An object relationship is a relationship that connects a human need with an object that satisfies this need. When one speaks of an object, one primarily means the object of satisfaction. The main object relationship is formed in relation to the child and the mother. It is the mother who satisfies the needs of the child, which is of structural importance. In principle, everything in the object relation is oriented towards the satisfaction of a need.

From the point of view of M. Klein, object relations exist from the very beginning of a child's life. The first object relations of the infant are its relations with the mother's breast and mother. If this primary object is introjected and rooted in the infant with sufficient stability, then the foundation is laid for the satisfactory development of the child.

Based on clinical observations, M. Klein put forward a position according to which the first experiences of the child associated with the presence of the mother and breastfeeding contribute to the emergence of an object relationship to her. At the same time, she singled out the phenomenon of greed as fundamental. “Since,” M. Klein emphasized, “greed is an innate component of the first desires associated with the breast, it has an extremely important influence on the attitude towards the mother and on the general nature of object relations.”

There are cases when some babies suckle their mother's breasts with pleasure, but at the same time do not show signs of greed. There are other cases when some babies are distinguished by the so-called "lazy sucking", which subsequently develops into a calm and even sucking. In the light of these observations, M. Klein's thesis about greed as an innate component of first desires and an important component of object relations can be perceived as doubtful and not supported by real observations of infants.

However, she assumed that the calm approach to sucking that occurs in a number of infants or the problems with it that occur may be associated with persecution anxiety, when the mother's breast, under the influence of aggressive impulses directed at her, turns in the child's perception into a "vampire-like devouring object", as a result of which persecutory anxiety inhibits greed and guesswork occurs.

OBJECT RELATIONS

sanation desire to suck. By the way, the presence of anxiety can lead, in her opinion, not only to the problems described above, but also to an increase in the baby's greed.

Along with the manifestation of greed by the infant, M. Klein also considered the phenomenon of envy, which she perceived as an expression of the oral and anal-sadistic impulses of the child. Like greed, envy manifests itself in early childhood. It is aimed at mastering the object and has a primary destructive goal. Envy is experienced by the infant in relation to the breast of the mother, and then in relation to the mother in general.

How did M. Klein imagine the interaction of the child with the mother's breast immediately after his birth? Is this interaction hereditary or acquired in the first days of a child's life?

Psychoanalytic work led her to the conclusion that a newborn baby on an unconscious level feels the existence of an object that personifies the mother's breast. Unconscious knowledge about the breast and the child's experience of certain feelings in relation to it were considered by M. Klein as a phylogenetic hereditary factor. Another thing is that ontogenetic factors also play a role.

So, from the point of view of M. Klein, initially there is such an attitude when the oral-libidinal and oral-destructive impulses of the child are directed to the mother's breast. In the form of a mental representation, the mother's breast is perceived by the child as "good" if it satisfies him, or as "bad" when it serves as a source of his frustration. During the first months of a child's life, there is no clear distinction in his psyche between a "good" and a "bad" object, and the mother's breast in both qualities merges with her bodily presence. Ultimately, the first object relationship of the child is, as M. Klein emphasized, the relationship to the beloved and hated, satisfying and frustrating, "good" and "bad" breasts. A split of this kind results in a separation of love and hate.

On the one hand, due to the process of projection, when the child transfers his love impulses to the “good” or “bad” breast, these impulses are attributed to the mother. On the other hand, thanks to the process of introjection, when the mother's breast, as a partial object, is taken in by the child, as it were, the properties and qualities this object formed within his psyche. As a result of this, the child's conception of an external object and an object transferred to an internal plane turns out to be

phantasies distorted in his psyche, due to the projection of the infant's own impulses onto the object. "The "good" chest - external and internal - becomes the prototype of all useful and satisfying objects, while the "bad" chest becomes the prototype of all external and internal persecuting objects."

Speaking of ambivalent attitude of the child to the first object, M. Klein considered various aspects of such an attitude. In particular, she believed that the “bad” breast becomes hated for the child, endowed with the oral-destructive qualities of his own impulses that arise in states of frustration and hatred. Under the influence of destructive fantasies, the child may bite the mother's breast and devour it. At the same time, he may have such a feeling that the chest can affect him in a similar way. Corresponding destructive fantasies serve as a breeding ground for the emergence of various fears in the child, acting as external and internal persecutors.

So, the "bad" breast can act as a devouring child, just as he feels the urge to devour it, resulting in persecutory anxiety. Another thing is that in the early stages of a child's development anxiety of persecution is neutralized, as it were, by his attitude towards a "good" breast, and physical closeness to the mother during feeding strengthens his trust in good objects.

If a bad, frustrating object (mother’s breast) is perceived by the child as persecuting, then a “good” breast idealized by him and becomes such an object that gives him immediate, unlimited, and eternally lasting pleasure. The idealization of a “good” breast is facilitated by the force of fear of persecution, which causes the child to need protection from persecution by a bad object. This is how idea of ​​an idealized breast, as a means of protecting the child from anxiety.

M. Klein believed that in the study of early splitting processes, it is important to distinguish between good and idealized objects. Although the distinction between these objects is not clear, it can nevertheless be said that the idealized object is less integrated into the self than the good object. In general, the splitting takes place not so much between good and bad objects, but between idealized and very bad objects.

Thus, in the understanding of M. Klein, from the very beginning, object relations are formed in the interaction between projection and introjection, external and internal objects and situations. Within the framework of these relations, the destructive impulses of the child are directed towards

OBJECT RELATIONS

tiv object. At first they appear to him in fantasizing oral-sadistic attacks on the mother's breast. These attacks then transform into phantasies of attacks on the mother's body, whether it be the child's desire to deprive the mother's body of all its good content (oral-sadistic impulses) or the desire to penetrate inside to control it from within (anal-sadistic impulses).

According to M. Klein, a child can resort to hallucinatory satisfaction, when anxiety subsides, frustration is eliminated and there is a feeling of owning an ideal breast within oneself. In this case, a situation may arise in which hallucinatory satisfaction is accompanied by the separation of the persecuting breast from the idealized breast, and the experience of frustration from the experience of satisfaction. Such isolation was considered by M. Klein as connected with the process denial, the extreme forms of which are associated with the destruction of any frustrating objects, leading to a weakening of anxiety of persecution.

Denial concerns not only the very fact of the existence of a frustrating object, but also the situation of frustration as a whole. It also covers the unpleasant sensations resulting from frustration. Finally, denial extends to psychic reality as well. The denial of the latter is made possible by a strong sense of omnipotence, which is an important characteristic of the early psyche. In addition to idealization and denial, M. Klein also referred to the first methods of protecting a child from anxiety at an early stage of his development. splitting, omnipotence, control over external and internal objects. Although all these defenses hinder the process of integration, they are nonetheless extremely important for the integral development of the self, since each time they alleviate the anxiety of the child. The child's attitude to the parts of the mother's body, which is primarily focused on her breasts, is gradually replaced by an attitude towards her as a person.

In general, M. Klein considered object relations as being formed under the influence of libido and aggression, love and hate. These relationships are filled with both the anxiety of persecution and the newfound confidence in the omnipotence that arises from the idealization of the object. Finally, it was with the introjection of the child's integral objects that she correlated the fundamental changes in his object relations.

To this it should be added that M. Klein's ideas about object relations had a corresponding influence on the formation and development of the theory of object relations, which initially arose among British psychoanalysts, and later gained recognition from a number of other psychoanalysts, especially Latin American and some American ones.

PSYCHOANALYTICAL SCHOOL M. KLEIN

It is also important to note the circumstance that M. Klein's reflections on object relations were accompanied by polemics with those representatives of the theory of object relations who took steps to develop it. So, she considered it necessary to emphasize the fundamental, in her opinion, differences between her own views and the ideas of R. D. Fairbairn, expressed in his works “The Psychopathology of Psychoses and Neuroses Revised” (1941), “Intrapsychic Structure in Concepts of the Theory of Object Relations” (1944 ), "Object Relations and the Dynamic Structure of the Mind" (1946).

Agreeing with R.D. Fairbairn’s identification of the “schizoid position”, which is part of normal development and is the basis for the occurrence of schizoid and schizophrenic diseases, M. Klein at the same time noted that, in contrast to this analyst, who approached the study of the object from the point of view development of the Self, she focused on the modification of early anxieties. In addition, she did not share the opinion of R.D. Fairbairn, according to which the “bad” object is primarily internalized, but adhered to the views according to which the introjected “good” breast forms one of the important parts of the Self.

Although there were disagreements between representatives of classical psychoanalysis almost from the very beginning, which often led to the fact that the followers of Freud offered new (and I must say very productive) ideas and approaches, object relations theory became the first truly alternative school of psychoanalysis.

Its creator, Melanie Klein (née Reitses), was born in Vienna in 1882, studied art history at the University of Vienna and, due to her own psychological difficulties, was personally analyzed by such luminaries of psychoanalysis as Carl Abraham and Sandor Ferenczi. Interested in psychoanalytic teaching, Melanie Klein got acquainted with the work of Z. Freud in 1919 - "Beyond the pleasure principle", which largely predetermined the essence of her theory.

Melanie Klein devoted herself to the deep development of the problem of the early development of the child, about which classical psychoanalysis had done mostly only general conclusions before her. Thanks to the identification of psychological patterns that form in early childhood, M. Klein was able to approach the solution of problems that her predecessors considered insoluble, namely, the treatment of children and people with psychotic disorders.

Although Z. Freud himself conducted an analysis of the five-year-old boy Hans, as well as an analysis of his own daughter Anna (at that time, the ethical principles of modern psychoanalysis were not yet developed, which did not allow work with loved ones), it was still believed that children, like psychotic individuals are unable to develop transference, which is the main tool of psychoanalysis. It is also obvious that it is impossible to work with young children in the technique of free association, since their speech activity is not yet developed.

Watching young children, M. Klein suggested that with from birth, they perceive the world around them and themselves through fantasies, the form and content of which are determined by the peculiarities of children's perception. So, it is believed that children are not from birth capable of perceiving the objects around them and themselves as a whole; moreover, they are incapable of separating the inside from the outside. For example, a mother is perceived not as a single object, but as a set of "motherly objects" - a face, eyes, hands, breasts, etc. Moreover, each such partial object can be divided into "good" and "bad". If the object gives pleasure, then the baby perceives it as "good".

If the object becomes a source of displeasure, frustration, then for the baby it is “bad”, hostile, dangerous. For example, if a child is tormented by hunger, and his mother does not feed him, then he, not yet able to distinguish the external from the internal, perceives this situation in such a way that he is attacked by a “bad” breast. If the baby is fed in excess, then for him this is also a “bad”, aggressive, pursuing breast.

When an infant experiences interaction with a “good” object, he develops a sense of security, security, trust, openness to the world around him.

If the “bad” experience of the infant prevails over the “good”, then aggression intensifies in him, which, according to M. Klein, comes from an innate drive to death, which comes into conflict with the drive to self-preservation.

The infant experiences a constant fear of persecution, a sense of mortal danger, and reacts to "bad" objects pursuing their own aggression.

In his fantasy, the infant tries to keep the "good" and "bad" objects separate, otherwise the "bad" ones can spoil the "good" ones by mixing with them.

M. Klein herself called this first stage of a child’s development, which lasts the first 3-4 weeks from birth, a “schizoid-paranoid position”, emphasizing that this is not just a transient period of life, but a certain predisposition that becomes a personal quality of a person on all his life.

At the next position, which M. Klein called "depressive-manic", the child gradually begins to perceive his mother as an integral object, which no longer breaks up into "good" and "bad". Thus, if the child's previous experience was predominantly bad, and he tried to destroy the "bad" mother with his aggression, now it turns out that he simultaneously tried to destroy the nursing, caring "good" mother. Each time, following an outburst of aggression, the child has a fear that he could destroy his “good” mother too. He begins to feel guilt (depression) and tries to make amends for it, i.e. to do something that could restore the "destroyed" by him "good" mother.

Otherwise, the child can use the fantasy of his omnipotence, the ability to completely control, destroy and restore the object (mania). To the “good” aspects of the mother, her ability to give milk, love and care, the child may feel envy, devalue them. If the child experiences this stage of his development relatively calmly, then he develops the ability to experience reciprocity, gratitude, the ability to accept and provide assistance.

M. Klein also developed a new view on the formation of a child's super-ego, which takes place in different ways in boys and girls, since the boy in his attraction to his mother always competes with only his father, while the girl is forced to compete with her primary object of love - her mother - for your own new love- father. M. Klein also introduced a new concept into psychoanalytic use - a specific defense mechanism, which she called "projective identification", the essence of which is still being discussed, however, in general, it means a situation when a person attributes his "bad" qualities to another and himself for this he begins to treat him with hostility.

The technique of psychoanalytic work with children according to M. Klein is based on the interpretation of the game, which reflects the relationship of the child with objects that are significant to him. By speaking with the child about the plot of the game, the analyst streamlines the child's inclinations, makes them more manageable for the child, thereby reducing his anxiety and aggression.

Adult psychoanalysis according to M. Klein is distinguished by an active interpretation of the client's fantasies and drives, unfolding in the transference, as a rule, bypassing the interpretation of defense mechanisms.

German: Objektbeziehung. -French: relation d "objet. -English: object-relationship or object-relation. - Spanish: relaciön de objeto or objetal. - Italian: relazione oggetale. - Portuguese: relacäo de objeto or objetal.

In modern psychoanalysis, the relation of the subject to the world as a complex and integral result of a certain organization of the personality, as a result of a certain perception of objects, to some extent associated with fantasizing, and the chosen methods of protection.

One can speak of object relations in relation to this or that subject, to certain stages of development (for example, object relations of the oral type) or to psychopathological phenomena (for example, the object relation of the melancholic type).

The concept of "object relation" occasionally occurs in Freud (1), and therefore it cannot be assumed that Freud does not know it, but it can be said with certainty that it is not part of his conceptual apparatus.

In the 1930s, the role of the concept of object relation in psychoanalytic literature increased: today it serves as the basis of many theories. As D. Lagash repeatedly emphasized, this shift affects the entire history of ideas, and not only psychoanalysis: it is a matter of studying not the organism itself, but its interactions with the environment (2). M. Balint argued that between the totality of methods of psychoanalysis based on communication, on interpersonal relationships, and his theory, which still remains, according to Rickman, "the psychology of the individual organism", there is a gap. According to Balint, who already in 1935 demanded that more attention be paid to the formation of object relations, all the terms and concepts of psychoanalysis, with the exception of the concepts of object and object relation, refer to a separate isolated individual (3). In line with the same approach, R. Spitz noted that, with the exception of an excerpt from "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality" (Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, 1905), which discusses the relationship between mother and child, Freud always considers the libidinal object only from the point of view of the subject (loads, object selection, etc.) (4).

The growing role of the concept of "object relation" has led to significant changes in the field of psychoanalytic clinics, technology and genetics. Here we will not be able to sum up even a brief summary of the changes that have taken place. We confine ourselves to clarifying the meaning of the terms, as well as an attempt to determine, at least in general terms, how the modern use of the concept of "object relation" differs from its Freudian use.

I. The very expression "object relation" may confuse the reader who is not familiar with psychoanalytic texts. The word "object" here should be understood in a special way - as it is understood in psychoanalysis (cf. such expressions as "choosing an object", "love for an object"; however, as we will see below, the preposition "to", which separates the subject from object, does not apply here). The person to whom the drives are directed is considered here as an object, and there is nothing pejorative in this: this does not mean a denial of his subjective qualities.

"Relationship" here is understood rather as interdependence, that is, it is not only about how the subject builds his objects, but also about how these objects shape his activity. The concept of M. Klein and her supporters reinforce this idea: objects (projected, introjected) literally affect the subject as his pursuers, benefactors, etc. (see: "Good" object, "bad" object).

Speaking of "object relation" and not about the relation to the object, we are trying to emphasize this moment of interaction. Otherwise, it will turn out that the object or objects exist before the subject enters into a relationship with them, or that the subject exists before the objects begin to exist.

II. How does Freud's theory relate to the modern concept of object relations?

Analyzing the concept of attraction, Freud, as you know, singled out its individual moments - source, object and target, source- this is the area or organ in which sexual arousal occurs. At the same time, Freud emphasized the importance of the source of attraction, naming the various stages of libidinal evolution by the name prevailing in this moment development of the erogenous zone. As for goals and object, their distinction was preserved throughout Freud's work. So, in "Three Essays" he investigated deviations from the goal (for example, sadism) and deviations from the object (for example, homosexuality), and in "Instincts and the fate of instincts" (Triebe und Triebschicksale, 1915) he distinguished the transformation of instincts in connection with a change in purpose from the corresponding transformations due to the change of the object.

At the basis of this difference is the idea that the purpose of drives is determined by a certain type of partial drive and, ultimately, by its bodily source. For example, incorporation, absorption is a way of behavior due to oral desire, which can shift (from the mouth to other parts of the body), turn into its opposite (devour - be devoured), undergo sublimation, etc., however, its plasticity is not unlimited. As for the object, here Freud often emphasizes its contingency, and in two complementary senses:

a) in the first case, the object is only required to be a means of satisfying desire. In this sense, such objects are relatively interchangeable: for example, in the oral stage, the significance of any object is determined by whether it can be eaten;

b) in the second case, however, the history of the subject leads to such a strong individualization of the object that only one single object or its replacement, which has the qualities of the original, can bring satisfaction.

Thus, it becomes clear how Freud can simultaneously assert that the object is "the most changeable moment of attraction" (5a) and that "... to find the object, properly speaking, means: to find it anew" (6).

The distinctions between source, object, and end, which for Freud define the general framework of mental work, become more flexible when it comes to the life of drives.

When we say that at a certain stage the general relation of a person to objects is due to the peculiarities of the functioning of some organ of the body (for example, the mouth), which means that this relation (absorption) becomes the prototype of all other types of activity of the subject - bodily or otherwise, which from now on may take on an oral meaning. There are also various relations between the object and the goal. Changes in the goal of drives are due to dialectics in which the object plays an important role; especially in sadomasochism and voyeurism-exhibitionism: "... the turning of the subject into itself [object change] and the change of attitude from active to passive [change of purpose] are combined or merged" (5b). Sublimation* is another example of this correlation between object and goal.

Finally, Freud was able to connect character types with types of relation to the object (7) and show in his clinical works how the same problematic can be revealed externally. various types activities of the same individual.

III. And now let us ask ourselves: what new do the post-Freudian conceptions of the object relation provide? It is not easy to answer this question, since these concepts are very different and it would be a stretch to generalize them. We confine ourselves here to the following remarks on this subject.

1) Although the concept of an object relation is used today, it would seem, independently of the Freudian theory of drives, it still implies some internal changes in this theory itself.

The source of attraction - if we understand it as an organic substratum - clearly recedes into the background; on the contrary, its significance as a prototype, already recognized by Freud, is strengthened. Consequently, sexual satisfaction in a certain erogenous zone ceases to be a goal: this very concept is destroyed by the concept of relationship. For example, in the "oral object relation" the main interest is in the various vicissitudes of absorption, as well as in the ways and means by which it acquires a special meaning and becomes the main stimulus for fantasizing among all other possible relations of the subject to the world. As for the object, many modern analysts do not recognize either its diversity in connection with the desired satisfaction, or its uniqueness in connection with its inclusion in the individual history of the subject: they rather tend to construct concepts typical an object for each kind of relationship (cf. oral, anal, and other objects).

2) The search for the typical does not end there. In fact, in the object relation of this type, not only the life of drives is represented, but also the corresponding defense mechanisms, the degree of development I, its structure, etc., since all this also characterizes the given object relation (a). Thus, the concept of an object relation is both something embracing (“holistic”) and something typical in the evolution of personality.

Incidentally, the term "stage" is now increasingly being replaced by the concept of an object relation. Such a shift indicates that in any subject various types of object relations are combined or alternate. On the contrary, to talk about the coexistence of different stages it would be illogical.

3) Since the concept of an object relation, by definition, singles out those relations from which the subject's life is intertwined, there is a danger of seeing the essential only in the actual relations of the subject with his environment. The psychoanalyst is obliged to abandon this false interpretation: after all, he must study the object relation primarily at the level of fantasies, although, of course, fantasies can change our perception of reality and actions directed towards it.

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All topics in this section:

Psychic apparatus
German: psychischer or seelischer Apparat. - French: appareil psychique. - English: psychic or mental apparatus. - Spanish: apparato psiquico. - Italian: apparato psichico or mentale. - Portuguese: appar&ec

attraction
German: Trieb. - French: pulsion. -English: msünkt or drive. - Spanish: instinto. - Italian: istinto or pulsione. - Portuguese: impulso or pulsào. dynamic process in which

crowding out
German: Verdrangung. - French: refoulement. -English: repression. 6n. - Italian: rimozione. - Portuguese: recalque or recalcamento. Spanish: repression. A) In the narrow sense of the word - action, cf.

A wish
German: Wunsch (sometimes Begierde or Lust). - French: desir. - English: wish. - Spanish: deseo. - Italian: desiderio. - Portuguese: desejo. In Freudian dynamics - one of the poles of the protective

Intellectualization
German: Intellektualisierung. - French: intellectualisation. - English: intellectualization. - Spanish: intellectualisacion. - Italian: intellettualizzazione. - Portuguese: intelectuali-zaçào.

Interiorization
German: Verinnerlichung. - French: interiorisation. -English: internalization. - Spanish: interiorisacion. - Italian: interiorizzazione. - Portuguese: interiorizaçâo. A) Ter

introjection
German: Introjektion. - French: mtrojection. -English: introjecuon. - Spanish: introy-ección. - Italian: introezione. - Portuguese: intrqjeçào. The process identified during the ps

mental conflict
German: psychischer Konflikt. - French: conflict psychique. -English: psychical conflict. - Spanish: conflicto psiquico. - Italian: conflitto psichico. - Portuguese: confleto psiquico. Psychoanalytic

Metapsychology
German: Metapsychology. -French: metapsychologie. -English: metapsychology. - Spanish: metapsicologia. - Italian: metapsicologia. - Portuguese: metapsicologia. The term used by Freud

Protection Mechanisms
German: Abwehimechanismen. - French: mechanismes de defense. -English: mechanisms of defense. - Spanish: mecanismes de defensa. - Italian: meccanismi di difesa. - Portuguese: mecanismos de defesa.

narcissism
German: Narzismus. - French: narcissisme. - English: narcissism. - Spanish: narcisis-mo. - Italian: narcisismo. - Portuguese: narcisismo. According to the myth of Narcissus, love for one's own image.

mental processing
German: psychische Verarbeitung (or Bearbeitung, or Ausarbeitung, or Aufarbeitung). - French: élaboration psychique. - English: psychical working over or out. - Spanish: elaboracion psiqu

condemnation
German: Verurteilung or Urteilsverwerrung. - French: jugement de condamnation. - English: judgment of condemnation. - Spanish: juicio de condenacion. - Italian: rifuto da parte del giudizio; condam

Subconscious, subconscious
German: Unterbewusste, Unterbewußtsein. - French: subconscient or subconscience. - English: subconscious, subconsciousness. - Spanish: subconsciente, subconsciencia. - Italian: subconscio. - Portugal.

Performance
German: Vorstellung. -French: representation. -English: idea or presentation. -Spanish: representacion. - Italian: rappresentazione. - Portuguese: representaçao. Classic ter

The principle of nirvana
German: Nirwaiuiprinzip. - French: principe de nirvana. - English. Nirvana principle. - Yen.: principio de pil-ana. - Italian: principio del Nirvana. - Portuguese: principio de nirvana. Term B

The principle of constancy
German: Konstanzprinzip. - French: principe de constance. - English: principle constance. - Spanish: principio de constancia. - Italian: principio di costanza. - Port) principio de constencia.

reality principle
One of the two principles that govern, according to Freud, the functioning of the psyche. It pairs with the pleasure principle and modifies its action: as soon as the reality principle asserts its master

Pleasure principle
German: Lustprinzip. - French: principe de plaisir. - English: pleasure principle. - Spanish: principio de placer. - Italian: principle di piacere. - Portuguese: principle de prazer. One of two

Projection
German: Projection. - French: projection. - English: projection. - Spanish: proyecci-6n. - Italian: proiezione. - Portuguese: projeçao. A) In the broad sense of the word - a mixture of neurological

The economic process in which Freud sees the support for the diverse defensive actions of the ego. This process presupposes the loading of representations, systems of representations, carried out by the ego.

Primary process Secondary process
German: Primärvovgang, Sekundärvorgang. - French: processus primaire, processus secondaire. - English: primary process, secondary process. - Hen.: proceso primario. processo secondario. - Ital

Work of sorrow
German: Traueraibeit. - French: travail du deuil. -English: work of mourning. - Spanish: trabajo del duelo. - Italian: lavoro del4utto (or del cordoglio). - Portuguese: trabalho or labor do luto.

splitting i
German: Ichspaltung. - French: clivage du moi. -English: Splitting of the ego. - Use. escision del yo. - Italian: scissione dell "io. - Portuguese: clivagem do ego. - Italian: scissione dell" io.

Rationalization
German: Rationalisierung. -French: rationalisation. - English: rationalization. - Spanish: rationalization. - Italian: razionalizzazione. - Portuguese: racionalisaçâo. procedure, p

Reality is psychic
German: psychische Realitat. - French: realité psychique. - English: psychical reality. - Spanish: realidad psiquica. - Italian: realta psychica. - Portuguese: realidade psiquica.

Regression
German: Regression. -French: regression. -English: regression. -Spanish: regresion. - Italian: regression. - Portuguese: tegressâo. If we imagine the mental process as a movement

Self-identification
German: Identifizierung. - French: identification. - English: identification, - Spanish: identificaciôn. - Italian: identilicazione. - Portuguese: identfficaçào. Psychological

Super-I
German: Ober-Ich, -t- French: surmoi (or sur-moi). - English: super-ego - Spanish: supereryô. - Italian: super-io. - Portuguese: superego. One of the instances of personality in the second Freudian theory

bonding, bonding
German: Bindung. - French: liaison. - English: binding. - Spanish: ligazön - Italian: legame. - Portuguese: ligaçào. The term by which Freud generically denotes (in various fields

Mirror Stage
German: Spiegelstufe. - French: stade de miroir. -English: mirror stage. - Spanish: phase del espejo. - Italian: stadio dello specchio. - Portuguese: phase do espelho. According to Lacan, the stage of human development

Sublimation
German: Sublimierung. - French: sublimation. -English: sublimation. - Spanish: subli-macion. - Italian: sublimazione. - Portuguese: sublimaçao. The process by which Freud explains the forms of che

Amount of excitation
German: Erregungs summe. - French: somme d "excitation. - English: sum of excitation. - Spanish: suma de excitaciôn. - Italian: somma di eccitazione. - Portuguese: soma de excitaçâo.

The identity of perception is the identity of thought
German: Wahrnehmungsidentität - Denkidentität. - French: identité de perception - identité de pensee. - English: perceptual identity - thought identity. - Spanish: identidad

Fantasy, fantasy
German: Phantasie. - French: fantasie. - English: fantasy or phantasy. - Spanish: fantasia. - Italian: fantasia or fantasma. - Portuguese: fantasia. An imaginary scenario in which it executes -

Goal presentation
German: Ziel Vorstellung. - French: representation-but. - English: purposive idea. - Spanish: representacion-meta. - Italian: rappresentazione finalizzata. - Portuguese: repre-sentaçao-meta.

Economic (adj.), Economics
German: okonomisch. - French: economique. -English: economic. - Spanish: econo-mico. - Italian: economico. - Portuguese: economico. Everything related to the hypothesis, according to

Free energy - bound energy
German: freie Energie - gebundene Energie. - French: énergie libre - énergie liee. - English: free energy - bound energy. - Spanish: energia libre - energia ligada. - Italian: :energia

I am pleasure - I am reality
German: Lust-Ich - Real-Ich. - French: moi-plaisir - moi-realite. -English: pleasure-ego - reality-ego. - Spanish: yo placer - yo realidad. - Italian: io-piacere - io realta. - Portugal.

Psychoanalysis [Introduction to the Psychology of Unconscious Processes] Peter Kutter

10. Modern theories of object relations

There are currently three different theories in psychoanalysis and their corresponding three concepts of object relations (Kernberg, 2001). In general, all theories of object relations are concerned (when viewed from the point of view of developmental psychology and psychogenetic aspects) with the question of the influence of internal and external representatives of objects on the mental development of the self. Thus, for example, Freud distinguishes, albeit in an implicit form, the oral, anal and oedipal object and the unconscious conflicts and fantasies associated with them, leading to the structuring of the mental apparatus. Following this logic, object relations theory studies the internalization of the experience of relations during the period of mental development of a young child, the structure-forming influence of this experience, conflicts in relations typical for a certain stage, as well as the re-actualization of internalized object relations in the processes of transference/countertransference.

The second, more specific meaning of the concept of object relations (Kleinians, self-psychologists, modern structural theorists, developmental psychologists, members of the group of independent psychoanalysts) emphasizes the structuring effect of internalized object relations and the importance of unconscious fantasies. Within this model (of the second, more specific meaning just mentioned), the Kleinian position stands out in particular. It is more focused on the development and structure of internal objects, while the psychology of the ego traditionally pays more attention to the study of any drives (oral, anal, phallic-narcissistic, etc.).

A third approach attempts to integrate Kleinian and self-psychological positions with the tenets of object relations theory. Kernberg, continuing in the tradition of Jacobson (Jacobson, 1964, 1971) and Mahler (Mahler et al., 1975), as well as Klein (Klein, 1962), attempts to integrate drive and representative theory (from ego psychology) with Kleinian theory. According to Kernberg, all libidinal and aggressive stages of development depend on the fate of internalized object relations. Only early neutralization (desexualization, deaggression) of impulse impulses is able to ensure the integration of representatives of the self and objects. Basically, Kernberg follows in line with Freud's dual drive theory, considering drives as motivational systems more high level, and affects as organizing components. According to Kernberg, unlike Freud, not drives, but affects are the main mental elements. They are also the structural components that then organize complex drives and thus form more highly organized motivational systems. According to Kernberg, intrapsychic conflict does not simply consist of instinctual defense components—I versus Id or I versus Superego, etc.—but exists between different representatives of the self and the object. In this case, one unit, consisting of representatives of the self and the object, represents the side of desires or drives, and the other - the protective side. Thus, from the position of the theory of object relations, intrapsychic conflict is not a conflict according to the impulse-defense scheme; it is always the manifestation of an internalized object relationship that is driven by drives and is in conflict with another unit of defensive self-representatives and objects. The formation of the mental sphere is understood as the development of intrapsychic ideas about the representatives of the self and objects, arising from the initial dyadic relations of mother and child and revealed through other, more differentiated dyadic, then triadic, and also triangular structures.

Significant differences between the main currents that exist within the theory of object relations are associated with approaches to solving questions about the primary motivating forces in a person’s mental life (drives and affects against object relations), about the existence of primary or, conversely, secondary aggression (aggression that causes frustration ), about the significance of external reality for the formation of mental structures (unconscious fantasies and internal objects versus real relationships with the external world), with an understanding of transference and countertransference, as well as using developmental psychology concepts such as internalization, oedipal structure, and, finally, with concepts of conflict and psychopathology.

Kleinian object relations theory emphasizes unconscious fantasy and internal objects (Hinshelwood, 1989; Bott Spillius, 2002), and this distinguishes it from other varieties of object relations theory. Certain differences already exist in the views of Freud and Klein on unconscious fantasy. In Freud, unconscious fantasy means something like unconscious desire or preconscious daydreams. Freud believed that fantasies originate from conscious or preconscious daydreams, which are then repressed due to their conflicting nature. Thus, Freud links the concept of fantasy with the model of neurotic conflict. Fantasies in this sense often turn out to be compromise formations, in the emergence of which various instances and systems participate. But, according to Freud, fantasies are already contained in the unconscious; existing as representations, they are here the psychic representatives of the drive. Thus, Freud, more than Klein, sees the roots of unconscious fantasy in unconscious desires, in primary motivating forces, in psychic representatives of drives. However, in his concept of primary fantasies, Freud took a slightly different point of view. He believed that there are certain phylogenetically inherited primary fantasies (fantasies about the primary scene, castration and sexual seduction) that have a structuring effect on the mental apparatus.

Klein, on the contrary, sees in the unconscious fantasy the primary motive forces for all mental actions. Klein believes that certain rudimentary forms of unconscious fantasies are innate and structure inner experiences and interpersonal relationships from the very beginning of life. According to Klein, these unconscious innate fantasies have a much stronger influence on the mental development of the infant than external, real influences from objects. External objects are needed to soften or correct the archaic power and concreteness of innate unconscious fantasies. In the work of Isaacs (1952), the Kleinian understanding of unconscious fantasy was defined, its numerous connections were established, as well as fundamental differences with the Freudian understanding of fantasy. In this work, fantasy is defined as the primary content of unconscious mental processes and as a psychic correspondence and representative of drive. In this definition, fantasies are equivalent to the drive representatives, representations, and affects in the Freudian sense. This definition of the concept of fantasy made it possible for Klein to enter the theory of unconscious internal objects:

“Unconscious fantasy is a confirmation of the activity of specifically felt “internal” objects ... A bodily sensation entails a mental experience, which is interpreted as a relationship with an object, with the object that causes this sensation; who loves or hates, depending on whether he has good or evil intentions ... Thus, an unpleasant sensation is psychically represented by relations with some “evil object”, which seeks to offend the subject or harm him ... Conversely, an infant, when he is breastfed, feels some object that we can identify as mother or milk; but the infant identifies it as some object in his tummy that has good intentions and wants to give him (the infant) a pleasant experience” (Hinshelwood, 1989, S. 42).

Such unconscious fantasies are characterized by omnipotence: to wish means to realize immediately, to think means to do, and all this happens simultaneously. This theory of unconscious phantasy was developed considerably in Bion's theory of thought (see chapter II.5). Through the mechanisms of introjection and projection, actions in which both unconscious fantasies and object relations are manifested, a complex world of fantasies and relations between internal objects and the self is gradually formed. Such an inner world corresponds to the Freudian concept of "mental reality" and structures experiences and behavior much stronger and longer than real external influences. The world of internal objects is an extension of Freud's unconscious psychic reality with the application of the provisions of the theory of object relations. Then, during further development Kleinian theory of object relations, an attempt was made to formulate all the impulsive (instinctive) desires described by Freud, as well as defense mechanisms In terms of unconscious fantasies and internal object relations, in individual defense mechanisms, I can find the whole gamut of complex unconscious object relations and unconscious fantasies about them. According to this theory, internal objects are “predetermined by the fates of unconscious (drive-driven) fantasies, internal experiences of external objects” (Bacal & Newman, 1990, S. 81). As well as representatives of the self and objects (Sandler's theory of representatives), they have the quality of a mental representative, while, however, they are more concrete than the internal pictures of representations. From this definition of unconscious phantasy, Kleinian object relations theory concludes that "all psychic activity<…>is based on fantasy relationships with objects, including images of perception, which in fantasy are presented as a concrete preliminary form of mental imprint felt by the body, and thoughts that are experienced as objects ”(Hinshelwood, 1989, S. 41).

In its approach to stages of mental development, narcissism, and the oedipal position, Kleinian object relations theory also differs significantly from other object relations theories (Roskamp & Wilde, 1999). Klein's theory of developmental positions, which, in contrast to Freud's concept of stages of development, are never completely overcome and completed, but dynamically manifest themselves throughout life, denotes cognitive-affective, mental states of the Self (fears, protection, internalized object relations ). The paranoid-schizoid position is characterized by narcissistically structured object relations. Unlike Freud, Klein suggested that there is no primary narcissistic stage that is pre-objective, conflict-free, and fear-free. In the paranoid-schizoid position, the fear of the destruction of the self by "evil" objects and aspects of the self comes to the fore. Gradually, the idealization of a good self and good objects turns into a realistic perception, allowing the emergence of a good internal object so important for development. At this stage of development, relations are formed with the so-called partial objects, with concretely felt internal objects, which are most often compared with parts of the body or internal organs. And in the depressive position, the experience of ambivalence, the integration of aspects of the self and objects that are perceived as good or evil, comes to the fore. Here the fear is associated with the preservation of the object, with its loss or guilt due to the possible harm to it, as well as with subsequent attempts to correct the situation. Narcissistically structured relationships based on projections of parts of the self and introjections of parts of objects (and therefore narcissistic in nature, see Freud's work on Leonardo-Freud, 1910c) undergo modification and give way to object relations characterized by concern for the object and the self.

The conceptualization of the oedipal stage and oedipal position also departs from the Freudian view and other object relations theories. Britton (1992) builds a model that relates to each other the dynamics, structure, and quality of object relations characteristic of the depressive position and the oedipal situation. All three positions (paranoid-schizoid, depressive, oedipal), according to the Kleinians, are never completely overcome, but are in dynamic interaction. The common structural moments of the depressive position and the oedipal situation are found in the transition from relations with partial objects to relations with integral objects, in the identification of ambivalence and integration of the self. Ideas about the self and objects, completely split in the paranoid-schizoid position into ideal, only good, and persecuting, evil, in a depressive and oedipal situation give way to their integration: “In a depressive position, one has to give up not only the possession of an object, but also a dream about the complete possession of a passionately desired parent” (Roskamp & Wilde, 1999, p. 179). In the depressive and oedipal situation, it will be necessary to recognize one's separation from the object and its otherness, and the fact that the object maintains various relations with other objects from which the self is excluded. This underlying structure of recognition of disunity and otherness forms a common building block for the depressive and oedipal situation and leads to the recognition of three basic “facts of life” (Roger Money-Kyrle): the breast as a potentially good object; the creative nature of the relationship of parents who are able to conceive a child and give him life; of death. The triangular structure of object relations is also common element oedipal and depressive positions.