov's books it began to be called (mainly by journalists) "aquarium".

In addition, a decryption (crypto-analytical) service, a space intelligence center, receiving and transmitting centers for long-distance communications, and radio centers for long-range intelligence are located on the territory of Moscow and under it. The head of the GRU, or the 2nd Main Directorate of the General Staff, reporting directly to the chief of the General Staff, was his deputy in status, and his position corresponded to the military rank of army general. In the mid 70s. he had one first deputy and several deputies, each of whom oversaw one or more departments of the GRU. More specifically, at the time of V. Rezun's flight, the head of the GRU, General of the Army P.I. Ivashutin, had one first and seven "simple" deputies, namely: - First Deputy Head of the GRU, Colonel General A.G. Pavlov, subordinate to which were all the "mining" bodies involved in the collection of information; - the head of the information service, Colonel-General A.V. Zotov, who was responsible for all the "processing" bodies of the GRU; - Head of the political department of the GRU, Lieutenant-General G.I. Dolin; - Head of the Electronic Intelligence Department, Lieutenant-General A. Paliy; - head of fleet intelligence, Admiral L.K. Bekrenev; - Head of the Space Intelligence Directorate, Lieutenant General of Aviation V.A.Shatalov; - Head of the Military Diplomatic Academy, Colonel-General V.I. Meshcheryakov; - Head of the Personnel Department, Colonel-General S.I. Izotov. In addition, the head of the GRU was directly subordinate to the command post of the GRU and a group of especially important agents and "illegals".

In the 70s. The GRU consisted of 16 departments. Of these, most were "numbered" - from 1 to 12, but some, such as the personnel department, did not have numbers. Directorates directly involved in the collection and processing of intelligence information were divided into directions, and auxiliary directorates - into departments. Directions and departments, in turn, were divided into sections. The GRU also had directions and departments that were not part of the departments.

The position of the head of the department corresponded to the military rank of lieutenant general, the position of deputy head of the department, head of the direction or department corresponded to the rank of major general. The positions of deputy head of a direction or department, head of a section and his deputy - to the rank of colonel. Ordinary members of the sections held the positions of senior operational officers and operational officers. The military rank corresponding to the position of a senior operational officer is a colonel, an operational officer is a lieutenant colonel. Depending on their function, the GRU units were divided into mining, processing and auxiliary. Mining bodies were called bodies directly involved in the collection of intelligence information.

As already mentioned, they reported to the first deputy head of the GRU and included four departments:

The 1st Directorate of the GRU carried out undercover intelligence in Western Europe. It included five directions, each of which was engaged in undercover intelligence on the territory of several countries;

The 2nd Directorate was engaged in undercover intelligence in North and South America;

the 3rd Directorate conducted undercover intelligence in Asian countries;

4th Directorate - in Africa and the Middle East. The staff of each of the listed departments, according to V. Rezun, consisted of approximately 300 officers in the Center and the same number abroad.

In addition to these four departments, there were also four separate areas that were not part of the departments and were also subordinate to the first deputy head of the GRU:

The 1st direction of the GRU conducted undercover intelligence in Moscow. The officers who served in this direction were recruiting agents among foreign military attachés, members of military, scientific and other delegations, businessmen and other foreigners visiting Moscow. Another important task of the 1st direction was the introduction of GRU officers into Soviet official institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Academy of Sciences, Aeroflot, etc. Positions in these institutions were later used as legal cover during intelligence work abroad.

The 3rd branch of the GRU conducted undercover intelligence in national liberation movements and terrorist organizations.

The 4th direction of the GRU was engaged in undercover intelligence from the territory of Cuba, primarily against the United States, in this case it interacted with Cuban intelligence. In many respects, it duplicated the activities of the 2nd directorate of the GRU.

The 5th Directorate of the GRU, or the Directorate of Operational-Tactical Intelligence, was also "mining" and reported to the first deputy chief of the GRU. However, the specificity of its activities was that it was not engaged in independent undercover intelligence, but directed the work of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of military districts and fleets. The intelligence departments of the military districts and the intelligence of the fleet were directly subordinate to the 5th Directorate. The latter, in turn, were subordinated to four intelligence departments of the fleets.

It should be noted that if the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the military districts were directly subordinate to the Directorate of operational-tactical intelligence, then the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the fleets - the Northern, Pacific, Black Sea and Baltic - were combined into a single structure known as fleet intelligence. This was due to the fact that if each military district had a strictly defined area of ​​​​responsibility, then the ships of the Soviet fleets operated in almost all points of the oceans, and each ship had to constantly have full information about a potential enemy.

Therefore, the head of the intelligence of the fleet was the deputy head of the GRU and led the four intelligence departments of the naval headquarters, as well as the naval space intelligence department and the information service. But in his daily activities, he obeyed the orders of the 5th Directorate of the GRU. In addition, the GRU had two more directorates involved in the collection of information - the 6th Directorate and the Space Intelligence Directorate. However, since these departments, although they obtained and partially processed information, did not conduct undercover intelligence, they did not report to the first deputy head of the GRU.

The 6th Directorate of the GRU carried out electronic intelligence. The officers of this department were part of residencies in the capitals of foreign states and were engaged in the interception and decoding of transmissions on government and military information networks. In addition, the electronic intelligence regiments stationed on Soviet territory, as well as the electronic intelligence services of military districts and fleets, were subordinate to this department.

In addition to the 6th directorate, the activities of several more units and services of the GRU were connected with radio intelligence. Thus, the command post of the GRU, which carried out round-the-clock monitoring of the appearance of signs of an impending attack on the USSR, also used the information that entered the 6th Directorate. The Information Support Directorates carried out the work of evaluating the intelligence reports coming from the 6th Directorate. The decryption service was engaged in cryptanalysis of intercepted encrypted messages. She was directly subordinate to the head of the GRU and was located on Komsomolsky Prospekt in Moscow.

The main task of the decryption service was to read cipher messages from tactical military communications networks. A special computer center of the GRU processed the incoming information, which was obtained by means of radio intelligence with the help of computer technology. The Central Research Institute in Moscow developed specialized equipment for conducting radio reconnaissance, and the operational and technical department of the GRU was responsible for its production and maintenance. As for the GRU space intelligence department, it collected intelligence data using satellites. The processing organs of the GRU, sometimes called the information service, were engaged in the processing and analysis of incoming materials. The position of the head of the information service corresponded to the rank of colonel general, and he himself was the deputy head of the GRU.

Under his command were six information directorates, the Institute of Information, the information service of the fleet, and the information services of the intelligence directorates of the headquarters of the military districts. The areas of work of each of these departments were as follows:

The 7th directorate consisted of six departments and studied NATO. Each division and each section was responsible for researching individual trends or aspects of NATO action.

The 8th directorate studied individual countries around the world, regardless of whether this country belongs to NATO or not. At the same time, special attention was paid to the issues political structure, the armed forces and the economy.

The 9th directorate researched military technologies and was directly connected with the Soviet military-industrial complex.

The 10th Directorate studied the war economy throughout the world, including the arms trade, military production, and technological advances. different countries, production and stocks of strategic resources.

The 11th directorate studied the strategic concepts and strategic nuclear forces of all those countries that possess such or may create them in the future. This directorate carefully monitored any signs of increased activity in the actions of strategic nuclear forces in any region of the globe.

There is no exact information about what the 12th department was doing. The GRU Information Institute functioned independently of the departments and reported directly to the head of the information service. In contrast to the departments listed above, which studied secret documents obtained by secret agents, electronic or space intelligence, the institute studied open sources of information: the press, radio and television.

The GRU units, which were not directly involved in obtaining or processing intelligence materials, were considered auxiliary. These divisions included the political department, the personnel department, the operational and technical department, the administrative department, the communications department, the financial department, the first department, the eighth department, and the archive department.

In addition, the GRU included several research institutes and educational institutions. Their functions were as follows: The operational and technical department was engaged in the production of intelligence equipment - cryptographic equipment, equipment for microphotography, radio devices, eavesdropping equipment, weapons, poisons, etc. In his submission were several research institutes and specialized enterprises. The administrative department was responsible for providing the GRU with foreign exchange. The Directorate of Communications was busy organizing radio and other communications between the GRU and foreign residencies. The finance department carried out legal financial activities in the Soviet Union.

The first special department of the GRU was engaged in forging passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, military documents, police documents, etc.

The GRU Section 8 was the most secret of all the secret GRU divisions. He did encryption and decryption. Archival department, perhaps the most interesting of all departments. Millions of registration cards of illegal immigrants, GRU officers, secret residents, information about successful and unsuccessful recruitment of foreigners, dossiers of various government and military figures from different countries, etc. were stored and are still stored in its basements.

However, the foundation of the GRU was made up of intelligence departments and intelligence departments in the armies and military districts, as well as special forces units and subunits subordinate to them. Their structure in the described period was as follows: At the headquarters of military districts and groups of Soviet troops abroad, intelligence was carried out by the 2nd Directorate, consisting of five departments:

The 1st department supervised the work of intelligence departments, armies subordinate to the district and other units.

The 2nd department was engaged in undercover intelligence in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the district.

The 3rd department supervised the activities of the reconnaissance and sabotage units of the district.

The 4th department was engaged in the processing of intelligence information.

The 5th department carried out radio reconnaissance. In addition, the intelligence department of the district headquarters included several more auxiliary units. The organization of intelligence at the army level was the same as in the district. Only instead of the intelligence department at the army headquarters there was a 2nd (intelligence) department, which in turn consisted of five groups. As already mentioned, the expansion of the sphere of activity of military intelligence and the increase in the tasks assigned to it required more serious and professional training of highly qualified personnel. Therefore, the educational institutions of the GRU in the 60-70s. received great attention.

The main forge of Soviet military intelligence personnel was the Military Diplomatic Academy (conservatory in the jargon of military intelligence officers), which was located in Moscow on Narodnogo Opolcheniya Street. The post of head of the academy corresponded to the military rank of colonel general, and in his status he was deputy head of the GRU. Candidates for enrollment in the academy were selected mainly among officers of the military level, and before being admitted to the entrance exams, they underwent a comprehensive check for reliability and moral qualities for two to three years.

The Military Diplomatic Academy included three numbered faculties:

1st - Special Intelligence Faculty - trained intelligence officers who were supposed to be used in legal residencies.

2nd - Military Diplomatic Faculty - trained employees of military attaches.

The 3rd faculty was engaged in the training of operational-tactical intelligence officers who were assigned to the headquarters of the military districts. Although it was officially believed that students who were to work under civilian cover were trained at the 1st faculty (employees of embassies, trade missions, the merchant fleet, Aeroflot, etc.), and at the 2nd faculty - those who intended to use as employees of the military attaché, their programs were quite similar. In addition, very often graduates of the 1st faculty were sent to the military attaché, and vice versa. But the Military Diplomatic Academy was not the only educational institution where personnel were trained for military intelligence.

In addition to it, the GRU also had whole line educational institutions: - seventh Advanced Courses for Officers (KUOS); - Higher reconnaissance and command courses for the improvement of command personnel (VRK UKS); - faculties in military universities and departments of intelligence courses and disciplines in various military educational institutions(Department of Intelligence of the Navy at the Naval Academy, Intelligence Faculty at the Academy of the General Staff, Intelligence Faculty at the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze, Intelligence Faculty of the Naval Academy, Special Faculty of the Military Academy of Communications, Military Institute of Foreign Languages, Cherepovets Higher military school communications, the special faculty of the Higher Naval School of Radio Electronics, the faculty of special forces of the Ryazan Higher Airborne School, the intelligence faculty of the Kyiv Higher Military Command School, the special faculty of the 2nd Kharkov Higher Military Aviation Technical School, the faculty of special intelligence (since 1994) and the faculty military intelligence at the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School).

Head of the GRU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Korabelnikov Valentin Vladimirovich.

Genus. 01/04/1946. Colonel General. Born in the Tambov region. He graduated from the Minsk Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile Engineering School (1969), the Military Academy (1974), the Military Academy of the General Staff (1988). He served in the troops and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In 1991-1997 - Head of Department, First Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. Specialist in the field of substantiating requirements and building an information support system for making military and military-political decisions. Head of research to determine the directions for the development of information tools and systems. Author of scientific papers on the problems of information support for preparation and decision-making. Corresponding member of the department "Technical means of reconnaissance and target designation" of the Russian Russian Academy rocket and artillery sciences. Graduated from the Military Diplomatic Academy under the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. For more than 20 years he worked in the bodies of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. From 1992 to 1997 he was the first deputy chief of the GRU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. During the hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic, he repeatedly traveled to the combat zone. In May 1997, during a medical examination preceding the dismissal of Colonel-General Fyodor Ladygin, he was acting head of the GRU. In May 1997, he was appointed head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. On August 20, 1997, he was introduced to the Coordinating Interdepartmental Council for Military-Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation with foreign states. Since December 31, 1997 - Member of the Supervisory Board for the activities of the Rosvooruzhenie and Promexport companies. In July 1999, V. Korabelnikov received gratitude from President B. Yeltsin for his significant contribution to the process of resolving the conflict in the Yugoslav region of Kosovo. On September 6, 1999, he was included in the Commission under the President of the Russian Federation on military-technical cooperation with foreign states.

difficult

In Russia, very few people understand what the destruction of the military intelligence system at the suggestion of the Kremlin will turn out for our country. The Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff is the central body of military intelligence in Russia. Its main task is to timely reveal an impending attack or a development of the situation threatening the security of the Russian Federation, and to warn the country's leadership about them. Specialists who can actually appreciate it - do not have the right to vote or have been killed. A high-ranking officer of the central apparatus of the GRU said at the meeting: "Professional cadres of the General Staff are purposefully knocked out." Generals and colonels who have their own opinion and are trying to answer the question - what is the point in destroying the institution of military intelligence? - at best, they end up in retirement, at worst, they die under unclear circumstances, as happened with Major General of the GRU Yuri Ivanov, who was in charge of organizing military intelligence in the Caucasus region.

Deputy head of the GRU, Major General Yuri Ivanov, tragically "died",
his body "surfaced" 90 km from the resting place in Syria off the coast of Turkey

One of the country's two most important intelligence services is being systematically destroyed by the Kremlin with the help of the FSB-SVR Corporation. Today it is clear that the GRU has nothing to do with the informers from the FSB, who occupied the highest command posts in this structure, and today are engaged in big politics. The GRU really hinders these informers. His employees know too much, they could get documents for many transactions, they are too informed witnesses ... I wonder what? Betrayal or corruption?

The betrayal of the upper echelon of power: the Kremlin, the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, etc. The level for our country is beyond.

Corruption has permeated the entire vertical of power from top to bottom, including the Interior Ministry and the Lubyanka. The price is hundreds of human lives. An explosion in Domodedovo (explosives from the North Caucasus were brought by bus, without hindrance passing through all the posts and checks for a small "magarych"). All truck drivers face this "magarych" every day, everything is the same as 8 years ago, when bombs were brought to the Dubrovka theater. The consequence of corruption is incompetence - the inability of the authorities to formulate a clear, well-founded concept of national interests, to determine the real challenges of the nation. The concept of national security formulated by the Security Council (Patrushev) still sees the main enemy in NATO and the US, completely forgetting about China. Along with this, the collapse of all army systems arranged by the Kremlin, the eradication of personnel generals, the appointment of "jackets" to the post of Minister of Defense and other positions. Hence the complete chaos in the structures, whose job is to obtain information about threats before they become the bloody reality of our lives.

What happens to our security and to those who are called to protect it? The headquarters of the GRU on Khodynka is a complex of buildings with an area of ​​​​more than 70 thousand square meters. meters - almost depopulated. Echoing empty corridors, constant reductions, oppressive uncertainty. The destruction of the GRU was preceded by a media campaign, which was carried out at the behest of the Kremlin and with a full range of political dirt, lies and fabrications.

After the first arrest of GRU Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov in 2005 in connection with the assassination attempt on Chubais (popularly known as “Red Voucher”), rumors spread that militant terrorist groups were being formed within the service. His new arrest in 2010 showed that these rumors had been turned into real allegations. The reserve colonel is accused of attempting an armed rebellion and facilitating terrorist activities. Let me remind you that Kvachkov was taken into custody on December 23, 2010 by the decision of the Lefortovo Court of Moscow at the request of the Investigation Department of the FSB of Russia. On the screens of corrupt television, films began to appear in the spirit of the Spy Games series, exposing traitors among the top of the GRU, arranging endless conspiracies, compiling lists to shoot oligarchs and politicians who sell Russian military secrets right and left.

They were exposed, naturally, by the heroes of the Federal Security Service. (received the titles of Heroes of Russia according to closed lists for unknown feats in an unknown war under the Kremlin carpet). Could it be otherwise if the one who has compromising information comes from this service and has been ruling the country for 12 years? All the main events took place "under the Kremlin carpet", and the citizens did not even see that a powerful propaganda campaign was underway to prepare for the liquidation of the GRU.

Today, GRU officials consider the destruction of the military intelligence system a fait accompli. Celebrating their professional holiday, veterans and active officers of the service, one after another, spoke "for the blessed memory" of the intelligence agency with which their professional destinies were connected. I appeal to all veterans and current officers of the GRU: thank Putin for this, the Minister of Defense is only an executor and, due to his stupidity, he himself, without a team, cannot do anything. The presence of a high position does not hide, but reveals the stupidity and stupidity of narrow-minded people who have nothing to do with state building. You can't call them statesmen. According to their deeds, they are enemies of the Russian people!

The GRU is the most secret special service of the intelligence community of the USSR and Russia. Therefore, the enemies of our Motherland are primarily interested in its destruction!

Former head of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff Valentin Korabelnikov

Today the situation is such that there is nothing to lose. When despair turns out to be stronger than the habit of living under the heading "secret", even GRU veterans begin to speak openly about the problems of the service. Lieutenant General Dmitry Gerasimov, the former head of the GRU department, who led all the special forces brigades, said: “I am deeply convinced that the GRU special forces have been completely consciously destroyed. Of the 14 brigades and two training regiments of the GRU, no more than four brigades remained. It must be understood that this is no longer GRU special forces, but ordinary military intelligence, which is part of the Ground Forces.

The Berdsk special forces brigade said goodbye to the combat banner of the unit.

One of the best brigades, the Berdskaya, was liquidated, with great difficulty they managed to defend the 22nd brigade, which bears the high rank of “Guards”. This is the most combat-ready GRU unit that fought in the most critical areas in Afghanistan, Chechnya and other "hot spots". I can say that the so-called "osnaz" - parts of electronic intelligence - have also been eliminated. In essence, we are building an armed force that can't see or hear anything." Everything is rightly said, the Kremlin also sees nothing and does not want to hear anything. And we hear only the bleating of the “tandem”, ruining what we should adequately maintain, strengthen and cherish. Intelligence is a vital necessity for any state and state leader. But in our "tandem" there is neither a leader nor a Russian state leader - for example, two narcissists who lead corruption.

Of the 7,000 officers who served in the GRU in Soviet times, now less than 2,000 remain in the structure. In the opinion of intelligence officers, the GRU held out until its former chief, General of the Army Valentin Korabelnikov, left it. After his forced resignation, the final cleansing of the system began. High-ranking officials of the central apparatus of the GRU, the General Staff, the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the FSB, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the FSO, heads, specialists and developers of the electronic intelligence system, heads of institutions conducting developments for law enforcement agencies, on condition of anonymity, also claim that they consider the collapse of the service a purposeful action .

At the first stage, the main blow was dealt to the “osnaz”, as a result of which all the existing electronic intelligence centers were liquidated both on the territory of our country, with the exception of the Transcaucasian direction, and at Russian military bases. Then all the main lines of work of the GRU were reduced, from strategic and undercover intelligence to auxiliary units and the Military Diplomatic Academy, which trained intelligence officers both for the military attache apparatus and for the illegal GRU residencies.

Today it is known that in the specialized research institute of the GRU all development and research work has been stopped, and the FSB cannot independently make a single development. All areas of radio intelligence have gone far ahead of the non-systemic generals of radio intelligence, who do not understand anything and do not want to understand. Everyone has their own business. Even the US radio reconnaissance vehicles that belonged to Georgia were seized in 2008, no one took an interest, they had to be sent under pressure. There was a team from the Kremlin, or through their own stupidity and thoughtlessness, the most valuable equipment was thrown out like a pile of rubbish. And not surprisingly, at about the same time I saw a picture of the brainwashing of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. Cars of the US Ambassador with full electronic equipment and without inspection drove into the closed territory of the Administration. Entrance N6, where the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Department of Internal Policy and presidential advisers are located. All the time, while negotiations with the ambassador were going on, the car stood and calmly filmed all the staff of the apparatus. A familiar employee of the FSO who passed by threw the phrase: “Everything was sold, bitches.”

The United States is not the opposing side for the Presidential Administration, about which Putin shouts with foam on his lips. Opposing is the people of Russia, in particular, the residents of Moscow, from whom they fenced off. This is not an isolated fact, one can give many examples and submit documents for leaders who obviously do not work in our country, at best, for themselves.

The Military Diplomatic Academy (VDA) began to cut teaching staff. According to the story of a high-ranking official, the number of "mining units" of the GRU responsible for undercover and strategic intelligence on the territory of foreign states has been reduced by 40%.

Apparently, the Minister of Defense has his own views on the work of intelligence, in which he understands nothing. Today, a huge number of intelligence officers who perform official duties outside of Russia already know that they have virtually nowhere to return. This makes their further work meaningless, and turns them into potential targets for recruitment by foreign intelligence services, which, it seems, is what the Kremlin is trying to achieve.

Mass layoffs are taking place among the most experienced officers of the GRU, who are being fired into nowhere, not even in connection with reaching the age limit, but at the ministerial desire and brainless command. The peculiarity of the GRU is that, unlike the SVR, which has a large number of specialized educational institutions, the specifics and traditions of the GRU require that only the most experienced military officers, who are at least 30 years old at the time they enter the GRU, be selected for military intelligence. The irresponsible, headless dismissal of such specialists is not stupidity, it is a betrayal of the state interests of our homeland and the Russian people, sabotage by the Kremlin and the government, an obvious waste of the “golden reserve” of professional Russian military intelligence personnel.

Combat officers of the GRU today can be found both in expensive offices and at railway stations, where they work as loaders, in shops, among repairmen or handymen. About the reform of their former service, the Minister of Defense and the "tandem", they speak mostly obscenities, but sometimes they squeeze out correct definitions of where the "tandem" should go.

“The GRU empire is dying,” said an analyst with extensive undercover intelligence experience. He fought in Afghanistan, is fluent in several European languages ​​and Arabic, and has traveled to more than 70 countries. Now unemployed, dismissed as useless, he helps translate specialized texts, writes articles, and conducts analytical research.

A computer assembler is a space intelligence officer. Assembles and installs computers and household appliances. He frankly says: “It is disgusting to see how our pathetic attempts to save at least something from the Soviet cosmonautics are presented as achievements of recent years.” This Serdyukov advertises Resurs satellites. "They still Soviet assembly are stored in warehouses. And they were made not for the military, but for oilmen. The equipment is obsolete, there is no resolution, it is difficult to distinguish a cruiser from an aircraft carrier.

“The GRU and military intelligence are two big differences, but the GRU special forces were merged into the Ground Forces. It was the GRU units that were the most productive.” Senior officer of the GRU special forces, awarded military orders and medals. Extensive experience of participating in special events around the world. At one time they met with him in Yugoslavia, after Yugoslavia he fought in the North Caucasus for many years, today the Kremlin no longer needs him.

(The Kremlin does not need anyone, neither GRU intelligence officers, nor radio intelligence, does not need generals of the General Staff, does not need the ZIL and Moskvich automobile plants, does not need the Samara Aviation Plant, Ulyanovsk Aviation Plant, does not need fundamental science, defense institutions, does not need Russian culture and the Russian people.)

The strongest blow fell on the agents of the GRU. Against the backdrop of public support for the SVR after a grandiose scandal and the failure of the illegal foreign intelligence network associated with the name of Anna Chapman, nothing is demonstrably and demonstratively done to protect the GRU agents captured on the territory of Georgia and other states. These political s... they just handed over everyone, they protect their money stolen from the state budget, they placed the Stabilization Fund in the USA, but they don't need people.

All the latest military intelligence failures provoked are used only to justify the ineffectiveness of the GRU, and no one talks about the leakage of information from the highest echelons of power. Why? Why, as a result of this approach, a number of agents recruited on the territory of the states of Southwest Asia have already been executed; who handed them over to the Kremlin and the government? Where did the information labeled “Top Secret” come from, and who from the leadership of our country blabbed and handed over operational data obtained at the risk of life?
The reason for the systemic attack of the Kremlin on the GRU was the unpreparedness of the army for an armed conflict with Georgia. According to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General A. Nogovitsyn, who commanded a group of Russian troops during the Russian-Georgian war, the Georgians had Soviet air defense systems of the Buk air defense system and modern American radio intelligence and airspace control systems, which came as a complete surprise to the General Staff, allowed to cause serious damage to the Russian Air Force.

The current officers of the central apparatus of the GRU called Serdyukov a complete "mu ... com", who at a meeting of the leadership following the results of the war, without hesitation in expressions, accused military intelligence of not having the necessary information. Meanwhile, the Kremlin king who dragged Russia into the war with Georgia, when assessing the operational situation and making decisions, not only did not consider the information of the GRU, but pointedly ignored it. Yes, and what would it change: one unfortunate lawyer, another couch worker, the third club spy, the head of the SVR is just a misunderstanding. Intelligence sent all the necessary information, including information about the delivery of modernized Buk systems by Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense and the top leadership of the country were aware. And the fact that they only read Playboy...

The dolts in the Kremlin would have been aware of everything if they had paid attention to the reports of the GRU. But the "tandem" dwarfs imagined themselves to be the heads of big politics, and the head of military intelligence lost the right to make a direct personal report to the President. The information sent by the chief of military intelligence now passes through two filters - the chief of the General Staff and the minister of defense. I watched how the documents addressed to the President of Russia were being processed. These cheerful "sofa workers" adjust documents for themselves in conditions military reform, removing “jambs” and “hangs” and other shortcomings from documents, completely emasculating the data and “clarifying” reliable information. Today, when there is a redistribution of resources and a lot of money, when generals of different branches of the military are fighting to maintain their posts and feeders, whoever has direct access to the "ear" of the president's stupid head can win.

The GRU is the main competitor of the FSB and the SVR, access to the "dwarfs" was blocked at the command of the "dwarfs" themselves, don't ask why. And those generals who have their own opinion are dying under unclear circumstances, as happened with Major General of the GRU Yu. Ivanov.

The corpse of General Ivanov, the country's most important secret bearer, who, according to the official version, was on vacation in Syria, was strangely discovered in the coastal waters of Turkey, and the corpse swam against the current for a very long distance. Apparently it's an attempt. Scouts of this level in the conditions of military reform rarely die naturally. The main business of the Kremlin, which is the customer of the so-called GRU reform, is connected with money laundering and offshore companies. Only the strategic intelligence of the GRU could pose a threat to this business, since it had the ability to control and monitor such actions. And at the same time, she did not belong to a bunch of FSB-SVR. A “special service” has been formed in Russia to serve the interests of a narrow group of people who govern the country. Secretly working for this structure, people are scattered and serve in different units of the Russian special services.

In order to control and successfully maintain the functioning of the Masonic “network system of the elite”, the “Kremlin dwarfs” need to solve only one task: to destroy all alternative sources of intelligence information and leaders capable of independent comparative analysis. The selfish interests of the leadership of the FSB and the Foreign Intelligence Service are to protect the top leadership of the country, close to these special services (the Security Council - FSB General Patrushev, the Presidential Administration - FSB General Ivanov, the government - FSB Lieutenant Colonel Putin, Transneft - FSB General Tokarev, etc.). The interests of the GRU are alien to these people, and its knowledge simply frightens them. The ability to provide a competitive advantage to “our own” Kremlin is more important than solving real government tasks, including intelligence ones. For example, to ensure the interests of very influential non-military groups related to unhealed hotbeds of tension, for example, in the Caucasus with its huge sources of funding. There is a certain specificity of the actions of special forces groups and their (actions) fundamental difference from the tactics of military intelligence officers. The main advantage of the GRU spetsnaz lies in the combination of operational work to obtain information with combat operations, including the use of special means and the latest technologies. Spetsnaz scouts, unlike military scouts, are able to operate both in the city - as an illegal underground, and in the forest - as a classic sabotage unit. The operatives of such a unit, as a by-product of their activities, always get access to very confidential information about the real channels and sources of funding, about the contacts of their "wards", about secret accounts, about contracts for the supply of weapons with multi-million dollar kickbacks, about the theft of weapons from army warehouses. and subsequent explosions on them, illegal financial flows involving high-ranking officials, the printing of counterfeit currency, the export of diamonds and precious metals, transit routes, channels and corridors at the border, a complete drug logistics scheme. There are documents on Moscow, the Kremlin, the government, the Ministry of Finance, how and to whom budget apartments go and how finances, schemes, accounts, kickbacks, routes, thefts, including the cars of the “rich Pinocchio”, etc. are carried out. etc. What kind of affairs and business do the wives of the “tandem” do, how do they receive kickbacks in managing the affairs of the president, which of the overthrown rulers of states keeps money in Russia, etc. It turns out that there are no saints either in the Kremlin, or in the government, or in the Union State, there are corrupt thieves, I say this with full responsibility. The Kremlin does not have one thing - guarantees of the loyalty of GRU intelligence officers to competitors from Lubyanka, covering up any information.

The virtually destroyed GRU electronic intelligence network shows that the Kremlin does not understand the importance of electronic intelligence, which is why the Russian Federation cannot play the role in world politics that belonged to the USSR. The scope is not the same and the caliber is watery. The strategic and undercover intelligence of the GRU is a resource that Russia cannot lose. The GRU had a huge information and analytical service. Several thematic departments and departments worked only through NATO. Today, NATO is quietly preparing to be based in Ulyanovsk, to the applause of the corrupt "tandem".

According to the most conservative estimates, the GRU has lost 75% of its personnel. The new starting point for the collapse of the GRU was 2009, when the Kremlin appointed Shlyakhturov as head of intelligence. Clueless instructions were given from above, and the general carried them out according to the principle "trust a fool to pray to God, he will hurt his forehead." His zeal is described in one phrase: “I won’t destroy it, I’ll ruin it!”. Entire scientific groups that developed the tactics of new reconnaissance actions were liquidated. All development and research work has been stopped at the Research Institute of the GRU. The military-diplomatic academy has undergone reductions in teaching staff. And now the corrupt and corrupt top authorities are striving to turn the GRU into a puppet structure, completely controlled by its interests.

The GRU is a searchlight that, independently of the Kremlin, highlighted contract killings in the center of Moscow, “suicides” and disappearances of FSB officers, kickbacks and distribution of funds during the Chechen war, has information about “golden” planes exporting the wealth of our homeland, about imported under the guise of drugs, drugs, etc. For the corrupt Kremlin with its corrupt vertical of power, extra eyes and ears capable of watching and listening to what is being done in the government, the Kremlin, Gazprom, Rosneft, Rosvooruzhenie and Rosatom are not needed.

Now the Ministry of Defense is doing everything to ensure that the GRU does not actually work. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense is generally incompetent in matters of management, the development of the armed forces, the purchase of military equipment and weapons, and many others. The incompetence of the government infected the already heavily shell-shocked Leningrad leadership of the Ministry of Defense. Veterans of the GRU would not have gone into reconnaissance either with Shlyakhturov or Serdyukov, there is nothing to say about a tandem. The special forces of the GRU recruit narrow professionals who are capable of incapacitating the enemy's strategic facilities in the shortest possible time. At the same time, some officers specialize in airfields, others in communications centers, and still others in nuclear attack weapons. Under these conditions, the reduction carried out by the Kremlin and the subordination of special forces units to the commanders of military districts looks like a deliberate blow to the country's combat capability and a betrayal of the Russian people.

Such reforms are unacceptable, no matter what the reasons are. As the military and political history of many centuries shows, the state must receive information about the enemy and about the situation as a whole from more than one source of intelligence. Today, the Kremlin has become the source of disinformation in the country. And the people of Russia are a victim of the incompetence of the rulers or betrayal in the ranks of the Kremlin!

At external similarity, the goals and objectives of the SVR and the GRU are largely different. The GRU collects information in the interests of the armed forces, providing data to the General Staff, which builds plans for the country's defense based on the information received. The political intelligence, which the SVR is engaged in, does not solve these problems, and if the two intelligence services merge, the army leadership will face a shortage of the necessary information.

Apparently, the lack of understanding of the real situation in the Armed Forces, and even more so in such a specific department of the General Staff as the GRU, pushed the Kremlin to carry out covert sabotage, covering up its actions with fictitious "sensations" about Colonel Kvachkov. After all, according to the Kremlin, terrorist and extremist organizations represent the greatest danger. Like, their actions are distinguished by extreme cruelty, and the attacks are committed in peacetime. Therefore, in its work, the FSB pays special attention to obtaining proactive intelligence information about the plans and actions of such groups... This chatter is necessary for the Kremlin and the FSB to take timely measures, including by force, that "neutralize terrorist threats."

But speaking on the merits, it should be emphasized that even using all the possibilities of the FSB, the Kremlin does not control the situation in those areas from where our country can really be attacked or military actions against the people of Russia can be organized. Such information must not only be obtained, it must be analyzed, conclusions drawn, and then reported to the highest state and military leadership of the country, which does not read this information. The most important documents of the GRU are sent to the president (who understands nothing), the chairman of the government (does business) and to the Security Council (pensioner Patrushev is the head of a public organization).

Mole in the Kremlin

Veteran of the Main Intelligence Directorate I.I. Parinov, who served there for more than 30 years, said: "Putin has long been recruited by the West and, apparently, has become the biggest success of the Western intelligence services." And he further explained that spies of this magnitude are being removed from intelligence, there are many other, more professional and more inconspicuous services. What service recruited Putin, today is not important. The main thing is that this person works for the whole West. As for his “resolute struggle against Western influence” and “against the collapse of Russia”, this is the appearance of a “struggle against”. This is a cover. It is time to learn to distinguish slogans from real actions. What spy will loudly admit that he is an enemy agent? Or will the spy applaud the cry “Forward, Russia!” the loudest of all, but surreptitiously do everything to destroy the country? Let's see, there is a significant drawback in intelligence - over time they become outdated. No one needs a new secret detail obtained by a spy at the risk of his life in five years. The country's defense plans will become obsolete in ten years. Information about the mistress of the ambassador or the military attache is of no interest to anyone the day after the ambassador retires. We see that most of the intelligence successes are short-lived. But using a spy as big as Putin to achieve short-term goals is irrational.
Let's say you recruited a person who in the future became the president of a country potentially hostile to you (not without your help he became, of course). How will you use the resident? Require from him lists of nomenclature of factories and schedules of military transportation? Or will you quietly, imperceptibly, begin the process of turning the state into a country that is submissive to you, moreover, submissive for a long time, for the entire foreseeable future, for generations to come? What is Putin's "anti-Americanism" expressed in? In his statements about the machinations of the Americans? In absurd and ridiculous allusions to how the Russian space program is plagued by failures because the Americans covertly shoot down Russian satellites and drop GLONASS satellites? In his loud denunciations of “human rights violations in the USA”, which no one notices in the USA or even in Finland?

In fictions, how people dissatisfied with his rule come out to rallies, it turns out, because they are bought up by enemies in a crowd, and they don’t like Putin just because they are paid for this “dislike”? Then they obviously surrounded us, we were at the rally, but they didn’t give us any money. True, no one promised. It's time to rise to the rallies for the city of Togliatti, whose car plant will be an assembly line for screwdriver assembly. The entire social sector and auxiliary production will not be needed along with the workers. Samara, with dying factories and an aircraft factory that died in peacetime, is already ready for protests. Izhevsk, Yekaterinburg, Kazan, Ufa, Vladivostok - there are countless cities that are preparing for rallies against unemployment, poverty and rising prices for housing and communal services, gasoline, food. Putin sold a controlling stake in AvtoVAZ to foreigners and promised to buy new technologies and create new jobs. Instead of new technologies, Togliatti will have a NATO base in Ulyanovsk.

Doesn't it really get that all these statements are made with the obvious goal of creating a country completely dependent on the United States, an appendage of America, its fiefdom. "Anti-Americanism" is only a cover - the thief shouts the loudest "stop the thief." The Russian economy is ruined, the industry does not exist, the Kremlin points to the "external enemy", so there is no need to fix something at home. There is no need to look for mistakes in the government and the organization of unfortunate reforms, no need to redirect funding, no need to fire lazybones and incompetent people and replace them with qualified specialists, no need to change the atmosphere of intrigue and squabbles in the Kremlin.

Nothing to do! After all, the enemies are to blame. Enough to strengthen the security measures, and everything will work out right there! After Putin's order to blame all failures on the Americans, the matter was left to chance. Opportunists, corrupt officials who tricked their way into the highest positions in the state will not be removed. Smart heads will not get a raise, the release of unnecessary laws, national projects, useless reforms, the beating of science and education will continue. The whole vicious system will develop viciously further.

Result? Complete lag, degradation and marking time, Russia's subjugation to America even in space - one of the most important areas of development for the next hundred years! Scientists, engineers, mathematicians are leaving, whoever remains will have to work under the guidance of cunning and sycophants who see their goal only in looking for the enemy and in intrigues.

To be continued...

Igor Korobov was born on August 3, 1956 in the city of Vyazma, Smolensk region. In 1977, he graduated with honors from the flight department of the Stavropol Higher Military Aviation School for Air Defense Pilots and Navigators named after Air Marshal Sudets.

In November 1977, Lieutenant Igor Korobov arrived on assignment for further service in the 518th Fighter Aviation Berlin Order of Suvorov Regiment, 10th Separate Red Banner Air Defense Army stationed in the city of Arkhangelsk. In 1980, he was selected for further service in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

In 1985, Korobov received additional education, having successfully graduated from the Military Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army. He served in the military in various leadership positions. He was the first deputy head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, supervising issues of strategic intelligence. In particular, Igor Valentinovich was in charge of all foreign management residencies. Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

In January 2016, by presidential decree Russian Federation, Korobov Igor Valentinovich was appointed Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

In early February 2016, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, presented Lieutenant General Igor Korobov with the personal standard of the Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

In May 2017, for the courage and heroism shown in the performance of military duty, Colonel General Igor Valentinovich Korobov was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation with the award of a special distinction - the Gold Star medal.

Korobov made a visit to the United States on January 27-28, 2018 - together with the head of the FSB Bortnikov and the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service Naryshkin. All of them met in Washington with CIA Director Pompeo, and it was the most status and representative meeting of the heads of the American and Russian intelligence services. The parties discussed the threat of return from Syria of the militants of the "Islamic State", who had previously arrived to fight in Syria from other countries.

Owns several foreign languages. Married. Has two daughters.

The head of the main department of the Russian General Staff, Igor Valentinovich Korobov, died on November 21, 2018 after a severe and prolonged illness.

It can be safely called the most popular military units in Russia. Dozens of films have been made about him, hundreds of books and articles have been written on the Internet. The Russian GRU Spetsnaz is the real elite of the armed forces - although, as a rule, film scripts have little relation to reality.

Only the very best get into the special forces, and in order to be enrolled in this unit, candidates must pass a tough selection. The usual training of the GRU special forces can shock the average man in the street - special attention is paid to the physical and psychological preparation of the special forces.

Real operations in which army special forces took part are usually not reported on TV or written in newspapers. Media hype usually means mission failure, and GRU spetsnaz failures are relatively rare.

Unlike special units of other law enforcement agencies, the special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate do not have their own name, and generally prefer to operate without publicity. During operations, they can wear the uniform of any army in the world, and the globe depicted on the emblem of military intelligence means that the GRU special forces can operate anywhere in the world.

GRU Spetsnaz is the "eyes and ears" of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, and often an effective tool for various "delicate" operations. However, before continuing the story about the special forces and its everyday life, it should be said what the Main Intelligence Directorate is and about the history of the special units that are part of it.

GRU

The need to create a special body that would deal with intelligence in the interests of the military became obvious almost immediately after the formation of the Red Army. In November 1918, the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Council of the Republic was created, which included the Registration Department, which was engaged in the collection and processing of intelligence information. This structure provided the work of undercover intelligence of the Red Army and was engaged in counterintelligence activities.

The order to create the Field Headquarters (and with it the Registration Office) was dated November 5, 1918, so this date is considered the birthday of Soviet and Russian military intelligence.

However, one should not think that before the revolution of 1917 in Russia there were no structures that collected information in the interests of the military department. The same can be said about special military units that performed special, specific tasks.

Back in the 16th century, the Russian Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible established a guard service, which recruited Cossacks who were distinguished by good physical health, excellent skills in handling firearms and edged weapons. Their task was to monitor the territory of the "Wild Field", from which the raids of the Tatars and Nogais constantly came to the Moscow kingdom.

Later, under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the Secret Order was organized, collecting military information about potential opponents.

During the reign of Alexander I (in 1817), a detachment of mounted gendarmes was formed, which today would be called a rapid reaction unit. Their main task was to maintain order within the state. In the middle of the 19th century, reconnaissance and sabotage battalions were formed in the Russian army, consisting of Cossack scouts.

There were also units in the Russian Empire that resembled modern army special forces. In 1764, on the initiative of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Panin, detachments of rangers were created, which could carry out operations separately from the main forces of the army: raids, ambushes, fight the enemy in difficult terrain (mountains, forests).

In 1810, on the initiative of Barclay de Tolly, a Special Expedition (or Expedition of Secret Affairs) was created.

In 1921, the Intelligence Directorate of the Headquarters of the Red Army was formed on the basis of the Registration Directorate. The order on the creation of a new body indicated that the Intelligence Agency was engaged in military intelligence both in peacetime and in wartime. In the 1920s, the department carried out undercover intelligence, created pro-Soviet partisan detachments in the territories of neighboring countries, and carried out active subversive activities.

Having survived several reorganizations, in 1934 the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army became directly subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Soviet saboteurs and military advisers successfully operated in the Spanish war. At the end of the 1930s, the roller of political repressions thoroughly walked through the Soviet military intelligence, many officers were arrested and shot.

On February 16, 1942, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the Red Army was formed, under this name the organization existed for more than sixty years. After the war, the GRU General Staff was abolished for several years, but in 1949 it was restored again.

On October 24, 1950, a secret directive was issued on the creation of special units (SpN) that would be engaged in reconnaissance and sabotage behind enemy lines. Almost immediately, similar units were formed in all military districts of the USSR (a total of 46 companies of 120 people each). Later, spetsnaz brigades formed on their basis. The first one was created in 1962. In 1968, the first special forces training regiment appeared (near Pskov), in 1970 the second was formed near Tashkent.

Initially, special forces were prepared for the war with the NATO bloc. After the start (or before it) of hostilities, the scouts had to operate deep behind enemy lines, collect information and transfer it to the Main Intelligence Directorate, act against enemy headquarters and other control points, commit sabotage and terrorist attacks, sow panic among the population, destroy infrastructure . Special attention was given to weapons of mass destruction of the enemy: missile silos and launchers, strategic airfields, submarine bases.

Special units of the GRU actively participated in the Afghan War, special forces units played an important role in suppressing separatism in the North Caucasus. GRU special forces were also involved in the civil war in Tajikistan and in the 2008 war against Georgia. There is information that some parts of the Special Forces are currently located on the territory of Syria.

At present, the Main Intelligence Directorate is not only sabotage and reconnaissance groups. The GRU is actively engaged in undercover intelligence, gathering information in cyberspace, and using electronic and space intelligence. Russian military intelligence officers successfully use information warfare methods, work with foreign political forces and individual politicians.

In 2010, the Main Intelligence Directorate was renamed the Main Directorate of the General Staff, but the old name is still more famous and popular.

The structure and composition of the GRU Spetsnaz

• The 2nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade is part of the Western Military District.
• The 3rd Guards Separate GRU Brigade (Central Military District) was created in 1966 in Tolyatti. However, there is information about its disbandment.
• 10th Mountain Separate Brigade of the GRU of the North Caucasian Military District. It was formed in 2003 in the village of Molpino, Krasnodar Territory.
• 14th separate brigade of the GRU. It is part of the Far Eastern District, was formed in 1966. The soldiers of this unit took an active part in the fighting in Afghanistan. The 14th brigade went through both Chechen campaigns.
• 16th Special Purpose Brigade, part of the Western Military District. Formed in 1963. Participated in both Chechen campaigns, in peacekeeping operations, guarded especially important objects on the territory of Tajikistan in the early 90s.
• 22nd Guards Separate Special Purpose Brigade. Part of the Southern Military District. It was formed in 1976 in Kazakhstan. She took an active part in the Afghan war. It is the first military unit to receive the rank of Guards after the end of World War II.
• 24th separate brigade of the GRU. Part of the Central Military District. The brigade participated in the Afghan war, in the fighting in the North Caucasus.
• 346th Separate Special Purpose Brigade. Southern Military District, town of Prokhladny, Kabardino-Balkaria.
• 25th Separate Special Purpose Regiment, part of the Southern Military District.

Also subordinate to the GRU are four reconnaissance maritime points: in the Pacific, Black, Baltic and Northern Fleets.

The total number of GRU special forces units is not exactly known. Different figures are called: from six to fifteen thousand people.

Training and arming of the GRU special forces

Who can get into the GRU special forces? What are the requirements for candidates?

It is rather difficult to get into the special forces, but not impossible.

First of all, the candidate must be in absolute physical health. It is not necessary to differ in impressive dimensions, in special forces endurance is much more important. Scouts during a raid can cover many tens of kilometers in a day, and they do it by no means lightly. You have to carry many kilograms of weapons, ammunition and ammunition on your own.

The applicant will have to pass the required minimum: run three kilometers in 10 minutes, pull up 25 times, run a hundred meters in 12 seconds, push up 90 times from the floor, do 90 abdominal exercises in 2 minutes. One of the physical standards is hand-to-hand combat.

Naturally, all candidates undergo the most thorough and scrupulous medical examination.

In addition to physical fitness, the psychological health of the applicant is no less important: a commando must be absolutely “stress-resistant” and not lose his head even in the most difficult environment. Therefore, candidates must pass an interview with a psychologist, followed by a lie detector test. Moreover, the relevant authorities carefully check all the relatives of the future intelligence officer, and parents are required to give written consent to the service of their son in special forces.

If a person still got into the special forces, he will have many months of hard training. Fighters are trained in hand-to-hand combat, which greatly enhances the spirit and strengthens the character. A commando must be able to fight not only with his bare hands, but also use different various items, sometimes not at all intended for combat use. A recruit is often placed against stronger opponents (and sometimes even several), in which case it is important for him not even to defeat him, but to hold out as long as possible.

From the very beginning of training, future special forces soldiers are instilled with the idea that they are the best.

Future special forces soldiers learn to endure the most severe tests on the verge of physical capabilities: long-term deprivation of sleep, food, extreme physical exercise, psychological pressure. Naturally, in the special forces, future fighters are trained to master all types of small arms.

Despite the "international" specifics of the tasks performed by the GRU special forces, its fighters most often use standard weapons of the Russian army.

If you have any questions - leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them.

The Israeli news agency DebkaFile (which specializes in publishing information and analytics on defense and intelligence issues) cites the opinion of Israeli intelligence agencies, according to which Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian Federation,former head of Russian military intelligence in the Caucasus, Major General Yuri Ivanov, whose death was reported a few days ago by the Russian media, did not accidentally drown, as the official version says, but was killed.

The Israelis also provide some new details of what happened.

The picture, however, still remains very vague.

So, what can be said with certainty:

Somewhere in early August (it is possible that earlier) Major General Yuri Ivanov, Deputy Chief of the Main Intelligence General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), disappeared in Syria. The GRU is subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of Defense, and is engaged in all types of intelligence in the interests of the Armed Forces - undercover, space, electronic.

It is important to emphasize that, along with the FSB, the GRU plays the main role in conducting counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus, and the deceased general, before being appointed to his high post, directly commanded military intelligence in the Caucasus.

Yuri Evgenievich Ivanov was born on October 28, 1957, served his military service, then entered the Kiev Higher Military Command School at the Intelligence Department, graduated from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze and the Academy of the General Staff, became deputy head of the GRU after 2006.

The general disappeared, according to the official version, on August 6 in the Syrian city of Latakia. This is the largest Syrian port on the Mediterranean Sea, the Assad clan comes from Latakia, the Syrian President lives here for a long time, and there is a large base of the Syrian Navy in the city. Until 1991, the base of the Mediterranean squadron of the USSR Navy was located here. AT last years the base is once again being used by the Russian navy and Russian military intelligence as a base for the Navy and a center for collecting intelligence information, including about Israel (which is then passed on to the Syrians and other Arabs). There are other Russian military installations in Syria as well. Another Syrian port, Tartus, hosts a Russian base Maintenance, its deployment (in a few months) to a full-fledged base of the Russian Navy is ending.

The following is already strange: despite the fact that Rossiyskaya Gazeta refers to the “official version” (“According to the official version, the scout drowned during the rest, overestimating his strength”), there is no official version signed by any official source, no official message the cause of death was not published anywhere! Nothing is reported, in any of the statements of officials, whether an investigation into the circumstances of the death of Yuri Ivanov is being carried out at all.

On the same day as Krasnaya Zvezda, RIA Novosti reported Ivanov's death. At 09:40 am on 08/28/2010, the agency distributed the material “Deputy Chief of the GRU of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces died while swimming” . « A source in the Russian Defense Ministry told the agency: "Major General Yuri Ivanov died while swimming a few days ago." The expression chosen by the “source” deserves attention: “died while swimming” is a broader wording than “drowned”.

Ivanov's death was first reported on August 13 by the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, citing the Anatolia News Agency (English version of the report).

A short note says that off the coast of Turkey, fishermen found the body of 53-year-old Russian diplomat Yuri Ivanov, who came as a tourist, but on a diplomatic passport to Syria (Latakia) and drowned while swimming in the sea.

In the Russian media, information related to this mysterious death first appeared four days later, on 08/17/2010 at 13:15:00 also in RIA Novosti. The agency released the following message: The Russian Embassy in Syria confirmed the death of a Russian diplomat

« The Russian Embassy in Damascus confirmed the information about the death of a Russian diplomat on the Syrian coast of the Mediterranean Sea, Andrey Zaitsev, press attache of the Russian Embassy in Syria, told RIA Novosti on Tuesday.

Earlier on Sunday, the media reported on the death of Russian diplomat Yuri Ivanov, whose body was discovered five days ago by fishermen on the coast of the Turkish city of Chevlik in the Hatay region bordering Syria.

"The body of a Russian diplomat was found off the coast of Turkey, who, apparently, drowned in Syrian waters. He was in Syria ... as a tourist and entered the country on a diplomatic passport. This is definitely not an employee of the embassy in Syria," Zaitsev said.

According to him, the diplomatic mission is currently dealing with the issue of establishing the circumstances of the death of the Russian and has not yet given his name.

“Apparently, the body was carried just to the shores of Turkey. So far, this is all we know. Now we are figuring out the details, all the related points,” said Zaitsev.

According to media reports, the diplomat drowned while relaxing in the Syrian city of Latakia on the Mediterranean coast. However, his body could not be found immediately. Local officials said they were able to identify the body by working with local and international organizations.».

Noteworthy here is that at the beginning of the message it is said about "death", the circumstances of which are unknown, and at the end - "drowned".

An even stranger date Earlier on Sunday, the media reported on the death of a Russian diplomat.” Sunday is August 15th! And the message in the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet appeared on August 13!

On August 30, 2010, two days after the first mention of the name and position of the deceased, additional details were thrown into the press. Some of them - with reference to official sources. Part - it is not clear where taken. Together, they further confused the picture.

Two versions appear at once - the Kommersant / Rossiyskaya Gazeta version and the Komsomolskaya Pravda version. The Russian media massively, in one day, replicated the first version.

The second version (“KP”), unlike the first one, gives a clear picture of what happened, is much more “tasty” for the media, contains more details, scandalous ones at that - but at the same time it is not replicated or even quoted anywhere in the Russian media. That is, it is, as it were, left for analysts and "thoughtful readers" who will be dissatisfied with the widely repeated version, will start looking for additional information - and oops !! - stumble upon the entire explanatory message "KP".

The material says that Yuri Ivanov was vacationing in the city of Latakia, "went to swim and disappeared." That is, it is generally unknown what happened: whether he “drowned”, “died” from another cause, or something else (for example: he was killed, kidnapped, tried to escape).

The date of what happened is no longer “a few days ago”, as in the version of August 28, but “as early as the beginning of August”, i.e. almost month.

"Rossiyskaya Gazeta" in the already cited report on the same day, August 30, gives the exact date: "The tragedy happened on August 6."

Another oddity: according to this version, it turns out that the embassy in Damascus did not know about the presence of General Ivanov in Syria. A more than implausible detail, except that the general's mission was SO secret that even the embassy should not have known about it! August 28. Kommersant also emphasizes that representatives of the Russian consulates in Syria and Turkey could not say exactly who the deceased was and in what department he served.

« Kommersant's sources in law enforcement agencies reported that the general died in early August and it happened in one of the Mediterranean resorts.

This information is indirectly confirmed by the Syrian and Turkish media. According to the Anatolian Information Agency, on August 8, fishermen on the coast of the city of Chevlik, Hatay province, found the body of an unknown man. Representatives of the authorities stated that, since the deceased was wearing an Orthodox cross, there was an assumption that one of the Russian tourists drowned. The police appealed to the Russian consulate, but they reported that all the Russians who came to rest in Turkey were alive and well, but the consulate in neighboring Syria actually turned to law enforcement agencies in connection with the disappearance of 52-year-old Russian citizen Yuri Ivanov.

Moreover, according to the press secretary of the Russian Embassy in Syria Andrei Zaitsev, it was about the disappearance at sea of ​​the Russian diplomat Ivanov, who was vacationing in this country as a tourist.

According to the consulate, Yuri Ivanov was vacationing in the Syrian city of Latakia, located on the Mediterranean coast near the border with Turkey, and disappeared, having gone for a swim, back in early August. In Syria, a large-scale operation was carried out to search for him, which did not bring results. After that, the police suggested that the diplomat drowned, and the wind and waves carried his body to the Turkish coast.

An autopsy of the body of the deceased and identification were carried out at the Institute of Forensic Medicine in the Turkish province of Adana, then the coffin with the body of Yuri Ivanov was sent to Moscow. At the same time, the consular services of Russia in Syria and Turkey could not tell Kommersant in which department the deceased tourist with a diplomatic passport still served.».

That is, Ivanov "disappeared" on August 6. And already 8 his corpse was caught in Turkey. The distance from Latakia to Chevlik, if you take the shortest route, is a little less than 90 km. Noteworthy movement speed for a corpse.

But the most incredible thing here is the information about the Orthodox cross on the neck of the drowned man. We will return to it later.

At about 8 am on August 30, 2010, the same material appeared in many media at once - an abridged version of a note in Kommersant - under the heading: “The circumstances of the death of a GRU general became known” (for example, in Vechernyaya Moskva).

It is noteworthy that it was the Kommersant version that was replicated.

Although, as I already noted, on the same day, August 30, Komsomolskaya Pravda published its version: “ The mysterious death of a GRU general.

The author of the note, Viktor Sokirko, a military observer for KP, clearly publishes a “leak” of some sources in law enforcement agencies (MO or FSB), but for some reason does not name them.

When reading the Komsomolskaya Pravda version, if you do not specifically set yourself the task of analyzing the text and comparing it with other publications (and the vast majority of readers will not engage in such an analysis, and they do not know how), such a clear and understandable picture emerges: the General was in Syria for inspection Russian base in the port of Tartus. After completing the assignment, Ivanov, who, it turns out, was an experienced diver, went to another port, Latakia, got out of nowhere (not from GRU naval commandos, otherwise it would be known) aqualung, got drunk with two more officers before diving - and drowned in drunk..

Here is the full text of the article in KP: There are three main versions of the death of a high-ranking intelligence officer. The first is heart problems that arose during deep-sea diving (Ivanov was quite seriously interested in diving). However, the 53-year-old general was in good health and had never complained about the "motor". The second is a malfunction of underwater equipment. Here there may be questions - whether it was rented, brought with you or borrowed from Russian specialists in Syria itself. The Turkish side did not transfer any data on the equipment to Russia.

The third version is an attempt. Scouts of this level rarely die naturally (unless due to old age). Previously, Yuri Ivanov headed the intelligence of the North Caucasus District and repeatedly visited Chechnya. Maybe a "thread" stretches from there?

Yes, and in Syria, the general was clearly carrying out a mission that corresponds to his high position. Most likely he was inspecting the Russian maintenance base located in the port of Tartus. Before 2011, a full-fledged foreign base of the Navy should appear there, and it is impossible to do without the participation of intelligence in its activities. It is possible that the death of the GRU general was supposed to prevent the expansion of Russian influence in Syria, which is traditionally friendly to us.

Another, not even a version, but an assumption that arose from reports that flashed through the Turkish press. Allegedly, two more comrades who were with Yuri Ivanov, who also made an underwater dive, were found in a state of alcohol intoxication. It is likely that the general's colleagues drank alcohol in a state of shock when they realized that their boss had drowned.

The GRU itself refuses to comment on any versions. This department is not happy even with the fact that the public has become aware of the death of the deputy head of the department. And not all intelligence officers knew what happened to Yuri Ivanov - only a circle of the elite.

It is no coincidence that the general was buried only twenty days later.».

Everything is clear and precise, this is exactly the behavior that a mass local and foreign reader expects from Russian generals - in the Russian army there is a mess and total drunkenness - everyone seems to know this. That is, we can assume that the explanation of the mysterious story has been received, forget about it and deal with other sensations.

Upon careful reading, however, questions remain.

It would seem that three equally probable versions are put forward at once: sudden heart problems, murder by enemies, and accidental death during an underwater dive from an accidental cause.

But in fact, the text itself refutes the first version (“the 53-year-old general was in good health and had not complained about the “motor” before”), the second (murder by enemies) is not supported by any facts or just reasoning, and the named killer is Chechens or those those who wanted to "prevent the expansion of Russian influence in Syria" are unlikely. For anyone who understands the situation, it is clear that Chechen and other Islamic terrorists do not have enough "long arm" to eliminate the secret Russian general in one of the most protected cities in Syria (recall that Latakia is the summer residence of President Assad). The development of Syrian-Russian relations is a strategic course for both Moscow and Damascus; the death of one general (who, whatever one may say, is just an executor of decisions made in Moscow) cannot stop him. Hypothetically, three external forces may want to “prevent the expansion of Russian influence in Syria”: Israel, the United States and Ukraine (more on that later), none of them will go for the actual start of hostilities with the Russian Federation for this, such as the elimination of top military personnel on foreign territory there were no enemy leaders even during the Cold War. And, again, no evidence, not even considerations. "KP" does not lead.

That is, both versions are colorless and obviously unreliable, they are given as a background. In order to draw attention to the version that the source of the leak wants to “put into the brains” of the reader: the general drowned in booze.

The version “drowned drunk” is colored with bright details. They are introduced into the mind of the reader unobtrusively, as if casually, but sequentially one after another. So by the end of reading a short note, a clear and indisputable picture of the event remains.

All this was clearly done by the hand of a master - either a talented journalist or a talented specialist in psychological warfare.

Immediately, as a well-known fact, it is reported that the general died during a dive, the story begins with this “fact”, as a given, the existence of some kind of “underwater equipment” is also mentioned. The feeling of indisputability is then reinforced by the message "Ivanov was pretty serious about diving." Finally, the final blow: flashed in the Turkish press reports. Allegedly, two more comrades who were with Yuri Ivanov, who also made an underwater dive, were found in a state of intoxication. This is the “highlight of the program”: it is easy to assume that the scuba diver was ambushed by enemies, but if “ general's colleagues those who dived with him were drunk - there is no doubt about what happened. The assumption given in the end that the officers got drunk AFTER the dive, having learned that Ivanov had drowned, obviously cannot be accepted in its grotesque absurdity. But on the other hand, it psychologically reinforces the version of a drunken immersion, the fact that they, together with Ivanov, got drunk BEFORE they went under water, gives an additional stroke to the subconsciously emerging picture of the general mess and drunkenness of the Russian military and, in general, “these Russians”.

An additional touch that enhances the picture: " Most likely he was inspecting the Russian maintenance base located in the port of Tartus.” That is: he finished the business trip, “inspected”, and then with his comrades he went off to anneal to the resort, where he was annealed almost to delirium tremens, so much so that he forgot the rules of diving, which an experienced diver has at the reflex level - and naturally drowned.

In general, this note by comrade Sokirko is a masterful work.

Upon careful reading, however, the seams come out.

It is not clear why Tartus was inspected by the general who drowned in Latakia - after all, Syria is full of Russian military facilities, in each of them " it is impossible to do without the participation of intelligence in its activities "- that's half the battle.

The main inconsistency is this: an assumption that arose from reports that flashed in the Turkish press. Allegedly, two more comrades who were with Yuri Ivanov, who also made an underwater dive, were found in a state of intoxication. Where, excuse me, were the drunken generals found? In Turkish waters? Sailed for almost a hundred kilometers, holding on to a corpse, posed for a Turkish journalist and sailed back? Or did the Soviet counterintelligence immediately leak information that two secret Russian high-ranking officers got drunk? Or do Turkish newspapers have their own spies in the GRU? However, no publications with a message about this either in the Turkish or in the non-Turkish press are known at all. Only the message of Mr. Sokirko.

On August 30, simultaneously with the release of the Kommersant and KP versions, the media began to promote another array of (disinformation?) information. First, surprising: the GRU will not conduct an internal investigation! Those. everything is so clear and understandable, there are no doubts and suspicions one iota! The second, also surprising, but already familiar: the country's second military intelligence officer died from the fact that before diving he either got drunk or swallowed "medicines"!

Late in the evening, a message appears in LiveJournal, signed "Colonel A. Chuikov." It was published in the blog http://korr-ru.livejournal.com/. It was created anonymously at the beginning of this year (2010-01-21), has on this moment only about twenty subscribers. From the content information in it, you can only find out that the author is "an almost professional journalist who has gone through all the hot spots on the territory of his country". But for a journalist with such a rich biography, the blog is surprisingly poor in information. Apart from a few personal posts relating to the owner's turbulent biography, there was nothing in it that could not be easily found on the Internet - until the last publication.

"My boss!

My words to Yurka. I respected him and will respect him.

General's death

It will come out, if not, then I'll quit.

General GRU died in the waters of Syria.

The GRU will not conduct an internal investigation into the tragic death of Deputy Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Major General Yuri Ivanov. According to shop canons, this means that his death does not arouse suspicion.

This note is personal. Yura was my boss. He oversaw work on the "illegal". Including in Chechnya, in general in the North Caucasus Military District. He was a normal general. A general with the letter "A" - a fucking general. I could call him at night and say - Yura help. And he helped. It's a pity. That he is no more. It is a pity that there will be no one to call and the phone will be silent. It’s a pity that I won’t hear his crown: “Everything will pass, old man!”. It is a pity that we will not go to the APC again in the Achkhoy-Martan area. Or we will not sit on carpets in Gorno-Badakhshan. You had friends there. Real friends.

It is a pity that you, General, will no longer be in my life. Eternal memory to you General.

Colonel A. Chuikov».

In response to a deleted comment Colonel A. Chuikov» reports " According to shop canons, Yuri should be in one place. It's impossible for such a person to fly at all. There are internal instructions, there is a procedure for issuing documents. But the person is no longer there, and accordingly there is no demand. I know today an order was issued on the procedure for visiting abroad, but what's the point. There is no refusal in the Main Military Prosecutor's Office (Chief Military Prosecutor's Office - A.Sh.), because there is no fact of a crime» .

Under this post, a bewildered question from another Jazhist appears: “ Although I am a reserve, but the captain of military justice, I am well aware that generals do not drown just like that. And then - the deputy head of the GRU ?! In the waters of Syria?!

Will there be no investigation? This is according to some kind of "shop canons" ?!

Does the abandoned material in the GWP in general, upon the fact of death, exist in nature ?!

In general, when there are more questions than clear answers, everything is clear to me personally. ”

The Russian media and numerous bloggers, including those from the military, immediately expressed doubts about the official version, according to which Russian intelligence generals could easily go and disappear without leaving a trace. The Free Press wrote, for example: “It is almost impossible to believe in such a version. Scouts of this rank are well guarded and, as a rule, do not accidentally die.

It is striking that for almost three weeks the Russian side did not seek the extradition of the body of a high-ranking military intelligence officer. Even his autopsy and identification was carried out at the Institute of Forensic Medicine in the Turkish province of Adana. Only then was the coffin with the body of Yuri Ivanov sent to Moscow, where on August 28 the funeral of the deceased took place.

Nothing is reported in any of the officials' statements about whether the Russian special services are investigating the circumstances of the death of Yuri Ivanov. But there are a lot of questions and versions. Firstly, why does a scout of this rank, who professionally possesses the most important secret information, easily, “as a simple tourist”, go on vacation to foreign countries? Secondly, why does it disappear in Syria, but is found in Turkey (after all, when a person chokes alive, his body, having collected water, sinks to the bottom, but if he is thrown into the sea already dead, it floats and can be quickly transferred over considerable distances current and wind) If Ivanov arrived in Syria as a tourist, then why did he hide behind a diplomatic passport?

The Ministry of Defense, except for a stingy obituary, does not provide any information about the death of General Ivanov.

Let's sum up some results.

Versions thrown out in the media by the security forces do not stand up to scrutiny.

Other inconsistencies and absurdities can be added to the inconsistencies and absurdities listed above.

For example: the corpse of the general was found on August 8. On August 13, according to Turkish reports, he was identified as diplomat Yuri Ivanov. The funeral took place on August 28. What happened to the body and around it during these 15 days?

There are other questions as well.

But three of them are simply fatal for all the versions given.

First. According to KP, the general was caught in Turkey with the equipment before diving, while Turkey not only did not return this equipment along with the corpse, but also did not provide any data about it at all. How is this to be understood? Turkish policemen stole it? Moreover, they stole it right away, without even having time to enter the data into the protocol for examining the corpse? Only that. that there was scuba gear, they managed to write it down, but nothing more - they immediately whistled it. It's hard to believe it. As well as the fact that the Russian side did not demand the return of the equipment. That is, one of two things: either the Turks returned the scuba gear, but the Russian side does not want to say anything about it, or there was no scuba gear.

Second. Movement speed.

If you sail Latakia to Chelvik by the shortest route, that is, first go around the cape, and then move strictly in a straight line, the distance will be a little less than 90 km. The speed of movement for a drowned man is somehow incredible, especially since it is unlikely that the corpse purposefully swam the shortest route all the time in a straight line. Those. the distance he traveled must be even greater.

In addition, I will quote Free Press: why does he disappear in Syria, but is found in Turkey? When a person chokes alive, his body, having collected water, sinks to the bottom, and (to be found not far from the place of death), but if he is thrown into the sea already dead, does it float and can be quickly transported over considerable distances by current and wind?

Eagle owl, caught near the village of Chelvik ( Ç Evlik ) in a Turkish province Hatay . A year and a half later, the body of General Ivanov will be caught there. (A photo MaartenSepp).

Finally, the third contradiction, which puts an end to the version of drowning in Syria, being in Turkey. It - cross, which was on the neck of a drowned man (again, I apologize for the gloomy pun). The fact that there was a cross is beyond doubt, because this is mentioned in all Turkish messages, both in the first mention and in subsequent analytics. But it is absolutely incredible that he could hold on to the neck of a drowned man, who was dragged for two days, moreover, with a truly cruising speed, current and winds across the open sea! Even in coastal waters, with normal waves, it would have been torn down within minutes.

That is, it is obvious that the deputy head of the GRU was thrown into the sea not in Latakia, where, according to the official version, he disappeared, but somewhere very close to the place where the body was found.

So, three questions regarding the death of the general can be answered:

How did he die? Was killed. And the body is thrown into the sea.

Where? Near the Turkish village of Chevlik in the border province of Hatay.

There remain two key questions.

Who did it and why?

Why Russian authorities trying to hush up the death of one of the military leaders of the country?

Who and why. Those who are running a campaign of disinformation around Ivanov's murder are hinting at two customers: Chechen and Islamic terrorists in general and Israel.

Islamists - since Ivanov, heading the intelligence of the Russian army in the Caucasus, was killed by Chechens in Syria or Al-Qaeda associated with them.

It is about the Chechen Islamists as possible killers that the foreign press writes, and the Israeli Haaretz and DebkaFile, and the Turkish Hurriyet, and the British Guardian Correspondents merge this version. But in publications in Russian, the main hints are precisely in the direction of the Mossad.

However, this assumption can be ruled out. There is not a single example of the liquidation of the action by Caucasian Islamists