If the Lutheran Church arose out of a concern with the doctrine of justification, then the Reformed Church was born out of a desire to re-establish the evangelical model of the apostolic Church, which we will examine in more detail in chapter 9. We will now turn our attention to one of the leading ideas of Reformed theology, which is of great importance for its political and social theories, - on the concept of divine sovereignty. Reformed theologians considered Luther's interest in personal experience to be too subjective and too individual-oriented; they were concerned, first of all, with the establishment of objective criteria on the basis of which society and the Church could be reformed. And they found such criteria in Scripture. They had little time for scholastic theology, which never posed a serious threat to the Swiss Reformation.

The doctrine of predestination is often seen as a core feature of Reformed theology. For many, the term "Calvinist" is almost identical to the definition of "a person who pays great attention to the doctrine of predestination." How then did the concept of mercy, which for Luther meant the justification of the sinner, come to be included in the sovereignty of God, especially as it is expressed in the doctrine of predestination? And how did this evolution take place? In this chapter we will look at the understanding of the doctrine of grace as presented by the Reformed Church.

Zwingli on Divine Sovereignty

Zwingli began his pastoral ministry in Zurich on January 1, 1519. This ministry almost ended in August of that year, when Zurich was hit by a plague. That such epidemics were common at the beginning of the sixteenth century should not detract from its dramatic nature: at least one in four, and perhaps as many as one in two, inhabitants of Zurich died between August 1519 and February 1520. In Zwingli's pastoral duties included the comfort of the dying, which, of course, required contact with the sick. Being close to the dying, Zwingli fully realized that his life was completely in the hands of God. We have a passage of poetry commonly known as "Pestlied" ("The Plague Song"), which is dated the autumn of 1519. In it we find Zwingli's reflections on his fate. There are no invocations to the saints or suggestions of the intercession of the Church. Instead, we find a firm determination to accept whatever God sends to man. Zwingli is ready to accept whatever God puts in his lot:

Do according to Thy will, For I lack nothing. I am Your vessel, ready to be saved or destroyed.

Reading these lines, it is impossible not to feel Zwingli's complete submission to the Divine will. Zwingli's disease was not fatal. Probably, from this experience grew his conviction that he was an instrument in the hands of God, completely obeying His plan.

We noted earlier that Luther's difficulties with the "righteousness of God" were as much existential as they were theological. Obviously, Zwingli's attention to Divine Providence also has a strong existential side. For Zwingli, the question of the omnipotence of God was not purely academic, but had a direct bearing on his existence. While Luther's theology, at least initially, was largely shaped by his personal experience justification of him, the sinner, Zwingli's theology was almost wholly shaped by his sense of the absolute sovereignty of God and the total dependence of mankind on His will. The idea of ​​the absolute sovereignty of God is developed by Zwingli in his doctrine of Providence and especially in his famous sermon "De providentia" ("On Providence"). Many of Zwingli's most critical readers have noted similarities between his ideas and Seneca's fatalism, and have suggested that Zwingli only revived Seneca's fatalism and gave it a self-critical meaning. Some weight was given to this assumption by Zwingli's interest in Seneca and references to him in De providentia. The salvation or condemnation of an individual depends entirely on God, who freely judges from the point of view of eternity. However, it seems that Zwingli's emphasis on divine omnipotence and human impotence is ultimately taken from the writings of Paul, reinforced by a reading of Seneca, and endowed with existential significance after a close encounter with death in August 1519.

It is very instructive to contrast Luther's and Zwingli's attitudes towards Scripture, which reflect their different approaches to the grace of God. For Luther, the main point of Scripture is the gracious promises of God, culminating in the promise of justification of the sinner by faith. For Zwingli, Scripture is, first and foremost, the Law of God, a code of conduct containing the demands that a sovereign God makes on His people. Luther makes a sharp distinction between law and Scripture, while for Zwingli they are essentially one and the same.

It was Zwingli's growing interest in the sovereignty of God that led to his break with humanism. It is difficult to say exactly when Zwingli ceased being a humanist and became a reformer: there are good reasons to suppose that Zwingli remained a humanist all his life. As we saw above (pp. 59-63), Christeller's definition of humanism is about his methods, not his doctrines: if this definition of humanism is applied to Zwingli, it can be inferred that he remained a humanist throughout his ministry. Similar remarks apply to Calvin. One may, however, object: how can these people be considered humanists if they developed such an inexorable doctrine of predestination? Of course, one cannot call Zwingli a humanist, nor Calvin, if the term is used in the sense that is given to this concept in the twentieth century. However, this does not apply to the sixteenth century. If we remember that numerous ancient writers - such as Seneca and Lucretius - developed a fatalistic philosophy, it becomes clear that there is every reason to consider both reformers humanists. Nevertheless, it seems that it was at this point in his ministry that Zwingli changed his mind on one of the central issues shared by contemporary Swiss humanists. If after this Zwingli was still a humanist, he was expressive of a particular form of humanism that might be regarded by his colleagues as slightly eccentric.

The reform program begun by Zwingli in Zurich in 1519 was essentially humanist. The character of his use of Scripture is deeply Erasmian, as is his preaching style, although his political views are tinged with Swiss nationalism, which Erasmus rejected. More important point for our consideration is that the Reformation was seen as an educational process, which reflected the views of both Erasmus and the Swiss humanist brotherhoods. In a letter to his colleague Miconius, dated December 31, 1519, Zwingli, summing up the first year of his stay in Zurich, announced that his result was that "more than two thousand more or less educated people appeared in Zurich." However, a letter dated July 24, 1520 paints an image of Zwingli recognizing the failure of the humanistic conception of the Reformation: more than Quintilian's educational views were required for the success of the Reformation. The fate of mankind in general, and of the Reformation in particular, was determined by Divine Providence. God, not humanity, is the main actor in the Reformation process. The educational technique of the humanists was a half-measure that did not touch the root of the problem.

This skepticism about the viability of a humanist reform program was made public in March 1515 when Zwingli published his Commentary on True and False Religion. Zwingli attacked two ideas that were central to the Erasmian reform program - the idea of ​​"free will" (libem arbitrium), which Erasmus strongly defended in 1524, and the suggestion that educational methods could reform depraved and sinful humanity. According to Zwingli, providential divine intervention was required, without which a true Reformation was impossible. It is also well known that in 1525 Luther's militantly anti-erasmic work "De servo arbitrio" ("On the Slavery of the Will") was published, in which Erasmus' doctrine of free will was criticized. Luther's work is imbued with the spirit of the full sovereignty of God, associated with a doctrine of predestination similar to that of Zwingli. Many humanists found this emphasis on human sinfulness and divine omnipotence unacceptable, leading to a certain rift between Zwingli and many of his former supporters.

Calvin on Predestination

In popular perception, Calvin's religious thought is presented as a strictly logical system, focusing on the doctrine of predestination. As common as this image may be, it has little to do with reality; important as the doctrine of predestination was to late Calvinism (see pp. 162-166), it does not represent Calvin's view on the matter. Calvin's successors later in the sixteenth century, faced with the need to apply a method of systematization to his teachings, found that his theology was eminently suited to be transformed into the more rigorous logical structures defined by the Aristotelian methodology so favored during the late Italian Renaissance (p. 62) . This led to the simple conclusion that Calvin's thought itself had the systematic structure and logical rigor of late Reformed orthodoxy, and made it possible to trace orthodoxy's interest in the doctrine of predestination in the 1559 Instructions in the Christian Faith. As will be pointed out below (pp. 162-166), on this point there is a certain difference between Calvin and Calvinism, which marks and reflects a significant turning point in intellectual history in general. Calvin's followers developed his ideas in accordance with the new zeitgeist, which saw systematization and interest in method as not only respectable but highly desirable.

Calvin's theological thought also reflects a preoccupation with human sinfulness and divine omnipotence and finds its fullest expression in his doctrine of predestination. In the early period of his life, Calvin adhered to mild humanistic views on the Reformation, which may have been similar to the views of Lefevre d'Etaple (Stapulensis). By 1533, however, he took a more radical position. On November 2, 1533, rector of the University of Paris Nicola Kop gave a speech dedicated to the beginning of a new school year, in which he hinted at several important themes associated with the Lutheran Reformation. Although these allusions were very discreet and interspersed with lanegyrics about traditional Catholic theology, the speech caused a scandal. The rector and Calvin, who probably took part in the drafting of the speech, were forced to flee Paris. Where and how did the young humanist become a reformer?

The question of the date and nature of Calvin's conversion has troubled many generations of researchers of his legacy, although these studies have yielded incredibly few concrete results. It is generally accepted that Calvin moved from a mild humanistic view of the Reformation to a more radical platform in late 1533 or early 1534, but we know why. Calvin describes his conversion in two places in his later writings, but we do not have a wealth of Luther's autobiographical details. Nevertheless, it is clear that Calvin attributes his conversion to Divine Providence. He claims to have been deeply devoted to "papal superstitions" and only an act of God could set him free. He claims that God "pacified his heart and brought him into subjection." Again we encounter the same emphasis characteristic of the Reformation: the impotence of mankind and the omnipotence of God. It is these ideas that are connected and developed in Calvin's doctrine of predestination.

Although some scholars argue that predestination is central to Calvin's theological thought, it is now clear that this is not the case at all. It is only one aspect of his doctrine of salvation. Calvin's main contribution to the development of the doctrine of grace is the strict logic of his approach. This is best seen by comparing the views of Augustine and Calvin on this doctrine.

For Augustine, mankind after the fall is corrupt and powerless, requiring the grace of God for salvation. This grace is not given to everyone. Augustine uses the term "predestination" in the sense of the escheat of the bestowal of Divine grace. It points to a special divine decision and action by which God bestows His grace on those who will be saved. However, the question arises as to what happens to the rest. God passes by them. He doesn't specifically decide to condemn them, He just doesn't save them. According to Augustine, predestination refers only to the divine decision of redemption, and not to the abandonment of the rest of fallen humanity.

For Calvin, strict logic requires God to actively decide whether to redeem or condemn. It cannot be assumed that God does something by default: He is active and sovereign in His actions. Therefore, God actively desires the salvation of those who will be saved and the curse of those who will not be saved. Predestination is therefore “God's eternal command by which He determines what He wills for each individual. He does not create equal conditions for everyone, but prepares eternal life for some and eternal damnation for others. One of the central functions of this doctrine is to emphasize the mercy of God. For Luther, the mercy of God is expressed in the fact that He justifies sinners, people who are unworthy of such a privilege. For Calvin, the mercy of God is manifested in His decision to redeem individuals, regardless of their merit: the decision to redeem a person is made, regardless of how worthy this person is. For Luther, Divine mercy is manifested in the fact that He saves sinners in spite of their vices; for Calvin, mercy is manifested in the fact that God saves individuals, despite their merits. Although Luther and Calvin argue for the mercy of God from slightly different points of view, their views on justification and predestination both assert the same principle.

Although the doctrine of predestination was not central to Calvin's theology, it became the core of later Reformed theology through the influence of authors such as Peter Martyr Vermigli and Theodore Beza. Starting from approx. 1570, the theme of "chosenness" came to dominate Reformed theology and made it possible to identify the Reformed communities with the people of Israel. Just as God once chose Israel, now He has chosen the Reformed communities to be His people. From this moment on, the doctrine of predestination begins to fulfill a leading social and political function, which it did not have under Calvin.

Calvin sets forth his doctrine of predestination in the third book of the 1559 edition of the Instructions in the Christian Faith as one of the aspects of the doctrine of redemption through Christ. In the earliest edition of this work (1536), it is treated as one of the aspects of the doctrine of providence. Since the 1539 edition, it has been treated as an equal topic.

Calvin's consideration of "the manner in which the grace of Christ is received, the benefits it brings with it, and the results it produces" suggests that there is a possibility of redemption through what Christ achieved by His death on the cross. Having discussed how this death can be the basis for human redemption (see pp. 114–115), Calvin moves on to a discussion of how man can benefit from the benefits that result from it. Thus the discussion shifts from the foundations of the atonement to the means by which it is carried out.

The next order of consideration of questions is a mystery to many generations of Calvin scholars. Calvin considers a number of issues in the following sequence: faith, rebirth, the Christian life, justification, predestination. Based on Calvin's definition of the relationship between these entities, one would expect that this order would be somewhat different: predestination would precede justification, and rebirth would follow it. The Calvinist order seems to reflect educational considerations rather than theological accuracy.

Calvin attaches markedly little importance to the doctrine of predestination, devoting to it only four chapters in his exposition (chapters 21-24 of the third book, hereafter III. XXI-XXIV). Predestination is defined as “God's eternal command by which He determines what He wants to do with each person. For He does not create everyone in the same conditions, but prescribes eternal life to some, and eternal damnation to others ”(HI. xxi. 5). Predestination should inspire us with a sense of reverence. "Dectum horribile" (Ill. xxiii. 7) is not a "terrible command," as a literal translation insensitive to the nuances of the Latin language might betray; on the contrary, it is an "awe-inspiring" or "terrifying" command.

The very location of Calvin's discourse on predestination in the 1559 edition of the Instructions is significant. It follows his exposition of the doctrine of grace. It is only after discussing the great themes of this doctrine, such as justification by faith, that Calvin turns to the mysterious and puzzling category of "predestination." From a logical point of view, predestination would have to precede this analysis; after all, predestination sets the stage for the election of man and hence his subsequent justification and sanctification. Yet Calvin refuses to submit to the canons of such logic. Why?

For Calvin, predestination must be seen in its proper context. It is not the product of human thought, but the mystery of divine revelation (I. ii. 2; III. xxi. 12). However, it was discovered in a specific context and in a specific way. This method is associated with Jesus Christ himself, who is "a mirror in which we can see the fact of our election" (III. xxiv. 5). The context is related to the power of the gospel call. Why does it happen that some people respond to the Christian gospel and others do not? Should this be attributed to a certain impotence, the inherent inadequacy of this gospel? Or is there another reason for these differences in response?

Far from dry, abstract theological contemplation, Calvin's analysis of predestination begins with observable facts. Some believe the gospel and some don't. The primary function of the doctrine of predestination is to explain why the gospel resonates with some but does not resonate with others. It is an ex post facto explanation of the peculiarity of human responses to grace. Calvin's predestinarianism should be seen as an a posteriori reflection of the data of human experience interpreted in the light of Scripture, and not as something inferred a priori from a preconceived idea of ​​divine omnipotence. Belief in predestination is not in itself a part of faith, but the ultimate result of scriptural reflection on the effect of grace on people in the light of the mysteries of human experience.

Experience indicates that God does not influence every human heart (III. xxiv. l5). Why is this happening? Is this the result of some shortcoming on the part of God? Or is there something preventing the gospel from converting every person? In the light of Scripture, Calvin feels able to deny the possibility of any weakness or inadequacy on the part of God or the gospel; the observed paradigm of human responses to the gospel reflects the mystery in which some are predestined to accept the promises of God and others to reject them. “Eternal life is destined for some, and eternal damnation for others” (III. xxi. 5).

Doctrine of predestination

It should be emphasized that this is not a theological innovation. Calvin does not introduce a previously unknown concept into the realm of Christian theology. As we have already seen, the "modern Augustinian school" (schola Augustiniana moderna), represented by such representatives as Gregory of Rimini, also taught the doctrine of absolute double predestination: God intended eternal life for one, and eternal condemnation for others, ignoring their personal merits or demerits. Their fate depends entirely on the will of God, and not on their individuality. Indeed, it is quite possible that Calvin deliberately adopted this aspect of late medieval Augustinianism, which bears a striking resemblance to his own teaching.

Thus, salvation is beyond the power of people who are powerless to change the status quo. Calvin emphasizes that this selectivity is not limited to the issue of salvation. In all areas of life, he argues, we are forced to face an incomprehensible mystery. Why are some people more successful in life than others? Why does one person have intellectual gifts that are denied to others? Even from the moment of birth, two babies, without any fault of their own, may find themselves in completely different circumstances: one may be brought to a breast full of milk and thus become satiated, while the other may suffer from malnutrition, being forced to suck almost dry breast. For Calvin, predestination was just another manifestation of the common mystery of human existence, when some get material and intellectual gifts that are denied to others. It does not cause any additional difficulties that would not be present in other areas of human existence.

Doesn't the idea of ​​predestination imply that God is liberated from the traditionally ascribed categories of goodness, justice, or rationality? Although Calvin specifically rejects the concept of God as an Absolute and Arbitrary Power, from his consideration of predestination emerges the image of a God whose relationship with creation is whimsical and capricious, and whose authority is not bound by any law or order. Here Calvin definitely puts himself on a par with the late medieval understanding of this controversial issue, and especially with "via moderna" and "schola Augustiniana moderna" in the question of the relationship of God and the established moral order. God is in no way subject to the law, for that would place the law above God, the aspect of creation, and even something outside of God before creation, above the Creator. God is outside the law in the sense that His will is the basis of existing conceptions of morality (III. xxiii. 2). These brief statements reflect one of Calvin's clearest points of contact with the late medieval voluntarist tradition.

In the end, Calvin argues that predestination must be recognized as based on the incomprehensible judgments of God (III. xxi. 1). It is not given to us to know why He chooses some and condemns others. Some scholars argue that this position may reflect the influence of late medieval discussions of "the absolute power of God (potentia Dei absolute)", according to which the whimsical or arbitrary God is free to do whatever He wants without the need to justify His actions. This assumption, however, is based on a misunderstanding of the role of the dialectical relationship between the two powers of God - absolute and predetermined - in late medieval theological thought. God is free to choose whom He wills, otherwise His freedom will be subject to external considerations and the Creator will be subject to His creation. Nonetheless. Divine decisions reflect His wisdom and justice, which are supported by predestination, and do not conflict with it (III. xxii. 4 III. xxiii. 2).

Far from being the central aspect of Calvin's theological system (if one can use the word at all), predestination is thus a subsidiary doctrine to explain the mysterious aspect of the consequences of the proclamation of the gospel of grace. However, as Calvin's followers sought to develop and reformulate his thought in the light of new intellectual currents, inevitably (if this potentially pre-destinary style could be justified) there must have been changes in the structure of Christian theology he proposed.

Predestination in Late Calvinism

As mentioned above, it is not entirely correct to speak of Calvin developing a "system" in the strict sense of the term. Calvin's religious ideas, as presented in the 1559 edition of the Instructions, are systematized on the basis of pedagogical considerations, and not of a leading speculative principle. Calvin considered biblical exposition and systematic theology to be essentially identical and refused to make the distinction between them that became common after his death.

During this period, a new interest in the method of systematization, that is, the systematic organization and sequential derivation of ideas, received an impulse. Reformed theologians were faced with the need to defend their ideas against both Lutheran and Roman Catholic opponents. Aristotelianism, which Calvin himself regarded with some suspicion, was now seen as an ally. It became extremely important to demonstrate the internal validity and consistency of Calvinism. As a consequence, many Calvinist writers turned to Aristotle in the hope of finding in his writings on method hints on how to give their theology a firmer rational basis.

Four characteristics of this new approach to theology can be pointed out:

1. The human mind has a major role to play in the research and defense of Christian theology.

2. Christian theology was presented as a logically consistent, rationally defensible system, derived from syllogistic inferences based on known axioms. In other words, theology began with first principles from which its doctrines were derived.

3. It was believed that theology should be based on Aristotelian philosophy, in particular, on his views on the nature of the method; late Reformed writers are better described as philosophical, rather than biblical, theologians.

4. It was believed that theology should develop metaphysical and speculative questions, especially those related to the nature of God, His will for humanity and creation, and, above all, the doctrine of predestination.

Thus, general principles, rather than a specific historical event, became the starting point of theology. The contrast with Calvin is quite obvious. For him, theology focused on Jesus Christ and proceeded from His appearance, as Scripture testifies. It is this new interest in establishing a logical starting point for theology that allows us to understand the attention that has come to be given to the doctrine of predestination. Calvin focused on the specific historical phenomenon of Jesus Christ and then proceeded to investigate its meaning (i.e., to use appropriate terms, his method was analytic and inductive). By contrast, Beza started with general principles and then moved on to explore their implications for Christian theology (i.e., his method was deductive and synthetic).

What general principles did Beza use as starting points for his theological systematization? The answer to this question is that he based his system on divine commandments of election, that is, on the divine decision to choose some people for salvation and others for condemnation. Everything else Beza sees as consequences of those decisions. Thus the doctrine of predestination received the status of a governing principle.

One important consequence of this principle can be pointed out: the doctrine of "limited reconciliation" or "partial atonement" (the term "reconciliation" is often used in relation to the benefits resulting from the death of Christ). Consider the following question. For whom did Christ die? The traditional answer to this question is that Christ died for all. However, although His death can redeem all, it has a real effect only on those whom it can have an effect on by the will of God.

This issue was raised very sharply during the great ninth-century ante-destination controversy, during which the Benedictine monk Godescalc of Orbais (also known as Gottschok) developed a doctrine of double predestination, similar to the later doctrines of Calvin and his followers. Examining with merciless logic the consequences of his assertion that God had ordained eternal condemnation for some people, Godescalk pointed out that in this connection it was wrong to say that Christ died for such people, for if this was so, then His death was in vain, for it did not influence on their destiny.

Hesitating over the consequences of his statements, Godescalk expressed the idea that Christ died only for the elect. The scope of His redemptive works is limited to those who are predestined to benefit from His death. Most writers of the ninth century regarded this statement with disbelief. However, he was destined to be reborn in late Calvinism.

Associated with this new emphasis on predestination was an interest in the idea of ​​election. In exploring the characteristic ideas of "via moderna" (pp. 99-102), we noted the idea of ​​a covenant between God and believers, similar to the covenant between God and Israel in the Old Testament. This idea began to gain in importance in the rapidly expanding Reformed Church. The Reformed congregations saw themselves as the new Israel, the new people of God, who were in a new covenant relationship with God.

The Covenant of Mercy proclaimed God's obligations to His people and the people's obligations (religious, social, and political) to Him. It defined the framework within which society and individuals functioned. The form that this theology took in England, Puritanism, is of particular interest. The feeling of "God's chosen people" intensified as the new people of God entered the new "promised land" - America. Although this process is beyond the scope of this work, it is important to understand that the social, political, and religious attitudes that characterized the settlers of New England were taken from the European Reformation of the sixteenth century. The international Reformed social outlook is based on the concept of God's chosen people and the "covenant of grace".

By contrast, later Lutheranism set aside Luther's 1525 views on divine predestination and preferred to develop within the framework of free human response to God, rather than sovereign divine election of particular individuals. For late sixteenth-century Lutheranism, "election" meant a human decision to love God, not a divine decision to choose certain people. Indeed, disagreement over the doctrine of predestination was one of the two main points of contention that occupied polemical writers during the following centuries (the second point of contention concerned the sacraments). The Lutherans never had that sense of "God's chosenness" and, accordingly, were more modest in their attempts to expand their sphere of influence. The remarkable success of "international Calvinism" reminds us of the power with which an idea can transform individuals and whole groups of people - the Reformed doctrine of election and predestination was undoubtedly the driving force behind the great expansion of the Reformed Church in the seventeenth century.

The Doctrine of Grace and the Reformation

"The Reformation, inwardly considered, was but the final victory of the Augustinian doctrine of grace over the Augustinian doctrine of the Church." This famous remark by Benjamin B. Warfield beautifully sums up the importance of the doctrine of grace for the development of the Reformation. The Reformers believed they had freed the Augustinian doctrine of grace from the distortions and misinterpretations of the medieval Church. For Luther, the Augustinian doctrine of grace, as expressed in the doctrine of justification by faith alone, was "articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae" ("the article on which the Church stands or falls"). If there were subtle or not-so-small differences between Augustine and the Reformers about the doctrine of grace, the latter explained them by superior textual and philological methods, which, unfortunately, Augustine did not have. For the Reformers, and especially for Luther, the doctrine of grace constituted the Christian Church - any compromise or retreat on this issue allowed by an ecclesiastical group led to the loss of that group's status as a Christian Church. The medieval Church lost its "Christian" status, which justified the reformers' break with it in order to reaffirm the gospel.

Augustine, however, developed an ecclesiology, or the doctrine of the Church, which denied any such action. In the early fifth century, during the Donatist controversy, Augustine emphasized the unity of the Church, arguing passionately against the temptation to form schismatic groups when the main line of the Church seemed to be wrong. On this point, the Reformers felt justified in ignoring Augustine's opinion, believing that his views on grace were far more important than his views on the Church. The Church, they argued, was the product of the grace of God - and therefore the latter was of primary importance. Opponents of the Reformation disagreed with this, arguing that the Church itself was the guarantor of the Christian faith. Thus the ground was set for the controversy about the nature of the church, to which we shall return in ch. 9. We now turn our attention to the second great theme of Reformation thought: the need to return to Scripture.

For further reading

On the Doctrine of Predestination in General, cm.:

Timothy George, "The Theology of the Reformers" (Nashville, Tenn., 1988), pp. 73-79; 231-234.

Excellent overviews of Tsingvli's life and work, cm.:

G. R-Potter (G. R. Potter), "Zwingli" (Zwingli) (Cambridge, 1976).

W. P. Stephans, "The Theology of Huldrych Zwingli" (The Theology of Ulrich Zwingli) (Oxford, 1986).

Doctrinal Development in Late Reformed Thought, cm.:

Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1988)

Excellent overviews of Calvin's life and work, cm.:

William J. Bouwsma, John Calvin: A Sixteenth Century Portrait (Oxford, 1989).

Alister E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin (Oxford, 1990).

T. H. L. Parker (T. H. L. Parker), "John Calvin" (John Calvin) (London, 1976).

Richard Staufffer, Calvin, in International Calvinism 1541-1715, ed. M. Prestwich (Oxford, 1985), pp. 15-38.

Francois Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of his Religious Thought (New York, 1963).

Notes:

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Chapter 7

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1. See the master's collection of studies in Cambridge History of the Bible, eds P. R. Ackroyd et al. (3 vols: Cambridge, 1963-69)

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2. See Alister E. McGrath, "The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation" (Oxford, 1987), pp. 140-51. Two major studies of this topic should be noted: Paul de Vooght, “Les sources de la doctrine chretienne d "apres las Theologiens du XIVsiecle et du debut du XV" (Paris, 1954); Hermann Schuessler, (Hermann Schuessler) "Der Primaet der Heiligen Schrift als theologisches und kanonistisches Problem im Spaetmittelalter" (Wiesbaden, 1977).

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3. Heiko A. Oberman, Quo vadis, Petre! Tradition from Irenaeus to Humani Generis" ("Where are you coming, Peter? Tradition from Irenaeus to Humani Generis"), in "The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought" (Edinburgh, 1986). pp. 269-96.

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4.CM. George H. Tavard, Holy Writ or Holy Church? The Crisis of the-Protestant Reformation (London, 1959)

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5. See J. N. D. Kelly, Jerome: Life, Writings and Controversies (London, 1975) Strictly speaking, the term "Vulgate" describes Jerome's translation of the Old Testament (except for the Psalter, taken from the Gallican Psalter); Apocryphal Books (except for the Books of Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiastes, 1 and 2 of the Books of Maccabees and Baruch, taken from the Old Latin version) and the entire New Testament.

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6. See Raphael Loewe, The Medieval History of the Latin Vulgate, in Cambridge History of the Bible, vol. 2, pp. 102-54

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7. See McGrath, "Intellectual origins", pp. 124-5 and the references given there.

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8. Henry Hargreaves, The Wycliffite Versions, in Cambridge History of the Bible, vol. 2, pp. 387-415.

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9. See Basil Hall, Biblical Scholarship: Editions and Commentaries, in Cambridge History of the Bible, vol. 3, pp. 38-93.

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10 See Roland H. Bainton, Erasmus of Christendom (New York, 1969), pp. 168-71.

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11. Roland H. Bainton, "The Bible in the Reformation" in Cambridge History of the Bible, vol. 3, pp. 1 - 37; especially pp. 6-9

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12. For further discussion of the problem of the New Testament canon, see Roger H. Beckwith, The Old Nestament Canon of the New Testament Church (London, 1985).

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13. See Pierre Fraenkel, Testimonia Patrum: The Function of the Patristuic Argumant in the Theology of Philip Melanchton (Geneva, 1961); Alister E. McGrath, "The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation", pp. 175-90.

Id="note_07_014">

Id="note_07_015">

15. G. R. Potter, "Zwingli" (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 74-96.

Id="note_07_016">

16. See Heiko A. Oberman, Masters of the Reformation: The Emergence of a New Intellectual Climate in Europe (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 187-209.

>

Id="note_08_001">

1. A number of biblical texts are used in this passage, primarily Matt. 2b: 26-8; OK. 22:19-20; 1 Cor. 11:24. For details see Basil Hall, "Hoc est corpus teite: The Centrality of the Real Presence for Luther", in "Luther: Theologian for Catholics and Protestants, ed. George Yule (Edinburgh, 1985), pp. 112-44.

Id="note_08_002">

2. For an analysis of the reasons underlying Luther's denial of Aristotle on this issue, see: in Alister McGrath (Alister McGrath), “Luther's Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough” (“The Theology of the Cross of Luther: Theological Achievements Martin Luther) (Oxford, 1985), pp. 136-41.

Id="note_08_003">

3. Other important texts used by Luther include 1 Cor. 10:16-33; 11:26-34. See David C. Steinmetz, "Scripture and the Lord's Supper in Luther's Theology" in "Luther in Context" (Bloomington, Ind., 1986 ), pp. 72-84.

Id="note_08_004">

4. See W. P. Stephens, The Theology of Huldrych Zwingli (Oxford, 1986), pp. 18093.

Id="note_08_005">

5.CM. Timothy George, "The Presuppositions of Zwingli's Baptismal Theology", in "Prophet, Pastor, Protestant: The Work of Huldrych Zwingli after Five Hundred Years", eds E. J. Furcha and H Wayne Pipkin (Allison Park, PA, 1984), pp. 71-87, especially pp. 79-82.

Id="note_08_006">

6. For this issue and its political and institutional importance, see Robert C. Walton, "The Institutionalization of the Reformation at Zurich", Zwingliana 13 (1972), pp. . 297-515.

Id="note_08_007">

7. Pope Clement VII made peace at Barcelona on 29 June; The King of France made an agreement with Charles V on 3 August. The Marburg Dispute took place on October 1-5.

Id="note_08_008">

8. For the account of the Marburg Dispute, see G. R. Potter, "Zwingli" (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 316-42.

>

Id="note_09_001">

1. B. B. Warfield (B. B. Warfield), "Calvin and Augustine" ("Calvin and Augustine") (Philadelphia, 1956), p. 322.

Id="note_09_002">

2. See Scott H. Hendrix, Luther and the Papacy: Stages in a Reformation Conflict (Philadelphia, 1981).

Id="note_09_003">

3. Also known as "Ratisbon". For details see: Peter Matheson, Cardinal Contarini at Regensburg (Oxford, 1972); Dermot Fenlon, Heresy and Obedience in Tredentine Italy: Cardinal Pole and the Counter Reformation (Cambridge, 1972).

Id="note_09_004">

4. For a full discussion, see F. H. Littel, "Anabaptist View of the Church" (Boston, 2nd edn, 1958)

Id="note_09_005">

5 See Geoffrey G. Willis, Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy (London, 1950); Gerald Bonner, St Augustine of Hippo: Life and controversies (Norwich, 2nd edn, 1986), pp. 237-311.

Id="note_09_006">

6. Earnst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches Christian churches”) (2 vols: London, 1931), vol. 1, p. 331, for variations on this analysis see Howard Becker, "Systematic Sociology" (Gary, Ind., 1950, pp. 624-42; Joachim Wach, "Types of Religious Experience: Christian and Non-Christian (Chicago, 1951), pp. 190-6.

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Chapter 10

Id="note_10_001">

1. An illustration of this is the fate of Thomas Müntzer: see Cordon Rupp (Gordon Rupp), "Patterns of Reformation" (Features of the Reformation) (London, 1969), pp. 157-353. More generally, the development of a radical reformation in the Netherlands should be pointed out: W. E. Keeney (W. E. Keeney) "Dutch Anabaptist Thought and Practice, 1539-1564" ("The thought and practice of Dutch Anabaptism in 1539 - 1564" (Nieuwkoop, 1968).

Id="note_10_002">

2. See W. Ullmann, Medieval Papalism: Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists (London, 1949). M. J. Wilks, "The Problem of Sovereignty: The Papal Monarchy with Augustus Triumph us and the Publicists" (Cambridge, 1963)

Id="note_10_003">

3. There is a considerable degree of ambiguity in Luther's use of the terms "kingdom" and "reign": CM. W. D-J. Cargill Thompson (W. D. J. Cargill Thompson) "The Two Kingdoms" and the "Two Regimants": Some Problems of Luther "s Zwei - Reiche - Lehre" ("Two Kingdoms" or "Two Reigns": Some Problems of Doctrine Luther on the Two Kingdoms"), in "Studies in the Reformation: Luther to Hooker" (London, 1908), pp. 42-59.

Id="note_10_004">

4. For a full analysis of this issue, see F. Edward Cranz (F. Edward Kranz), "An Essay on the development of Luther's Thought on Justice, Law and Society" ("Essay on the development of Luther's views on justice, law and Society") (Cambridge, Mass., 1959)

Id="note_10_005">

5. See David C. Steinmetz, "Luther and the Two Kingdoms", in "Luther in Context" (Bloomington, Ind., 1986), pp. 112-25.

Id="note_10_006">

6. See Karl Barth's famous letter (1939), in which he states that "the German people are suffering ... because of the error made by Martin Luther in connection with the relationship of law and gospel, temporal and spiritual order and government": quoted in Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics (3 vols: Grand Rapids, 1979), vol. 1, p. 368.

Id="note_10_007">

7. See Steinmetz, Luther and the Two Kingdoms, p. 114.

Id="note_10_008">

8. See: useful study by W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, "Luther and the Right of Resistance to the Emperor", in "Studies in the Reformation", pp. 3-41.

Id="note_10_009">

9. CM.: R. N. C. Hunt (R. N. S. Hunt), "ZwingU" s Theory of Church and State "(" Zwingli's Theory of Church and State "), Church Quarterly Review 112 (1931), pp. 20 - 36 ; Robert C. Walton (Robert C. Walton), "Zwibgli's Theocracy" ("Zwingli's Theocracy") (Toronto, 1967); W. P. Stephens, "The Theology ofHuldiych ZwingU" (Oxford, 1986), pp. 282 - 310.

Id="note_10_010">

10.CM. W. P. Stephens, "The Theology of Huldiych Zwingi" (Oxford, 1986), pp. 303, no. 87

Id="note_10_011">

11. W. P. Stephans, The Holy Spirit in the Theology of Martin Bucer (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 167-72. For Booker's political theology in general, see T. R. Togthapse (T. F. Torrance), Kingdom an Church: A Study in the Theology of the Reformation. ”) (Edinburgh, 1956), pp. 73-89.

Id="note_10_012">

12 For a thorough study, see Harro Hoepfl, The Christian Polity of John Calvin (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 152-206. Additional information can be found in Gillian Lewis, "Calvinism in Geneva in the Time of Calvin and Beza", in "International Calvinism 1541-1715", ed. Menna Prestwich (Oxford, 1985), pp. 39-70.

Id="note_10_013">

13. K. R. Davis, "Wo Discipline, no Church: An Anabaptist Contribution to the Reformed Tradition," Sixteenth Century Journal 13 (1982) , pp. 45-9.

Id="note_10_014">

14. It should be mentioned that Calvin also had the habit of dedicating his writings to European monarchs, hoping to secure their support for the Reformation. Among those to whom Calvin dedicated his works were Edward VI and Elizabeth I of England and Christopher III of Denmark.

>

Chapter 11

Id="note_11_001">

1. Robert M. Kingdom (Robert M. Kingdom) "The Deacons of the Reformed Church in Calvin "s Geneva" ("Deacons of the Reformed Church in Calvin's Geneva"), in Melanges d "histoire du XVIe siecle (Geneva, 1970), pp. 81-9.

Id="note_11_002">

2. Franziska Conrad, "Reformation in - der baeuerlichen Gesellschaft: Zur Rezeption reformatorischer Theologie im Elsass" (Stuttgart, 1984), p. fourteen

Id="note_06_001">

1. W. P. Stephans, The Theology of Huldrych Zwingli (Oxford, 1986), pp. 86-106.

2. For this work, see Harry J. McSorley, "Luther - Right by Wrong" (Minneapolis, 1969).

3. Although Calvin's role in composing Nicholas Cope's All Saints' Day speech was in doubt, new handwritten evidence points to his involvement. See Jean Rott, Documents strasbourgeois concemant Calvin. Un manuscrit autographe: la harangue du recteur Nicolas Cop", in "Regards contemporains sur Jean Calvin" (Paris, 1966), pp. 28-43.

4. See, for example, Naggo Hoepfl (Garro Hoepfl), The Christian Polity of John Calvin (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 219-26. Alister E. McGrath, "A Life of John Calvin" (Oxford/Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. 69-78.

5. For details of this important change and an analysis of its implications, see McGrath, Life of John Calvin, pp. 69-78.

6. For Calvinism in England and America during this period, see Patrick Collinson, "England and International Calvinism, 1558-1640", in "International Calvinism . 1541-1715". ed. Menna Prestwich (Oxford, 1985), pp. 197-223; W. A. ​​Speck and L-Billington, Calvinism in Colonial North America, in International Calvinism, ed. Prestwich, pp. 257-83.

7. B. B. Warfield (B. B. Warfield), "Calvin and Augustine" ("Calvin and Augustine") (Philadelphia, 1956), p. 322.

Predestination- an idea spread by representatives of religious monotheistic teachings, according to which the activities and fate of people are entirely determined by the will of God. This idea occupies a central place in the religious philosophy of history. In particular, in the Christian philosophy of Augustine, it appears in the form of providentialism as the predestination of the path and the ultimate goal of history - to the eschatological "Kingdom of God". This idea became the basis of the entire medieval church Christian history and continued to exert its influence in the future. Sharp discussions around the idea of ​​P. arose in Christianity, as in other religions, in connection with the solution of the problem of free will and human responsibility. If the activities and fate of a person are completely predetermined by the divine will, he does not bear any responsibility for his actions. In such a case, he cannot be accused of sins, and, therefore, the defenders of the idea of absolute predestination undermine the moral fabric of society. On the other hand, supporters of free will leave too much to the arbitrariness of the individual and thereby encroach on the prerogatives of religion and the same moral foundations. A particularly sharp controversy between defenders of opposing views on P. arose during the period of the religious Reformation. Such leaders of the Reformation as M. Luther and especially J. Calvin opposed the dominance of the Roman Catholic Church, its trade in indulgences, and other abuses of the clergy. They declared that man's salvation could only be achieved by faith, which was bestowed upon him by God, and therefore they defended the idea of ​​absolute P. In this connection, not only did they not make any distinction between the clergy and the laity, but they believed that service to God could not be achieved without as much by observance of church rites and rituals as by worldly affairs and cares (justice, economical housekeeping, accumulation of good, frugality, etc.). Protestant morality, which arose on these principles, contributed, as is known, to the formation of the primitive accumulation of capital.

Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M.: Gardariki. Edited by A.A. Ivin. 2004.

Predestination- in religion. systems of thinking emanating from the will of a deity, the determinism of ethical. human behavior and hence - his "salvation" or "condemnation" in eternity (Greek προορισμός, Latin praedestinatio or praedeterminatio). Because with t. sp. follow. monotheism, everything that exists is ultimately determined by the will of God, any monotheistic. theology, of necessity, must reckon with the idea of ​​P. (cf. the religious fatalism of Islam, the image of the Old Testament "Book of Life" with the names of Yahweh's chosen ones, Ex. XXXII, Ps. XIX, 29; Dan. XII, 1, etc.). At the same time, P.'s concept conflicts with the doctrine of free will and the responsibility of a person for his guilt, without which religion is impossible. ethics.

In the history of Christianity, the controversy around P. was due not so much to the need to eliminate the logical. contradictions of dogma, how many struggle of two competing types of religions. psychology: on the one hand, individualistic. and irrationalistic. experiences of hopeless guilt and unaccountable devotion to God, on the other hand, dogmatic. rationalism of the church, building its promises of salvation on the legal. concepts of "merit", which the believer acquires through obedience to the church, and "rewards", which she can guarantee him.

P.'s motive in the Gospels has predominance. optimistic character and expresses the confidence of the adherents of the new religion in their chosenness and calling (see, for example, Matt. XX, 23, John X, 29). Relig. Gnostic aristocracy demanded a sharp division into "those who are by nature akin to heaven" and "those who are by nature akin to flesh" (see G. Quispel, An unknown fragment of the Acts of Andrew, in Vigiliae Christianae, t 10, 1956, p.129–48). new concept of grace (χάρις) and shifting the emphasis on the illusory nature of self-sufficiency. morals. human efforts ("What do you have that you would not receive?" - Corinth. I, 4, 7). It is this emphasis that dominates in Augustine, who concludes from the pessimistic. assessment of the normal state of a person To the necessity of grace, which leads him out of his identity with himself and thereby "saves" him; this grace cannot be merited and is conditioned only by the free arbitrariness of the deity. Augustine's formula "give what you command and command what you wish" (da, quod iubes et iube quod vis) ("Confession", X, 31) provoked a protest from Pelagius, who countered it with the principle of free will. Although in reality Pelagianism could only appeal to the practice of monastic "asceticism", it restored certain features of the ancient. heroism (man is self-reliant. Effort ascends to the deity).

Despite repeated condemnations of Pelagianism, the church. instances, the controversy did not stop even in the 5th-6th centuries. (Augustinism was defended by Prosper of Aquitaine, Fulgentius and Caesar from Arles, Pelagianism by Faust from Riez). The resolution of the council in Orange (529) confirmed the authority of Augustine, but could not achieve a real assimilation by the church of the idea of ​​​​P. religious experiences, vital for Augustine, loses all significance for a while: the religiosity of the early Middle Ages is exclusively ecclesiastical. It is characteristic that the Paulinist-Augustinian concept of grace in the 6th c. radically rethought: from a personal experience, it becomes the effect of the church. "sacraments". The Church sought to comprehend itself as an institution of the universe. "salvation", within the framework of which any believer through submission to her can earn an otherworldly reward; if, in the name of her claims, she encroached on the thesis, important for Christianity, about the eternity of the afterlife retribution (the doctrine of purgatory, the legends about the deliverance of souls from hell by the church), then in earthly life there was obviously no place left for the immutable P..

Vost. the church, over which the authority of Augustine did not weigh, was especially consistent: already John Chrysostom replaces the concept of "P." the concept of "foresight" (πρόγνωσις) of God and thus nullifies the tendency of ethical. irrationalism. Behind him comes the greatest authority of Orthodox scholasticism, which also influenced the Middle Ages. West, - John of Damascus: "God foresees everything, but does not predetermine everything." The Orthodox Church restores, as a dogma, Origen's teaching about God's intention to save everyone (but without the logical conclusion that everyone will really be saved, as Origen taught).

In the West, Gottschalk's attempt (c. 805 - c. 865) to update the doctrine of P. in the form of the doctrine of "double" P. (gemina praedestinatio - not only to salvation, but also to condemnation) is recognized as heretical. In the system of John Scotus Eriugena, the doctrine of "simple" P. (simplex praedestinatio - only to salvation) was substantiated by the denial (in the neoplatonic spirit) of the essential reality of evil; this solution to the problem led to pantheistic. optimism and was also unacceptable to the church. Mature scholasticism treats the problem of P. with great caution and without deep interest. Bonaventure prefers to formulate the "original love" (praedilectio) of God as the true cause of man's moral achievements. Thomas Aquinas also teaches about the love of God as the true source of moral goodness, while at the same time emphasizing the free cooperation of man. will from the deities. grace. Scholasticism avoids the problem of P. to condemnation.

Relig. the individualism of the Reformation led to a rise. interest in the problem of predestination Luther revives the Paulinist-Augustinian style of religions. psychologism, evaluating the Catholic. the concept of "merit" as blasphemous huckstering and putting forward against it theories of unfree will and salvation by faith. Calvin goes even further, clearly expressing bourgeois. the content of the Reformation: he brings the doctrine of the "double" P. to the thesis, according to which Christ did not sacrifice himself for all people, but only for the elect. Engels pointed out the connection between Calvin's doctrine and the reality of the era of "primitive accumulation": "His doctrine of predestination was a religious expression of the fact that in the world of trade and competition, success or bankruptcy does not depend on the activity or skill of individuals, but on circumstances, on them not dependent" (Engels F., Marx K. and Engels F., Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 22, p. 308). Cruel disregard for the doomed, in contrast to tradition. pity for the penitent sinner, characterizes the displacement of the feud. patriarchy in relations between people dry bourgeois. efficiency. Calvin's doctrine was met with opposition from Gaullists. reformer J. Arminius (1560–1609), but was officially adopted at the synod in Dort 1618–19 and at the Westminster Assembly in 1643.

Orthodoxy reacted to the Protestant doctrines of P., demonstrating at the Jerusalem Council of 1672 fidelity to its old views on the will of God for the salvation of all; The Orthodox Church holds these views to this day. Catholic the counter-reformation followed the line of repulsion from the Augustinian tradition (in the 17th century there was a case of the publication of Augustine's writings with cuts of passages about P.); the Jesuits were especially consistent in this, opposing extreme moral optimism to the severity of the Protestants. The Jesuit L. Molina (1535–1600) decided to completely replace P.'s idea with the doctrine of "conditional knowledge" of God (scientia condicionata) about the readiness of the righteous to freely cooperate with him; this knowledge gives the deity the opportunity to "in advance" reward the deserving. Thus, the concepts of merit and reward were universalized, which corresponded to the mechanical. the spirit of the counter-reformation. religiosity. Modern Catholic theologians (eg, R. Garrigou-Lagrange) defend free will and optimistic. understanding P.: many among them insist that a person can achieve salvation without being predestined to it. At the same time, within the framework of modern Neoscholasticism continues the controversy between the orthodox Thomistic and the Jesuit understanding of P.

The attitude of liberal Protestantism of the late 19th - early. 20th century to the problem of P. was ambivalent: idealizing the Augustinian religion. psychologism, he was critical of the "narcotic" (A. Harnack's expression) elements of the latter, i.e. above all to the pessimistic. P.'s concept is more consistent in its restoration of the archaic. the severity of early Protestantism modern. "neo-orthodoxy" in its German-Swiss (K. Barth, E. Brunner, R. Bultmann) and Anglo-Saxon (R. Niebuhr) variants. Insisting on abs. irrationality and, moreover, the individual uniqueness of the "existential" relationship between God and man (according to K. Barth, "the relationship of this particular person to this particular god is for me both the theme of the Bible and the sum of philosophy"), "neo-orthodoxy" with logical. necessarily gravitates towards the Calvinistic understanding of P.

Being specific. religious product. worldview, the concept of "P." served in the history of philosophy logical. model for setting such important general philosophies. problems, such as the question of free will, the reconciliation of determinism and moral responsibility, and so on.

Lit .: K. Marx and F. Engels on religion, M., 1955, p. 114–115; Friehoff S., Die Prädestinationslehre bei Thomas von Aquino und Calvin, Freiburg (Schweiz), 1926; Garrigou-Lagrange, La prédestination des saints et la grâce, P., 1936; Hygren G., Das Prästinationsproblem in der Theologie Augustins, Gött., 1956; Rabeneck, J., Grundzüge der Prästinationslehre Molinas, "Scholastik", 1956, 31. Juli, S. 351–69.

S. Averintsev. Moscow.

Philosophical Encyclopedia. In 5 volumes - M .: Soviet Encyclopedia. Edited by F. V. Konstantinov. 1960-1970.

Predestination(Greek προορισμός, Latin praedestinati or praedeterminatio) - in religious systems of thinking, the determinism of the ethical behavior of a person coming from the will of the Divine and hence his “salvation” or “condemnation” in eternity. Since, from the point of view of consistent monotheism, everything that exists is ultimately determined by the will of God, any monotheistic theology must necessarily reckon with the idea of ​​predestination (cf. the religious fatalism of Islam, the image of the Old Testament “Book of Life” with the names of Yahweh’s chosen ones - Ex 32: 32-33; Ps 68:29; Dan 12:1 etc.). At the same time, the concept of predestination comes into conflict with the doctrine of the freedom of sculpting and the responsibility of a person for his guilt, without which religious ethics is impossible.

In the history of Christianity, the controversy around predestination was conditioned not so much by the need to eliminate the logical contradictions of dogma, but by the struggle of two competing types of religious psychology: on the one hand, individualistic and irrationalistic experiences of hopeless guilt and unaccountable devotion to God, on the other hand, the dogmatic rationalism of the church building its promises of salvation on the legal concepts of the "merit" that the believer acquires through obedience to the church, and the "reward" that she can guarantee him. The motive of predestination in the Gospels is predominantly optimistic in nature and expresses the confidence of the adherents of the new religion in their chosenness and calling (eg Mt 20:23, Jn 10:29). The religious aristocracy of the Gnostics demanded a sharp division into “those who are by nature akin to heaven” and “those who are by nature akin to the flesh” (Quispel G. An unknown fragment of the Acts of Andrew,- Vigiliae Chnstianae, 1.10.1956, p. 129 -48). A speculative development of the idea of ​​predestination is given by the Epistles of St. Paul (Rom 8: 28-30; Εφ 1: 3-14 and, especially, 2 Tim 1: 9), linking it with the new concept of grace (χάρις) and shifting the emphasis to the illusory nature of a person’s independent moral efforts (“What do you have, what would not receive?” - 1 Corinthians 4:7). It is this emphasis that dominates in Augustine, who concludes from a pessimistic assessment of the normal state of a person to the need for grace, which leads him out of his identity with himself and thereby “saves” him; this grace cannot be merited and is conditioned only by the free will of the Divine. Augustine's formula “give what you command, and command what you wish” (da, quod iubes et uibe quod vis) (“Confession”, X, 31) provoked a protest from Pelagius, who countered it with the principle of free will. Although in reality Pelagianism could only appeal to the practice of monastic "asceticism", it restored some features of ancient heroism (man ascends to the Divine by his own effort).

Despite the repeated condemnation of Pelagianism by church authorities, the controversy did not stop even in the 5th-6th centuries. (Augustinism was defended by Prosper of Aquitaine, Fulgentius and Caesar from Arles, Pelagianism by Faust from Riez). The resolution of the Council of Orange (529) confirmed the authority of Augustine, but failed to achieve a real assimilation of the idea of ​​predestination by the church. The problem of individualistic religious experience, vital for Augustine, loses all significance for a while: the religiosity of the early Middle Ages was exclusively ecclesiastical. It is characteristic that the Paulinist-Augustinian concept of grace in the 6th c. is radically rethought: from a personal experience, it becomes the effect of church “sacraments”. The Church sought to conceive of itself as an institution of universal "salvation", within which any believer, through submission to her, can earn a reward from beyond; if, in the name of its claims, it encroached on the thesis, important for Christianity, about the eternity of the afterlife retribution (the doctrine of purgatory, the legends about the deliverance of souls from hell by the church), then in earthly life there was obviously no room for immutable predestination.

The Eastern Church, over which the authority of Augustine did not weigh, was especially consistent: even John Chrysostom replaces the concept of “predestination” with the concept of “foreknowledge” (πρόγνοσις) of God, and thereby nullifies the tendency of ethical irrationalism. He is followed by the greatest authority of Orthodox scholasticism, which also influenced the medieval West, John of Damascus: "God foresees everything, but does not predetermine everything." The Orthodox Church restores as a dogma Origen's teaching about God's intention to save everyone (but without the conclusion that everyone will really be saved, as Origen taught).

In the West, Gottschalk's attempt (c. 805 - c. 865) to update the doctrine of predestination in the form of the doctrine of "double" predestination (gemina praedestinatio - not only to salvation, but also to condemnation) is recognized as heretical. In the system of John Scotus Eraugena, the doctrine of "simple" predestination (simplex praedestinatio - only to salvation) was substantiated by the denial (in the Neoplatonic spirit) of the essential reality of evil; this solution to the problem led to pantheistic optimism and was also unacceptable to the church. Mature scholasticism treats the problem of predestination with great caution and without deep interest. Bonavepture prefers to formulate the "original love" (praedilectio) of God as the true cause of man's moral achievements. Φα””β Aquinas also teaches about the love of God as the true source of moral good, while at the same time emphasizing the moment of free cooperation human will with divine grace. Scholasticism avoids the problem of predestination to condemnation.

The religious individualism of the Reformation led to an increased interest in the problem of predestination. M. Luther revives the Paulinist-Augustinian style of religious psychologism, evaluating the Catholic concept of "merit" as blasphemous bargaining and putting forward against it theories of unfree will and salvation by faith. J. Calvin goes even further, clearly expressing the bourgeois content of the Reformation; he brings the doctrine of "double" predestination to the thesis that Christ did not sacrifice himself for all people, but only for the elect. Cruel disregard for the doomed, contrasting with traditional pity for the repentant sinner, characterizes the displacement of feudal patriarchy in relations between people by dry bourgeois efficiency. Calvin's doctrine met with resistance from adherents of the Dutch reformer J. Armshiy, but was officially adopted at the synod in Dort (1618-19) and at the Westminster Assembly (1643).

Orthodoxy reacted to the Protestant doctrines of predestination by demonstrating at the Council of Jerusalem in 1672 faithfulness to its old views on the will of God for the salvation of all; The Orthodox Church holds these views to this day. The Catholic counter-reformation took the line of repulsion from the Augustinian tradition (in the 17th century there was a case of the publication of Augustine's writings with cuts of passages on predestination); the Jesuits were especially consistent in this, opposing extreme moral optimism to the severity of the Protestants. Jesuit L. Malina decided to completely replace the idea of ​​predestination with the doctrine of “conditional knowledge” of God (scientia condicionata), of the readiness of the righteous to freely cooperate with Him; this knowledge also gives the Deity the opportunity to “in advance” reward the deserving. Thus, the concepts of merit and reward were universalized, which corresponded to the mechanical spirit of counter-reformation religiosity. Contemporary Catholic theologians (eg, R. Garrigou-Lagrange) defend free will and an optimistic understanding of predestination: many among them insist that a person can achieve salvation without being predestined to it. At the same time, within the framework of the modern Peoscholasishkia, the controversy between the orthodox Thomistic and the Jesuit understanding of predestination continues.

The attitude of liberal Protestantism con. 19 - beg. 20th century to the problem of predestination was ambivalent: while idealizing Augustinian religious psychologism, he was critical of the “narcotic” (A. Garshgka’s expression) elements of the latter, i.e., first of all, to the pessimistic concept of predestination. More consistent in its restoration of the archaic severity of early Protestantism is modern “neo-orthodoxy” in its German-Swiss (K. Borth, E. Bruckner) and Anglo-Saxon (R. Niebuhr) variants. Insisting on the absolute irrationality and, moreover, the individual uniqueness of the “existential” relationship between God and man (according to K. Barth, “the relationship of this particular person to this particular God is for me both the theme of the Bible and the sum of philosophy”), “neo-orthodoxy” with a logical necessarily gravitates toward the Calvinistic understanding of predestination.

Being a specific product of the religious worldview, the concept of “predestination” served in the history of philosophy as a logical model for posing such important general philosophical problems as the question of free will, the harmonization of determinism and moral responsibility, etc.

Lit.: Friehoff C. Die Prästinationslehre bei Thomas von Aquino und Calvin. Freiburg (Schweiz), 1926; Garrigou- Lagrange R. La predestination des saints et la grâce. P., 1836; Hygren G. Das Prästinationsproblem in der Theologie Augustins. Gott., 1956; Rabeneck J, Grundzüge der Prästinationslehre Molinas.- “Scholastik”, 1956, 31 Juli, S. 351-69.

S. S. Averintsev

New Philosophical Encyclopedia: In 4 vols. M.: Thought. Edited by V. S. Stepin. 2001.

The occult cook Urayda pulled out a bottle of cognac from his sack.
“You see here,” he said, uncorking the bottle, “irrefutable proof of my assertion. Before leaving, I took this bottle from the officer's kitchen. Cognac of the best brand, issued for icing sugar for Linz cakes. But it was destined for me to steal it, just as I was destined to become a thief.
I. Hasek. "The Adventures of the Good Soldier Schweik"

Man is a highly contradictory being. Controversial - and at the same time incredibly ambitious. He undertakes to remake the world, intends to dominate Nature, while he has not yet fully understood himself, has not understood what, in fact, he is, on the basis of what principles he exists and what he lives for. Moreover: he is not even completely sure whether he is his own master and whether his actions are really his actions.
People have always had a feeling of their dependence on some higher forces, and there is nothing strange in this. A man is really not by himself: he is a part of Nature, a part of a system in which he has his own place and tasks. He will instinctively feel this dependence on the system with which he is tightly connected and thanks to which he was born and lives in general. But this instinctive sensation is refracted in a certain way in the mind; it requires reflection on oneself, a certain design and linking with other realities of life. The basic idea is simple: man is small, he depends on someone who is bigger, stronger and wiser than him. In general, this fits into the scheme of clan relations, where there is a head or elders who lead the life of the clan and dominate over each of its members. Approximately this scheme is embodied in the relationship of people with their gods. The gods are the highest authorities that govern the world and people, establish laws according to their arbitrariness, determine what is good and what is evil, and require certain actions from their subordinates. And here the question arises: is a person free in his actions?
The answer, which suggests itself, is this: in any case, a person is free - after all, he may not obey the gods. Let him be punished later for this, let him regret his self-will, but these will be the consequences of a strong-willed choice. In other words, at each specific moment a person is free, although in general he is dependent, because disobedience to higher forces will not remain without divine punishment. This is true for polytheistic religious systems, such as ancient Greek. Another question is whether a person's self-consciousness will allow him to accept the very possibility of disobedience to the gods? After all, they rule over everything, and it is normal for a small and weak person to obey them (that is, in fact, obey brute force), just like an ox harnessed to a wagon or a plow, it is normal to obey your driver. Therefore, the essence of the question here is whether a person is internally free, i.e. whether he is able to realize that he is free.
If we take monotheistic systems, the picture will be somewhat different. Here, God can punish disobedience, or he can simply not allow actions that are objectionable to him, for he is omnipotent. In the second case, it turns out that a person is free only as long as God allows it; in other words, he is not free, since everything will be the way the deity wants anyway. From here, one step remains to the idea of ​​complete predetermination of the future of each person and the whole world. After all, if God is omnipotent, then he could well predetermine everything for the world even at the moment of its creation. The idea of ​​such predestination naturally follows from the postulate of God's omnipotence and omniscience, including the knowledge of the future, which God himself predetermined.
It is not surprising that one of the currents in Christianity - namely Calvinism - builds its theology on this basis. John Calvin taught that every human action was originally ordained by God, and that, therefore, there can be no question of any free will. Godly people are godly because God willed it so, and impious people are impious for the same reason. In other words, according to this teaching, one can even disobey God or become an apostate only in so far as God Himself wants it. The logical apogee of the postulate of God's omnipotence. Similar teachings about the absolute determinism of human life are also known from the history of Orthodoxy.
On the other side of the world, in India, their own concept of predestination was formed. The doctrine of karma, which has entered into Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, says that future rebirths with their eventfulness depend on the actions committed by a person in past lives. So, it depends on how pious a person is and how moral his actions are, whether he will be born in the next life as a man or an animal (atom and a demon), and if a man, then what fate - whether he will belong to the lower or upper classes of society whether he will be happy or unhappy, what ups and downs will await him on life path, etc. It follows from this teaching that every act of a person, good or bad, will be reflected in his future life through the creation of a certain situation, which will play the role of either punishment or reward. Accordingly, the situations of the present life are the consequences of actions committed in past lives. This system of predestination and retribution does not fail, and it is impossible to step over it. It remains only to take everything for granted and try to ensure a more prosperous rebirth with the right life, and over time - completely getting rid of rebirths, the opportunity to break out of the wheel of samsara.
So, two teachings about predestination: one is Western, the other is Eastern. It cannot be said that they are talking exactly about the same thing; however, in both there is a powerful force that decides for a person how to live and what to do. Moreover, if the law of karma at least leaves him the opportunity to react in his own way to predetermined life situations that arose as a result of the same internally free reactions to the same predetermined situations in previous incarnations, then God's predestination is absolute: it predetermines every thought of a person, every emotional nuance his soul. In the doctrine of karma, if you think about it, you can find a lot of inconsistencies and absurdities. But the doctrine of Divine predestination generally turns everything into nonsense. A reasonable question arises: if there is no free development, and everything to the last detail, including the end of the existence of the world, together with the final result of this existence, was predetermined and known already at the moment of creation, why and for what then was all this needed? Why didn’t God, with his omnipotence, simply do everything at once as he needed? Why is this multi-thousand-year-old performance started, where everyone is weak-willed puppets, and everything is strictly according to the script? What's the point? I don't think it's possible to explain this clearly and convincingly. An apologist for the doctrine of God's predestination will simply say that the ways of the Lord are inscrutable, and that it is not in the power of man to understand God's plan. At the same time, he will very likely emphasize that I myself ask similar questions only because God predestined this long before my birth. What for? God works in mysterious ways…
However, from the philosophical aspect of the idea of ​​predestination, let's move on to its psychological aspect. Although, in fact, the interweaving of these two sides of one phenomenon in the course of reasoning is, of course, inevitable.
First of all, let us ask ourselves the question: what feelings should a person evoke in the realization of the complete predestination of everything that happens to him and still has to happen in the future? Probably, at the deepest level, it will be fear, a natural reaction to the fact that you are trapped, in the power of someone who can do whatever he pleases with you, and you are not able to oppose anything to him. This is instinctive: horror, genetically close to the panic of an animal caught in a snare. A threat is possible - and you are powerless to escape. This fear will not necessarily be clearly felt and realized: it may be present latently; but as a psychological effect, it is based on one of the fundamental instincts of every living being - on the instinct of self-preservation, and therefore it is practically inevitable.
The second reaction can be apathy, when you stop feeling like an active, something powerful being, and you simply accept the fact of your powerlessness as inevitable. As a result, you lose interest in active life, you lose the desire to act, you turn into a weak-willed doll.
But the second reaction can also be indignation, a rebellion caused by the unwillingness to be a weak-willed and powerless puppet. This is also deeply instinctive. Even a caught bird - and she beats in a snare, trying to escape. Man is a rational being and endowed with will, which gives him the opportunity to understand the laws of Nature, the laws of human life, and build his own destiny. Therefore, his rebellion against someone else's arbitrariness over him is absolutely natural.
You can be a rebel all your life. But the awareness of the doom of this rebellion can again lead to apathy, and maybe to a much more peculiar effect. A person can psychologically adapt to such a given (which, of course, can happen - and most often happens - without going through the stage of rebellion). Again, there are options here.
One will simply live, minding his own business and trying, if possible, not to sin. When he succeeds, he will console himself with the hope that God does not want him to perish, and that is why he succeeds. When this fails, he will hope that God still does not want his death - and he will make every effort to live righteously, in the hope that God will give him such an opportunity. Rather, it will be a hope that God nevertheless predestined him to salvation - and therefore he should be able to go this way. In general, the essence of the Puritan way of life fits into this rather rough sketched by me scheme.
What will the other one do? He will behave in the opposite way. He will exploit the idea of ​​predestination, forcing it to serve his passions and justify them. If he wants to steal, he will steal, if he wants to debauchery, he will debauch, and in general will do whatever he wants, motivating this for himself - and, on occasion, for others - by the fact that he is predestined to commit these acts. That's what God wanted. And how can you blame this on a person who does not have free will?
I have listed the most natural and most obvious of the possible psychological reactions of a person to the realization of the fact of the complete predestination of all his actions and, in general, all the phenomena of the surrounding world. Now it makes sense to see how this is reflected in the lives of people in society.
Fear is a common human condition. Everyone is always afraid of something; someone is afraid for themselves, someone - for others. But fear of fear is different. Complete predestination, dependence and hopelessness causes instinctive horror, teetering on the brink of panic. Fear of this quality, especially if it is felt clearly, can turn into a phobia and cause a mental disorder. However, in Christianity, the "fear of God" is regarded as an unconditional good and is considered a necessary quality of the believer. And although it does not mean exactly what I am talking about, the essence here is, in general, the same. Only the fear of God must be conscious and must be accompanied by hope for the boundless mercy of God. However, I note that, logically, where predestination takes place, there mercy, which can change something, no longer plays any role, and where the work of mercy can be performed, predestination cannot be such.
Apathy and indifference to everything of a person who believes in predestination are quite natural: upon realizing the fact that absolutely nothing depends on you, a state of psychological stupor may set in. Thus, a person sentenced to death sometimes falls into apathy, no longer reacting to anything and even understanding little; this is a defensive reaction of the psyche, which does not allow you to go crazy with horror and the realization of hopelessness. But there is also another psychological reason. The human mind is designed by Nature itself for active functioning, which should not be “idle”, i.e. it implies the indispensable presence of some particular result. And where everything is predetermined in advance, no result can be achieved in principle. And therefore, with the deepest awareness of his impotence, the human mind can simply “close”, stop responding to external stimuli. At best, a person simply ceases to worry about anything (after all, even without his intervention, everything goes as it goes, and intervention will not change anything), and at worst, a psychological breakdown occurs, and apathy becomes a manifestation of mental illness. Is it necessary to say that both of these options represent asocial personality types, not adapted to a more or less active life in society and to normal contacts with other people?
However, indifference often does not go to extremes and takes the form of so-called fatalism. Fatalism in itself is a most interesting and controversial phenomenon, which is characteristic not only of Christians, but has become widespread in the Muslim world, where it is common to believe that everything in the world is predetermined by Almighty Allah. In a simplified folk interpretation, the idea of ​​fatalism is expressed by the formula "What will be, will not be avoided." For clarity, I will illustrate the practical implementation of this principle with a quote from the work of Academician E. V. Tarle "Napoleon": "Left by Bonaparte as Governor General of Alexandria, General Kleber arrested the former sheikh of this city and the big rich man Sidi Mohammed El Koraim on charges of treason although he had no proof of it. El Koraim was sent under escort to Cairo, where he was told that if he wanted to save his head, he must give 300 thousand francs in gold. El Koraim turned out to be a fatalist to his misfortune: "If I am destined to die now, then nothing will save me and I will give, therefore, my piastres uselessly; if I am not destined to die, then why should I give them away?" General Bonaparte ordered to cut off his head and carry it through all the streets of Cairo with the inscription: "This is how all traitors and perjurers will be punished." The money hidden by the executed sheikh was never found, despite all the searches.” From this characteristic example, it can be seen that although fatalism cannot be called complete apathy and a tendency to complete inaction, it still prevents you from making strong-willed decisions, discourages the desire to somehow try to resolve a difficult situation yourself. And if, for example, the matter concerns the salvation of another person, how can an inveterate fatalist behave? He may well reason as follows: “If he (the perishing one) is destined to be saved, he will be saved even without my intervention; if he is destined to die, then I still can’t do anything. ” However, practice shows that the majority of fatalists (both Christian and Muslim) are in fact people with the usual degree of activity and enterprise, and they remember their fatalism for the most part in moments of failure and in moments of despondency. Obviously, this plays the role of a kind of psychological buffer that allows you to endure difficult moments of life less painfully.
Rebellion against predestination can, first of all, degenerate into a denial of predestination, when a person simply fundamentally refuses to believe in such injustice. This cannot be called a negative psychological effect; in essence, there is simply a change in worldview, although it occurred under the influence of factors more emotional than intellectual. As negative consequences, one can only consider here a hostile attitude towards those who continue to believe in predestination, and towards religion in general; one or the other can take place - but it is not necessary at all. However, rebellion can also lead to a mental disorder - experiences are so strong. Paranoia or another dangerous form of mental illness may ensue. In another case, things will not come to this, and the person will simply harden internally. This can turn into a struggle against predestination in all its manifestations, in other words, into a struggle against everything and everyone. The behavior of such a person is most likely to be antisocial; the worst sides of anarchism and nihilism can find expression in it. But if a rebel retains a religious platform in the vision of the world and approaches the issue from the point of view of religious logic, then his transition to the camp of Satanism is very likely. And this is quite natural. The Bible promises God's final triumph; the denial of predestination in this context leads logically to the belief in the final victory of those who oppose God, i.e. to the victory of Satan. Thus, the idea of ​​Divine predestination to a certain extent can contribute to the replenishment of the ranks of Satanists - and, most likely, not primitively thinking and acting Satanists - at the level of striving for momentary benefits, but ideological Satanists, with a thoroughly developed ideological platform and far-reaching social plans. Such a turn should not come as a surprise. Divine predestination is a religious idea, and the consequences of the impact of this idea on human psychology can be most clearly manifested in the same religious plane.
It should be noted that manifestations of rebellion against predestination are not necessarily negative. Disagreement with this idea is able to develop in the dissenting individual independence, a more sober view of reality (which most likely implies a break with religion), useful volitional qualities, the desire to take an active part in public life and in the destinies of the world in general. Or maybe a person will simply join some more liberal religious trend, whose doctrine leaves people the opportunity to be people, and not miserable puppets in the hands of forces inaccessible to human understanding.
As for the way of life of orthodox Calvinists, both positive and negative aspects can be found in it. On the one hand, the desire to live decently, combined with diligence, is highly commendable. On the other hand, kinks are possible here as well. Those wishing to be convinced of this I refer to historical works describing Calvin's Geneva. Among other things, such "piety" also led to bonfires on which people burned. It must be assumed that this was done so that Divine predestination could be realized. And who's to blame? God? Indeed, even not the worst idea, if taken to the point of absurdity, can become destructive. Especially if this idea is not logically linked to itself. Indeed: where is the logic of efforts in a righteous life, if no efforts are capable of influencing the final result of the work? It turns out that God himself makes these people make the said efforts, and only because he predestined them to salvation? Does he force the one whom he did not predestinate to salvation to sin? What is this cynical farce for? It is impossible to find a normal explanation for this.
For all the immorality of their behavior, those who do not see limits for themselves act much more logically, sin with might and main and shift the responsibility on God. Indeed, if such a lawless person has no concept of what is permissible and what is inadmissible, then this is because God did not inspire him with this concept. He's not even a slave of God - ie. a being, although forced to obey, but, in principle, capable of resisting, is his puppet. In other words, God Himself does all this with his hands. And who should be punished for atrocities? It turns out the wildest picture: Divine predestination forces some to sin and commit crimes, while others it forces to punish for it. Apotheosis of injustice and cynicism.
But let's leave alone the question of the legality of punishment, especially since the state punitive bodies so far act by no means on the basis of considerations of the reality of Divine predestination. Let's turn to the other side of the problem.
Now popular - and, it seems, becoming more popular - are various pseudo-oriental pseudo-spiritual teachings, in which karma is one of the most popular elements of the doctrines. These are more or less inventive fakes of Buddhism or Hinduism, mostly eclectic, and therefore sinning with the absence of logic and common sense, but rich in lofty words. In them, the concept of predestination (karma) blooms violently. It is interpreted, as a rule, roughly and primitively; however, the idea of ​​karma in such a presentation takes more and more power over the minds.
Adherents of such "teachings" have already become the talk of the town. Such a person stumbles on a stone and immediately draws a conclusion about the connection of this event with some events of his past lives. Because of this, he often behaves twitchy, and considers each of his good deeds not as an act of humanism, generally characteristic of a person, but as atonement for the sins of his past lives and as a merit at the expense of future lives. Such people really strive to do good, but not for the sake of others, but for their own sake. They are good only outwardly; in fact, their concepts of goodness are mercenary, hypocritical concepts. Then, they usually accept troubles and troubles without resistance, understanding them as an inevitable retribution for past sins; and seeing someone else's misfortune, they will reason in the same way, and will hardly try to help. If they try, then, again, not out of humanism, but out of their commercial calculation. Buddhism and Hinduism in their basic forms, as serious, carefully developed worldview systems, tested by time, more or less link all these ethical contradictions, explain them and teach how to overcome them. But those surrogates that we are talking about here, in most cases, are just rough crafts, a vinaigrette from Eastern philosophy, European paganism, Christianity in its most primitive interpretation and occultism of the artisanal level. Of course, such nonsense is not capable of raising the spiritual, intellectual and cultural level of a person; but to discourage him from being guided in his actions common sense and it is quite possible to turn him into a do-gooder-speculator - which often happens.
In addition, such systems successfully breed those who explain their vices and immoral acts by karmic predestination. It is clear that this allows them to never be tormented by remorse—i.e. gives complete moral (or rather immoral) freedom to do whatever you want. And this delicious moment of delusional teachings, their adherents realize very quickly. Not everyone, of course, begins to actively use it - but many do. At the same time, some sincerely believe in their predestination to commit abominations, while others simply prefer to believe in it, since such a belief is very convenient. There are also those who consciously and cynically use this as an "excuse", in essence, only pretending to believe, but in their hearts laughing at all this. These are practically frank charlatans of various scales, who, like Hasek's Uraide, are well settled in terms of freedom of action.
I do not seek to sweep all the neo-cults of the eastern wing, as their level varies greatly, and among them there are quite sound and interesting systems. But in general, this is spiritual consumer goods, the level of which is below any criticism. And if we take into account the fact that some of them are founded with the aim of confusing the heads of naive seekers of Truth, solely so that the fraudulent founders can command and fill their pockets to their fullest, the picture turns out to be completely alarming. And the mercilessly mutilated, clumsily interpreted doctrine of karma plays here the role of one of the most effective tools for the spiritual emasculation of people.
I will not claim to have exhaustively elucidated the problem of the impact of the idea of ​​predestination on human psychology; on the contrary, I have touched upon it only in the most general terms. However, we can already try to draw some conclusions.
In general, it is obvious that this idea has a negative effect on people rather than a beneficial one. Whichever way you look, it loosens the psyche and tells the character not the most best qualities. It would seem that it is good that she brings up humility in people - but there is a catch here too: after all, this humility has its source not in modesty and peacefulness, but in impotence.
That's just the problem. Man is a part of Nature, endowed with amazing qualities of mind and soul; he is a great being capable of great things. It is designed for such accomplishments. And he is convinced that he is worthless and powerless. And this comes into conflict with his deepest essence, which knows its great destiny at the level of instinct. Such a deep and cruel conflict literally shakes the human psyche from the inside, the natural consequence of which is the painful changes that begin to occur in it. Let me emphasize: the basis of the conflict lies in the depths, at the subconscious level, and only then it manifests itself “on the surface”, at the conscious level, when the mind is aware of what is happening and its causes. Man is in control of his life. Of course, he can voluntarily submit to circumstances or other people - but this will be his strong-willed choice, the responsibility for which will lie with him. And in order to be a puppet, on which nothing depends, he is not adapted by his very nature, by his very essence - and he will never accept this. True, there are those who are happy to shift responsibility for their actions and for their very life to others, because it is easier to exist that way. But this is more a deviation than the norm, especially since in the life of most of these people, sooner or later, there comes a moment of realization that it is impossible to live like this. The deep, real essence of a person takes precedence over unnatural behavioral patterns imposed from the outside.
The forces to which each of us obeys are the laws of Nature. Obeying them is natural and normal. Almighty God, karma, - they are the creations of the human mind, which is imperfect, which follows its own path of development and, like everything imperfect, is not free from certain flaws and is capable of making mistakes. There are many examples of such misconceptions. But delusions become obsolete over time, moving from the realm of serious faith into the realm of examples, often anecdotal, of human ignorance and the triumph of violent fantasy over common sense. And it is safe to say that the idea of ​​predestination will one day stand on a par with those three whales on which the flat Earth rests.

Unusual at first glance, the belief of the British in fate becomes more understandable if we recall the teachings of J. Calvin (1509-1564), who became the “pivotal figure of the New Age” for the West, in the words of an article from the encyclopedia “Religion” (“Religion”, 2007). It was he who developed the doctrine of predestination, which later became "the flesh and blood" of Western society, especially its Protestant part.
Here is what the same encyclopedia writes about this doctrine: “God actively desires the salvation of those who will be saved, and the curse of those who will not be saved. Predestination is therefore "God's eternal command, by which He determines what He wills for each individual. He does not create equal conditions for all, but prepares eternal life for some and eternal damnation for others." One of the central functions of this doctrine is to emphasize the mercy of God. For Luther, the mercy of God is expressed in the fact that He justifies sinners, people who are not worthy of such a privilege. For K[alvin - E.Z.], the mercy of God is manifested in His decision to atone for the sins of individuals, regardless of their merit: the decision to redeem a person is made regardless of how much this person is worthy of it. For Luther, Divine mercy is manifested in the fact that He saves sinners in spite of their vices; for K. mercy is manifested in the fact that God saves individuals regardless of their merits. Although Luther and K. argue for God's mercy from somewhat different points of view, their views on justification and predestination both assert the same principle. Although the doctrine of predestination was not central to K. theology, it became the core of late Reformed theology. As early as 1570, the theme of "chosenness" began to dominate Reformed theology... [... ]
The doctrine of predestination was not innovative for Christianity. K. did not introduce a previously unknown concept into the sphere of Christian theology. The late medieval Augustinian school taught the doctrine of absolute double predestination: God destines eternal life for some and eternal condemnation for others, regardless of their personal merits or demerits. Their fate depends entirely on the will of God, and not on their individuality. Probably K. deliberately adopted this aspect of late medieval Augustinianism, which has an unusual similarity with his own teachings.
According to K., salvation is beyond the power of people who are powerless to change the status quo. K. emphasized that this selectivity is observed not only in the question of salvation. In all areas of life, he argues, we are forced to face an incomprehensible mystery. Why are some people more successful in life than others? Why does one person have intellectual gifts that are denied to others? Even from the moment of birth, two babies, without any fault of their own, can find themselves in completely different circumstances ... For K. predestination was just another manifestation of the common secret of human existence, when one gets material and intellectual gifts that are denied to others ”(“ Religion", 2007).
The doctrine of Calvinism has left a deep imprint on the worldview of almost all Western societies. To this day, it gives the consciousness of its own infallibility and chosenness to the owners of a solid state and the consciousness of inferiority, originally predetermined and inevitable torment in hell - to the poor segments of the population (at least, its religious part). If God's chosenness is determined by material well-being, then poverty serves as an omen that a person was cursed even before birth, that no good deeds can earn him salvation, that God knows all his actions in advance, that all of them are predetermined and condemned. Christ died not for everyone, but for the elect, who, on the contrary, by the grace of God will go to heaven under any circumstances, even if they are the most notorious sinners. This mercy is determined even during life according to the earthly blessings allegedly granted by God, mainly in monetary terms. It is money that measures the success of a person in the search for his "calling" given by God. For Orthodoxy, the measurement of God's chosenness by this criterion remains alien, since more emphasis is placed on the words of the Bible that it is easier for a camel (in the correct translation - a rope) to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. In Soviet ideology, wealth was seen as a threat to the collectivist foundations of society. In both cases, the emphasis was on the moral side of actions, and not on material rewards for them.
We will not go into details of whether fatalism is inherent in Orthodoxy. Let us cite only a statement on this subject by the candidate of historical sciences S. Rybakov: “What is God's Providence[in Orthodoxy - E.Z.]? This is by no means primitive fatalism. The freedom of personal choice is not suppressed or limited by God's Providence: a person is responsible for his deeds and deeds. God does not force anyone: a person determines his own destiny, the people determine their history” (Rybakov, 1998). Undoubtedly, there are many works where this point of view would be questioned, especially among the followers of M. Weber. The last half century has shown, however, that M. Weber's theory of active Protestants and passive Buddhists, Catholics, etc. unable to explain the rapid economic development of those countries whose inhabitants are allegedly not active enough because of their religions (see the chapter “Alternative cultural explanations for impersonal constructions”). Here is how the difference in attitudes towards predestination among Protestants and Orthodox is defined in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia: “Theological. F.[atalism - E.Z.], teaching that even before birth God predestined some people "to salvation" and others "to perdition", received a particularly consistent expression in Islam (the doctrine of the Jabarites, formulated in disputes of the 8th-9th centuries .), in some Christian heresies of the Middle Ages (by Gottschalk, 9th century), in Calvinism and Jansenism, the orthodox theology of Orthodoxy and Catholicism is hostile to him ”(“ The Great Soviet Encyclopedia ”, 1969-1978).
A similar explanation can be found in the “Small Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron”, published before the revolution: “Predestination, the teaching that the omnipotent will of the omniscient God predestined some people to good and salvation, others to evil and death. [...] The Orthodox Church does not recognize absolute P. and teaches that God wants the salvation of all, but rational beings who consciously reject any help of grace for their salvation cannot be saved and, according to God's omniscience, are predestined to perdition; next, P. refers only to the consequences of evil, and not to evil itself. In the XVI century. the doctrine of absolute P. was renewed by Calvin” (http://slovari.yandex.ru/).
The encyclopedia "Religion" mentioned above explains the difference between the understanding of predestination among the Orthodox and Protestants (Calvinists) as follows: the following: God wants everyone to be saved, and therefore there is no absolute P. [predetermination - E.Z.] or P. to moral evil; but true or final salvation cannot be forced and external, and therefore the action of the goodness and wisdom of God for the salvation of man uses all means for this purpose, with the exception of those that would abolish moral freedom; consequently, rational beings, consciously rejecting any help of grace for their salvation, cannot be saved and, according to God's omniscience, are predestined to exclusion from the Kingdom of God or to perdition. P., therefore, refers only to the necessary consequences of evil, and not to evil itself, which is only the resistance of the free will to the action of saving grace. [...] The final development of issues related to P. belong to Calvin, who showed that the study of the issue of P. is not a purely academic exercise, but has practical significance. Although Calvin disagrees with W. Zwingli's statement that sin became necessary for the glory of God to be properly manifested, he nonetheless insisted that God chose some for salvation and rejected others, but in all this remained absolutely righteous and blameless. . Calvin's successor, T. Beza, not only adhered to Calvin's doctrine of the double P., but also asserted without hesitation that God decided to send some people to hell, that he encouraged them to sin. He was convinced that, despite the absence of any specific reference to this in the Bible, it was possible to determine the logical priority and sequence of God's decisions. He believed that the decision to save some and condemn others logically preceded the decision to create humans. It follows from this that God creates some in order to condemn them later. This doctrine eventually came to be regarded by many as the official position of Calvinism” (“Religion”, 2007).
The difference in the worldview of Orthodox and Protestants was most clearly reflected in the following definition of fatalism from the “Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary”: “Theological F. [atalism - E.Z.] proceeds from the predetermination of the events of history and human life by the will of God; within its framework, there is a struggle between the concepts of absolute predestination (Augustinism, Calvinism, Jansenism) and views that try to combine the omnipotence of Providence with the free will of man (Catholicism, Orthodoxy) ”(“ Philosophical encyclopedic Dictionary", 1992).
Thus, Orthodoxy places more emphasis on the free will of man, while Calvinism proceeds from the predestination of events.
In the "Atheistic Dictionary" edited by M.P. Novikov does not say anything about Orthodoxy, but emphasizes the fatalism of Calvinism and Protestantism in general (Calvinism is one of the varieties of Protestantism along with Lutheranism, Zwinglianism, Anabaptism, Mennonism, Anglicanism, Baptism, Methodism, Quakerism, Pentecostalism, the Salvation Army, etc.). etc.): “In one form or another, F. [atalism - E.Z.] is inherent in many. idealistic teachings, occupies an important place in religion. worldview. The recognition of God as the creator and ruler of the world inevitably leads to a denial of man's ability to influence the course of events, dooms him to passivity and inaction. F. manifests itself in different degrees in the creeds of various religions. It permeates the creed of Islam. Ideas F. clearly expressed in Calvinism. [...]
Catholicism relies on the teaching of Augustine that a person is not free in good, since grace acts in him on this path, but is free in evil, to which his sinful nature attracts. Protestantism is dominated by the idea of ​​predestination of all destinies by the will of God, which turns S[freedom - E.Z.] into an illusion” (“Atheistic Dictionary”, 1986).
The German "Herders Conversations-Lexikon" (1st edition, 1854-1857, cited in the original) says in a similar way: "In der nach-christl. Zeit spielt das F. vor allem im Mohammedanismus, in der Kirchengeschichte durch den gall. Priester Lucidus im 5., den Monch Gottschalk im 9., dann durch Luther, Zwingli und vor allem durch Calvin und Beza, in der Philosophie durch Spinoza, Hobbes, Bayle, die frz. Encyklopadisten und Hegel eine entscheidende Rolle” .
"Meyers GroBes Konversations-Lexikon" (6th edition, 1905-1909) suggests that fatalism is one of the characteristics of the Protestant doctrine of predestination. In the definition of the term “determinism” in the Handbook of Heresies, Sects and Schisms, S.V. Bulgakov also mentions that fatalism is inherent in Calvinism: “Religious determinism, otherwise called fatalism, should be distinguished from strict philosophical materialistic and idealistic determinism. Thus, the religion of the ancient Greeks recognized the existence of fate or fate as a dark, incomprehensible, impersonal force that determines the life of people, and which not only people, but even the gods themselves, are unable to resist. In the East, and later in the West, it was widely believed that all the main events of the historical and private life of people are invariably predetermined by the course of the stars (astrological determinism). This also includes the belief of the Mohammedans that God, by virtue of the eternal decision of His will, invariably determined the fate of each person, even to the smallest circumstances of his life. In the Christian world, this includes the teaching of Calvin and others, which denies moral freedom, according to which God unconditionally and invariably predestined some to eternal bliss, others to eternal damnation” (Bulgakov, 1994).
Thus, the fatalism of Protestantism is noted in pre-revolutionary, Soviet, post-Soviet, and Western reference publications.
A researcher who wished to prove the original inclination of the Germans to fatalism would find sufficient confirmation of this thesis in the ancient epic and scientific (historical, sociological, cultural) literature. Thus, a specialist in English literature R. Fletcher writes in his commentary on the ancient Anglo-Saxon epic "Beofulf" (700) that the concept of fate, played out in this work, seems to be a despotic force that does not have compassion for people, with which it is impossible to fight; Moreover, this concept (called Wyrd) did not die out along with paganism, but entered, in a slightly modified form, into the worldview of the English Puritans (Fletcher, 2004).
AND I. Gurevich notes in the preface to Beowulf that this work is “replete with references to Fate, which either acts as a tool of the creator and is identical to divine Providence, or appears as an independent force. But belief in Destiny was central to the pre-Christian ideology of the Germanic peoples. [...] Fate was understood not as a universal fate, but as an individual share of an individual, his luck, happiness; some have more luck, others less” (“Beowulf. Elder Edda. Song of the Nibelungs”, 1975). Accordingly, according to the mythology of the ancient Germans, a person is initially predetermined to be successful or unsuccessful, happy or unhappy. This is also confirmed by the following passage from Velva's Divination (Elder Edda, VI-VIII centuries, verse collection of Germanic myths):
Wise virgins arose from there, three from the key under the high tree;
Urd is the name of the first, the second - Verdani, - they cut the runes, - Skuld is the name of the third; destinies were judged, life was chosen for the children of people, lots are being prepared.
We are talking here about the goddesses of fate - the norns, who are responsible for the present, past and future of man (like ancient Roman parks, ancient Greek moira). K. Bishop (Australian National University) comments on the words Wyrd bip ful arwd (Fate is always predetermined) of the Old English poem “The Wanderer” (modern title) as follows: the poem reflects the typical view of the ancient West Saxons about the inevitability of fate, about the impossibility of appeasing it with prayers, gifts and noble deeds (Bishop, 2007). The concept of “Wyrd” (“fate”), according to Bishop, is not just fatalistic, but also implies an all-encompassing, inevitable predestination that does not have any meaningful power, but leads everything to destruction and annihilation.
In Appendix 2, we have given the point of view of the culturologist A.P. Bogatyrev to this question (the article was written specifically for this monograph at our request). He believes that:
a) fatalism has been inherent in Western man since the time of Ancient Greece;
b) this fatalism significantly intensified during the Middle Ages due to constant epidemics that could not be prevented or stopped (in the 14th century, for example, from a quarter to a third of the population of Europe died out from the “black death”);
c) fatalism found its most vivid reflection in the doctrine of predestination among the Protestants;
d) it may well be that the corresponding worldview is reflected in the high frequency of "fatalistic" vocabulary.
With a request to explain the relatively widespread belief in fate in England compared to Russia, we turned directly to A. Vezhbitskaya, who popularized the theory of the “fatalism” of Russian grammar. Here is her response, received by email in June 2007: “To take just one of your questions - How many "Anglos" believe in "sud'ba". To me, the question doesn't make much sense, since there is no concept of "sud'ba' in English. Questionnaires of this kind are based on the assumption that there is a shared concept which can be investigated in different languages. To do semantics cross-linguistically, one needs an appropriate metalanguage”.
On the one hand, her refusal to equate the Russian concept of "fate" with the English "destiny" or "fate" is completely understandable, since each word has its own special connotations. On the other hand, hardly anyone will deny that the English “fate” (this is the word used in the polls above) is no less fatalistic than the Russian “fate”. Here is how, for example, the concept of “fate” is defined by Roget’s II: The New Thesaurus" (1995): "1. A predestined tragic end.., 2. That which is inevitably destined...” (Roget's II: The New Thesaurus, 1995), that is, “fate” is, by definition, more tragic than “fate”, it is rather fate, fate, and it is not for nothing that other meanings of this word are “death”, “death”. Wierzbicka herself in one of her works compares “fate” with the Russian word “rock” (Wierzbicka, 1992, p. 66).
Given the widespread belief of the English in “fate”, it cannot be called an accident that it was in England that gothic novels were born and gained particular popularity, the characters of which invariably become victims of fate and otherworldly forces, and then all kinds of mystical thrillers and the horror genre. Until very recently, all this was alien to Russians, mythical creatures were often treated with irony, and even the most negative characters from underworld(such as Baba Yaga, Koshchei the Immortal, devils) often became the subject of humorous stories. This is especially true of the works of Soviet times, but already in Gogol the tendency to talk about the otherworldly in an ironic tone can be seen quite clearly.
Based on the results of the analyzes of the frequency of lexemes related to fatalism presented in this paper (see below), it should still be recognized that before the revolution, Russian writers used the means of expressing the inevitability of fate more actively than Soviet ones, and after the collapse of the USSR, in some respects, the return to pre-revolutionary levels. Whether this is a consequence of the secondary spread of Orthodoxy cannot be said with certainty, since the majority of Russians, although they consider themselves Orthodox, usually have no idea about his teaching. For example, 60% of the Russians surveyed in 2002 have never even read the Bible, 18% have read it once, and only 2% read it regularly (see the above source for more detailed statistics and other parameters). For comparison: 59% of Americans read the Bible from time to time, 37% - at least once a week (Gallup, Simmons, 2000); one in three Americans believe the Bible should be taken literally (Barrick, 2007). More likely is the assumption that the mythologization of consciousness after the collapse of the USSR is due to the influence of Western culture through horror films, mystical works, through the spread of all kinds of sects.
Given the Protestant belief in the God-givenness of success, especially in terms of money, it is logical to assume that modern British and American literature on how to achieve your goals in life will be more or less imbued with mysticism. The way it is. We will demonstrate this on the example of the most famous and popular book on this topic - "Think and Grow Rich" by N. Hill. Although the book was released in 1937, it is still constantly reprinted in many countries in various versions (full, abridged), and only in the USA after 1973 it has gone through more than 50 editions, periodically getting into the “BusinessWeek Best-Seller List” ” (including in 2007). By the end of 2007, at least 30 million copies had been sold worldwide. There are several sequels. The book was repeatedly reprinted in Russia.
Among the various tips on how to achieve your goal (wealth), the author quite seriously gives ways to communicate with the Higher Mind (in order to “beg” the desired amount from him), advises using the sixth sense, discusses the usefulness of telepathy and clairvoyance: “If you pray for what - something, being afraid that the Higher Mind will not want to act according to your desire, means that you are praying in vain. If you have ever received what you asked for in prayer, remember the state of your soul then - and you will understand that the theory presented here is more than a theory.
The method of communication with the World Mind is similar to how sound vibrations are transmitted by radio. If you are familiar with the principle of radio operation, then, of course, you know that sound can only be transmitted when its vibrations are converted to a level that is not perceived by the human ear. The radio transmitting device modifies the human voice, increasing its vibrations a million times. Only in this way can the energy of sound be transmitted through space. The energy thus converted enters the radio receivers and is reconverted to the original vibration level.
The subconscious mind, acting as an intermediary, translates the prayer into a Language understandable to the World Mind, conveys the message contained in the prayer, and receives an answer - in the form of a plan or idea to achieve the goal. Realize this - and you will understand why the words contained in the prayer book cannot and will never be able to connect your mind with the Higher Mind. [...] Your mind is small - tune it to the World Mind. The subconscious is your radio: send prayers and receive answers. The energy of the entire universe will help prayers come true. [...]
We have discovered what - I want to believe - is ideal conditions, being in which the consciousness makes the sixth sense work (described in the next chapter). [...]
From what I have experienced in my life, the sixth sense is closest to a miracle. And I know for sure that there is a certain force in the world, or the First Impulse, or Reason, penetrating every atom of matter and making clots of energy perceptible for a person; that this Universal Mind turns acorns into oaks, makes water fall from hills (making the Law of Gravity responsible for it); replaces night by day and winter by summer, establishes for each his place and relation to the rest of the world. This Mind, combined with the principles of our philosophy, can also help you - in turning your desires into concrete material forms. I know this: I have experience - and this experience has taught me" (Hill, 1996).
Such an unusual approach to achieving success should not be surprising: while Soviet schoolchildren were learning logic, American students were learning divine law. If in the USSR they quite consciously, at the state level, abandoned the fatalistic worldview, then in the USA the God-givenness of life's blessings is still being promoted. The result is a mystified consciousness, and to such an extent that 83% of Americans at the beginning of the XXI century. still believe in the virgin birth (Kristof, 2003).
We do not set ourselves the task of proving the fatalism of the British, Americans or Western people in general in comparison with Russians. It suffices to demonstrate how easily this could be done on the basis of quite solid and reliable sources, including sociological surveys (which, by the way, ethnolinguists who criticize Russians for fatalism never cite) and the most famous encyclopedias. The materials we have cited on the fatalism of the Protestant worldview are invariably hushed up by critics of the Russian mentality, which is why such criticism is nothing more than a one-sided selection of suitable facts and ignoring the rest.

in religion systems of thinking emanating from the will of a deity, the determinism of ethical. human behavior and hence - his "salvation" or "condemnation" in eternity (Greek ??????????, Latin praedestinatio or praedeterminatio). Because with t. sp. follow. monotheism, everything that exists is ultimately determined by the will of God, any monotheistic. theology, of necessity, must reckon with the idea of ​​P. (cf. the religious fatalism of Islam, the image of the Old Testament "Book of Life" with the names of Yahweh's chosen ones, Ex. XXXII, Ps. XIX, 29; Dan. XII, 1, etc.). At the same time, P.'s concept conflicts with the doctrine of free will and the responsibility of a person for his guilt, without which religion is impossible. ethics. In the history of Christianity, the controversy around P. was due not so much to the need to eliminate the logical. contradictions of dogma, how many struggle of two competing types of religions. psychology: on the one hand, individualistic. and irrationalistic. experiences of hopeless guilt and unaccountable devotion to God, on the other hand, dogmatic. rationalism of the church, building its promises of salvation on the legal. concepts of "merit", which the believer acquires through obedience to the church, and "rewards", which she can guarantee him. P.'s motive in the Gospels has predominance. optimistic character and expresses the confidence of the adherents of the new religion in their chosenness and calling (see, for example, Matt. XX, 23, John X, 29). Relig. Gnostic aristocracy demanded a sharp division into "those who are by nature akin to heaven" and "those who are by nature akin to flesh" (see G. Quispel, An unknown fragment of the Acts of Andrew, in Vigiliae Christianae, t 10, 1956, p.129–48). new concept of grace (?????) and shifting the emphasis on the illusory nature of self-sufficiency. morals. human efforts ("What do you have that you would not receive?" - Corinth. I, 4, 7). It is this emphasis that dominates in Augustine, who concludes from the pessimistic. assessment of the normal state of a person To the necessity of grace, which leads him out of his identity with himself and thereby "saves" him; this grace cannot be merited and is conditioned only by the free arbitrariness of the deity. Augustine's formula "give what you command and command what you wish" (da, quod iubes et iube quod vis) ("Confession", X, 31) provoked a protest from Pelagius, who countered it with the principle of free will. Although in reality Pelagianism could only appeal to the practice of monastic "asceticism", it restored certain features of the ancient. heroism (man is self-reliant. Effort ascends to the deity). Despite repeated condemnations of Pelagianism, the church. instances, the controversy did not stop even in the 5th-6th centuries. (Augustinism was defended by Prosper of Aquitaine, Fulgentius and Caesar from Arles, Pelagianism by Faust from Riez). The resolution of the council in Orange (529) confirmed the authority of Augustine, but could not achieve a real assimilation by the church of the idea of ​​​​P. religious experiences, vital for Augustine, loses all significance for a while: the religiosity of the early Middle Ages is exclusively ecclesiastical. It is characteristic that the Paulinist-Augustinian concept of grace in the 6th c. radically rethought: from a personal experience, it becomes the effect of the church. "sacraments". The Church sought to comprehend itself as an institution of the universe. "salvation", within the framework of which any believer through submission to her can earn an otherworldly reward; if, in the name of her claims, she encroached on the thesis, important for Christianity, about the eternity of the afterlife retribution (the doctrine of purgatory, the legends about the deliverance of souls from hell by the church), then in earthly life there was obviously no place left for the immutable P.. Vost. the church, over which the authority of Augustine did not weigh, was especially consistent: already John Chrysostom replaces the concept of "P." the concept of "foresight" (?????????) of God and thus nullifies the tendency of ethical. irrationalism. Behind him comes the greatest authority of Orthodox scholasticism, which also influenced the Middle Ages. West, - John of Damascus: "God foresees everything, but does not predetermine everything." The Orthodox Church restores, as a dogma, Origen's teaching about God's intention to save everyone (but without the logical conclusion that everyone will really be saved, as Origen taught). In the West, Gottschalk's attempt (c. 805 - c. 865) to update the doctrine of P. in the form of the doctrine of "double" P. (gemina praedestinatio - not only to salvation, but also to condemnation) is recognized as heretical. In the system of John Scotus Eriugena, the doctrine of "simple" P. (simplex praedestinatio - only to salvation) was substantiated by the denial (in the neoplatonic spirit) of the essential reality of evil; this solution to the problem led to pantheistic. optimism and was also unacceptable to the church. Mature scholasticism treats the problem of P. with great caution and without deep interest. Bonaventure prefers to formulate the "original love" (praedilectio) of God as the true cause of man's moral achievements. Thomas Aquinas also teaches about the love of God as the true source of moral goodness, while at the same time emphasizing the free cooperation of man. will from the deities. grace. Scholasticism avoids the problem of P. to condemnation. Relig. the individualism of the Reformation led to a rise. interest in the problem of predestination Luther revives the Paulinist-Augustinian style of religions. psychologism, evaluating the Catholic. the concept of "merit" as blasphemous huckstering and putting forward against it theories of unfree will and salvation by faith. Calvin goes even further, clearly expressing bourgeois. the content of the Reformation: he brings the doctrine of the "double" P. to the thesis, according to which Christ did not sacrifice himself for all people, but only for the elect. Engels pointed out the connection between Calvin's doctrine and the reality of the era of "primitive accumulation": "His doctrine of predestination was a religious expression of the fact that in the world of trade and competition, success or bankruptcy does not depend on the activity or skill of individuals, but on circumstances, on them not dependent" (Engels F., Marx K. and Engels F., Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 22, p. 308). Cruel disregard for the doomed, in contrast to tradition. pity for the penitent sinner, characterizes the displacement of the feud. patriarchy in relations between people dry bourgeois. efficiency. Calvin's doctrine was met with opposition from Gaullists. reformer J. Arminius (1560–1609), but was officially adopted at the synod in Dort 1618–19 and at the Westminster Assembly in 1643. Orthodoxy reacted to the Protestant doctrines of P., demonstrating at the Jerusalem Cathedral of 1672 fidelity to its old views on the will of God to save all ; The Orthodox Church holds these views to this day. Catholic the counter-reformation followed the line of repulsion from the Augustinian tradition (in the 17th century there was a case of the publication of Augustine's writings with cuts of passages about P.); the Jesuits were especially consistent in this, opposing extreme moral optimism to the severity of the Protestants. The Jesuit L. Molina (1535–1600) decided to completely replace P.'s idea with the doctrine of "conditional knowledge" of God (scientia condicionata) about the readiness of the righteous to freely cooperate with him; this knowledge gives the deity the opportunity to "in advance" reward the deserving. Thus, the concepts of merit and reward were universalized, which corresponded to the mechanical. the spirit of the counter-reformation. religiosity. Modern Catholic theologians (eg, R. Garrigou-Lagrange) defend free will and optimistic. understanding P.: many among them insist that a person can achieve salvation without being predestined to it. At the same time, within the framework of modern Neoscholasticism continues the controversy between the orthodox Thomistic and the Jesuit understanding of P. The attitude of liberal Protestantism of the late 19th - early. 20th century to the problem of P. was ambivalent: idealizing the Augustinian religion. psychologism, he was critical of the "narcotic" (A. Harnack's expression) elements of the latter, i.e. above all to the pessimistic. P.'s concept is more consistent in its restoration of the archaic. the severity of early Protestantism modern. "neo-orthodoxy" in its German-Swiss (K. Barth, E. Brunner, R. Bultmann) and Anglo-Saxon (R. Niebuhr) variants. Insisting on abs. irrationality and, moreover, the individual uniqueness of the "existential" relationship between God and man (according to K. Barth, "the relationship of this particular person to this particular god is for me both the theme of the Bible and the sum of philosophy"), "neo-orthodoxy" with logical. necessarily gravitates towards the Calvinist understanding of P. Being specific. religious product. worldview, the concept of "P." served in the history of philosophy logical. model for setting such important general philosophies. problems, such as the question of free will, the reconciliation of determinism and moral responsibility, and so on. Lit.: K. Marx and F. Engels on religion, M., 1955, p. 114–115; Friehoff S., Die Pr?destinationslehre bei Thomas von Aquino und Calvin, Freiburg (Schweiz), 1926; Garrigou-Lagrange, La pr?destination des saints et la gr?ce, P., 1936; Hygren G., Das Pr?destinationsproblem in der Theologie Augustins, G?tt., 1956; Rabeneck, J., Grundzäge der Prästinationslehre Molinas, "Scholastik", 1956, 31. Juli, S. 351–69. S. Averintsev. Moscow.

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